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Prominent commentators recently have proposed that the government allocate sig-
nificant portions of the radio spectrum for use as a wireless commons.  The
problem for commons proposals is that truly open access leads to interference,
which renders a commons unattractive.  Those advocating a commons assert, how-
ever, that a network comprising devices that operate at low power and repeat each
other’s messages can eliminate the interference problem.  They contend that this
possibility renders a spectrum commons more efficient than privately owned spec-
trum, and in fact that private owners would not create these “abundant networks”
in the first place.  In this Article, Professor Benjamin argues that these assertions
are not well founded, and that efficiency considerations favor private ownership of
spectrum.
Those advocating a commons do not propose a network in which anyone can
transmit as she pleases.  The abundant networks they envision involve significant
control over the devices that will be allowed to transmit.  On the question whether
private entities will create these abundant networks, commons advocates emphasize
the transaction costs of aggregating spectrum, but those costs can be avoided via
allotment of spectrum in large swaths.  The comparative question of the efficiency
of private versus public control, meanwhile, entails an evaluation of the implica-
tions of the profit motive (enhanced ability and desire to devise the best networks,
but also the desire to attain monopoly power) versus properties of government
action (the avoidance of private monopoly, but also a cumbersome process that can
be subject to rent-seeking).  Professor Benjamin contends that, on balance, these
considerations favor private control.  An additional factor makes the decision
clearer:  Abundant networks might not develop as planned, and so the flexibility
entailed by private ownership—as well as the shifting of the risk of failure from
taxpayers to shareholders—makes private ownership the better option.
The unattractiveness of a commons for abundant networks casts serious doubt on
the desirability of spectrum commons more generally.  If private ownership is a
more efficient means of creating abundant networks, then the same is almost cer-
tainly true for networks that run the risk of interference.  Most uses of spectrum are
subject to interference, so the failure of the commons advocates’ arguments under-
mines the appeal of a commons for most potential uses of spectrum.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been much ferment recently in the world of wireless
communications.  Technologists and legal scholars have argued that
new wireless networks can be developed that would allow for a wire-
less “commons” in which people could transmit freely on open radio
spectrum.1  One major concern about these proposals is that wide-
spread use of such a commons may result in more traffic than the
1 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia:  Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 287, 325-26 (1998); George
Gilder, Auctioning the Airwaves, Forbes ASAP, Apr. 11, 1994, at 98, 111-12; Eli M. Noam,
Taking the Next Step Beyond Spectrum Auctions:  Open Spectrum Access, IEEE Comm.
Mag., Dec. 1995, at 66, 69-70.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 3  3-DEC-03 16:30
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network can handle—so many messages being sent that they interfere
with one another.2  Several leading commentators, though, argue that
technology has solved the interference problem.  They contend that
we can now have wireless networks in which each new device also
creates new capacity, such that a wireless network can add users
without creating interference.  They also take a further step:  They
assert that such networks will not be created if spectrum is privately
owned, and that a commons—in which no one owned spectrum
rights—would be a more efficient system for managing the spectrum
than would a property rights regime.3  In this Article, I critically assess
the argument that a government-created commons is a more efficient
means of spectrum allocation than is private property, and in partic-
ular that it is a more efficient means of producing these new networks.
I conclude that private owners will create these capacious networks if
such networks are as promising as their advocates suggest, and that—
in light of the tradeoffs involved in the choice between public and
private control—private control is preferable to public control.
This debate marks a new stage in spectrum policy.  For most of
the twentieth century, the model of spectrum regulation was straight-
forward:  With respect to any given set of available frequencies, the
federal government chose what service (usually only one service, such
as broadcast television or FM radio) it would authorize.  Then the
The radio spectrum is the range of frequencies suitable for the propagation of radio
waves.  See Harry Newton, Newton’s Telecom Dictionary 657, 744 (19th ed. 2003).  It
would be a bit ungainly to refer constantly to “the range of frequencies suitable for wire-
less transmissions” or “the available range of radio frequencies,” so in most places I simply
refer to “the spectrum.”  This shorthand should not obscure the fact, however, that spec-
trum has no independent existence, but instead is just the available range of frequencies.
2 See infra notes 28, 42-47 and accompanying text.  Interference occurs when “the R
electromagnetic field of one device disrupts, impedes or degrades the electromagnetic field
of another device by coming into proximity with it.”  Webopedia, Definition of EMI, at
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/E/EMI.html (last modified July 24, 2003).  Interference
is not a pure function of waves intersecting.  In some situations, a crude receiver is not able
to find the intended signal (and thus suffers from interference), but a more sophisticated
receiver is able to find the intended signal (and thus avoids interference).  See infra notes
60-67 and accompanying text (discussing ways of avoiding interference via more sophisti- R
cated receivers); see also Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications,
16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 25, 39 (2002) (“‘Interference’ describes the condition of a stupid lone
receiver faced with multiple sources of radiation that it is trying to decode but, in its sim-
plicity, cannot.”).  But the greater the degree to which signals overlap with each other, the
more sophistication is required of receivers (which may make them prohibitively expen-
sive), and at some point even the best receivers cannot find the desired signal.  That is why,
even in new networks, interference is such a major concern.  See infra notes 45-53 and R
accompanying text.
3 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 48; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas:  The R
Fate of the Commons in a Connected World 222, 226, 230, 241-43 (2001) [hereinafter
Lessig, The Future of Ideas]; Lawrence Lessig, Commons and Code, 9 Fordham Intell.
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 405, 415 (1999).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 4  3-DEC-03 16:30
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government decided how those frequencies would be divided for
licensing purposes—e.g., how big a range of frequencies each license
would be allotted, how much of the United States each license would
cover, and how much power each licensee could use.  Finally, it
selected the particular licensees by holding comparative hearings.4
The FCC decided, for example, which frequencies to allocate for tele-
vision broadcasting, determined which sets of frequencies it would
allot for any given city, and then parceled out licenses to the broad-
casters in each city that it deemed most worthy.5  If a potential new
entrant, or an existing licensee, wanted to provide another service
(either in addition to or instead of broadcasting), it was out of luck.
This level of government control was striking in comparison to the
relatively light regulation of other goods and services (like land and
printing presses), but the government justified its heavy hand in this
area by arguing that spectrum was uniquely scarce and thus had to be
controlled by a central governing authority.6
Ronald Coase challenged the validity of the scarcity rationale,
and the government control of the spectrum that was understood to
rely on it.7  In a 1959 article, he argued that there was nothing special
4 See Stuart Minor Benjamin et al., Telecommunications Law and Policy 62-64 (2001).
5 The government (through the FCC) determined worthiness via comparative hear-
ings, at which each applicant could present evidence about itself and its programming.  See
id. at 81-90.
6 See Second Annual Report of the Federal Radio Commission to the Congress of the
United States 166, 168, 170 (1928) (statement by Commission Relative to Public Interest,
Convenience or Necessity) (emphasizing “paucity of channels,” “the limited facilities for
broadcasting,” and fact that “the number of persons desiring to broadcast is far greater
than can be accommodated”); KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670,
672 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (stating that “because the number of available broadcasting frequen-
cies is limited, the commission is necessarily called upon to consider the character and
quality of the service to be rendered”); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213
(1943) (asserting “certain basic facts about radio as a means of communication—its facili-
ties are limited; they are not available to all who may wish to use them; the radio spectrum
simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody.  There is a fixed natural limitation
upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering with one another.  Regu-
lation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as traffic control was to the devel-
opment of the automobile.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)
(declaring that “only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope to
communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible communication is to be had, even if
the entire radio spectrum is utilized in the present state of commercially acceptable tech-
nology. . . . Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”);
Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity:  Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Viola-
tion, 52 Duke L.J. 1, 38-45 (2002) (discussing scarcity rationale); Laurence H. Winer, The
Signal Cable Sends—Part I:  Why Can’t Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 Md. L.
Rev. 212, 218-27 (1987) (same).
7 R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1959).  As
many commentators have noted, the mere fact of scarcity does not necessarily justify gov-\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 5  3-DEC-03 16:30
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about spectrum, and that it could and should be sold like any other
form of property.8  The initial response to Coase’s article was not
encouraging:  When he made these arguments in testimony to the
FCC, the first question a Commissioner asked him was, “[I]s this all a
big joke?”9  Many economists came to advocate auctions of spectrum
licenses as property, but policymakers were slow to respond.10  Mean-
while, other commentators advocated that users be allowed to offer
whatever services they deemed appropriate, rather than the one (or
sometimes two) that the FCC authorized.11  These arguments were
consonant with Coase’s:  One ordinary element of property rights is
the owner’s ability to use that property as she sees fit, as long as her
use does not interfere with her neighbors.  The spectrum theorists
were proposing just such a rule for spectrum.
More than thirty years after Coase argued in favor of auctioning
spectrum rights, his position started to gain political traction.  In 1993,
Congress authorized auctions of some spectrum licenses.12  In 1997,
ernment control.  See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 6, at 41-43; Thomas W. Hazlett, The R
Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & Econ. 133, 138 n.15
(1990); Winer, supra note 6, at 221-22. R
8 Coase, supra note 7, at 20-21. R
9 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”:  An Essay
on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 335, 343 (2001) (quoting Commis-
sioner Philip S. Cross) (alteration in original).
10 See, e.g., Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the
Electromagnetic Spectrum:  A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1499,
1557-59 (1969) (advocating auctioning of TV, voice, and FM frequencies); Jora R.
Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation:  An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency
Allocation, 18 J.L. & Econ. 221, 263 (1975) (discussing possibility of spectrum auctions);
Douglas W. Webbink, Radio Licenses and Frequency Spectrum Use Property Rights,
Comm. & L., June 1987, at 3, 20-22 (describing FCC’s use of lotteries and auctions to
assign spectrum licenses).
In 1977, two FCC Commissioners suggested that the odds of the government con-
signing the comparative hearings process “to the scrapheap” in favor of licensing by lottery
“are about the same as those on the Easter Bunny in the Preakness.”  Formulation of
Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative
Hearing Process, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 434 n.2 (1977) (Separate Statement of Commissioners
Benjamin L. Hooks and Joseph R. Fogarty).  Nonetheless, by 1985, FCC Chairman Fowler
had requested limited authority from Congress to hold auctions.  Webbink, supra, at 22.
11 See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to
Communications Spectrum, 16 Yale J. on Reg. 53, 69 (1999) (arguing for “granting the
licensee the ultimate choice of application of the spectrum”); Howard A. Shelanski, The
Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage,” 97 Colum. L.
Rev. 1048, 1079 (1997) (suggesting that “the fundamental rule should be to de-zone spec-
trum usage where possible”); see also Arthur De Vany, Implementing a Market-Based
Spectrum Policy, 41 J.L. & Econ. 627, 628, 630-32 (1998) (advocating unbundling of broad-
cast product and spectrum band).
12 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6001, 107 Stat.
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Congress mandated (rather than merely authorized) auctions, and it
made that mandate applicable to most spectrum bands.13
At the same time, government control over permissible uses fell
out of political favor.  The FCC has moved toward giving licensees
greater flexibility in the services they can offer.  In many frequency
bands the FCC authorizes one or more additional services, and
recently the government promulgated rules allowing licensees in a few
bands to choose from a wide range of possible services.14  Moreover,
in 2000, the FCC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and an
accompanying policy statement that proposed replacing government
control over spectrum uses with broad spectrum rights.15  Similarly, a
2002 FCC report on spectrum policy advocated curtailing FCC control
over licenses and instead implementing broad, exclusive, and transfer-
able spectrum rights, in which licensees choose what services to pro-
vide on their spectrum.16  Meanwhile, a report by the FCC’s Office of
Plans and Policy argued in favor of an auction in which broad prop-
erty rights for hundreds of megahertz (MHz) are sold in one pro-
13 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)-(j) (2000); see Benjamin et al., supra note 4, at 144-46 (discussing R
move from hearings to lotteries to auctions).  It bears noting that FCC licenses had long
been auctioned in the secondary market.  The government gave out licenses free of mone-
tary charge, but the licensees were not so insulated from considerations of profit as to give
those licenses to third parties gratis.  Licenses often changed hands, almost always as a
result of market transactions in which the buyer paid handsomely for the license.  Indeed,
more than half of all broadcast licenses have been sold at least once, and many have
changed hands multiple times.  See Evan Kwerel & Alex D. Felker, Using Auctions to
Select FCC Licensees 9 n.12 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 16, 1985)
(noting that majority of spectrum licenses had been sold at least once).
14 See Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands, 15 F.C.C.R. 476, ¶ 2
(2000); see also Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the
Development of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, ¶ 20 (2000) (“Licenses and spec-
trum usage rights should be easily transferable for lease or sale, divisible, or aggregatable.
Licensees/users should have flexibility in determining the services to be provided and the
technology used for operation consistent with the other policies and rules governing the
service.”).
15 See Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the
Development of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, ¶ 1 (2000); Promoting Efficient
Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Mar-
kets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,203, ¶ 2 (2000).
16 Report of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force 35-45 (2002), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf; see also Promoting Effi-
cient Use of the Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secon-
dary Markets, FCC 03-113 ¶ 7 (2003) (report and order) (permitting wireless radio licenses
to lease spectrum rights, as part of a plan “to ensure that spectrum is put to its highest
valued use, which generally can be most efficiently determined by operation of mar-
ket forces”), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
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ceeding;17 and several papers—including one by the recently departed
Chief Technologist and Chief Economist of the FCC and another by a
different former Chief Economist—went further, advocating the
privatization of almost all spectrum rights, via a massive “big bang”
auction or other mechanism.18
Flexibility has not been limited to licensed (and auctioned) por-
tions of the spectrum.  The FCC has also created a few unlicensed
bands that allow for flexible uses.19  The FCC does not mandate any
particular service on those bands, but instead allows most uses and
simply requires FCC approval of the equipment to be used.20  The
FCC sets the standards applicable to the devices, including limits on
the power that entities can use and their emissions outside of the fre-
quency bands, leaving providers to create services within those con-
17 Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market Alloca-
tion of Spectrum 16-19, 33-36 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 38, 2002),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228552A1.pdf.
Hertz is a measure of cycles per second in a waveform.  One hertz (Hz) is one cycle
per second.  One kilohertz (KHz) is one thousand cycles per second, one megahertz (MHz)
is one million cycles per second, and one gigahertz (GHz) is one billion cycles per second.
So a radio station operating at 99.5 MHz is generating a sine wave at a frequency of
99,500,000 cycles per second.  See Jade Clayton, McGraw-Hill Illustrated Telecom Dic-
tionary 174, 304, 323, 382, 436 (3d ed. 2001).
18 See Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management:  Property Rights,
Markets, and the Commons, 2002 Proc. Telecomm. Pol’y Res. Conf. (forthcoming 2003),
http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~faulhabe/SPECTRUM_MANAGEMENTv51.pdf;
Hazlett, supra note 9, at 551-55; Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 11, at 82 (stating that FCC R
should “publicly auction fully transferable warrants, each enabling an existing specific
operating license to be converted to a full property right”); Lawrence J. White,
“Propertyzing” the Electromagnetic Spectrum:  Why It’s Important, and How to Begin,
Media L. & Pol’y, Fall 2000, at 19, 20-21 (proposing that spectrum rights be transformed
into private property).  Spiller and Cardilli advocate a big bang auction for virtually all
spectrum.  Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 11, at 82.  Faulhaber and Farber similarly suggest a R
big bang auction, but they propose that resulting property rights be subject to an easement
allowing low-power noninterfering uses.  See, e.g., Faulhaber & Farber, supra.  Such an
easement has much to recommend it, but it is inconsistent with the commons advocates’
proposals.  See infra note 275 and accompanying text.  Hazlett and White, meanwhile, R
advocate granting exclusive property rights in virtually all spectrum, whether through auc-
tion or other means.  See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 9; White, supra, at 20-22.  Hazlett sug- R
gests that the common law rule of priority-in-use could govern spectrum allocation,
granting property rights to those who have managed to put frequencies to productive use.
See Hazlett, supra note 9, at 552. R
19 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.407 (2002) (listing technical requirements for “Unlicensed
National Information Infrastructure”).
20 Note that this is not true open access to anyone who wants to transmit.  The FCC
regulates access by controlling the transmitters that can be used on this spectrum—exactly
the sort of regulation that an abundant network would require.  See infra notes 77-80 and R
accompanying text (noting regulations necessary for abundant networks to work as
planned); infra note 48 and accompanying text (noting FCC’s regulation of devices on R
current unlicensed spectrum).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 8  3-DEC-03 16:30
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straints.21  And in December 2002, the FCC launched an inquiry into
allowing unlicensed transmitters to operate in a few additional bands
when others were not using those frequencies.22
Probably the most successful, and certainly the best known, of the
unlicensed bands is the 2400-2483.5 MHz band, which has seen a rapid
increase in usage in recent months due in significant part to the popu-
larity of Wi-Fi (or 802.11)23 and Bluetooth.24  Some commentators
have pushed the government to go much further and create large
spectrum commons in desirable portions of the spectrum as the only
use of those frequencies.25  One concern about such proposals is that
widespread use of such a commons might result in messages inter-
fering with one another.  In response, though, a few major voices have
suggested that new networks can be created that would eliminate
interference problems.  The two most prominent are Larry Lessig and
Yochai Benkler, but there are others as well—notably David Reed,
21 Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Provide for Operation of Unlicensed NII
Devices in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, 12 F.C.C.R. 1576, ¶¶ 32-55 (1997) [hereinafter U-
NII Order]; Modification of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission’s Rules for Unlicensed
Devices and Equipment Approval, FCC 03-223 (released Sept. 17, 2003) (proposing
greater flexibility in portions of unlicensed spectrum).
22 Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz
Band, 17 F.C.C.R. 25,632 (2002).  The FCC’s actions and proposals regarding unlicensed
spectrum are still fairly modest, however.  The FCC has not set aside major portions of the
most valuable spectrum—the frequencies falling roughly between 300 MHz and 3000
MHz—for such unlicensed transmissions.  See infra text accompanying notes 183-84 (iden- R
tifying this range as spectrum’s “prime beachfront”).  It has allocated relatively small por-
tions of the most desired frequencies for unlicensed uses and larger portions of a few
higher-frequency bands that have somewhat less desirable propagation characteristics.  See
Report of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, supra note 16, at 54-55; Additional Spec- R
trum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, 17 F.C.C.R. 25,632,
¶¶ 2-8.  Its December 2002 proposals involve some prime broadcast spectrum, but unli-
censed transmitters would be permitted only when broadcasters were not using those fre-
quencies.  See id.
23 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers created the 802.11 standard as a
protocol that wireless transmitters could use to communicate with one another and thereby
create a wireless local area network.  See Newton, supra note 1, at 24-25 (describing speci- R
fications of 802 standards).  The whole family of 802.11 protocols are sometimes referred to
as “Wi-Fi,” short for “Wireless Fidelity.”  See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993:  Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive
Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, FCC 03-150 ¶¶ 180-84
(2003) (discussing deployment of devices with Wi-Fi capability), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-150A1.pdf.  As the FCC notes, Wi-Fi
allows for fast data transfer speeds—“up to 11 Mbps [megabits per second] for 802.11b and
up to 54 Mbps for 802.11a and 802.11g.”  Id. ¶ 180.
24 See generally Bluetooth, The Official Bluetooth Website, at http://
www.bluetooth.com/dev/specifications.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003); see also Additional
Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, 17 F.C.C.R.
25,632, ¶¶ 3-6 (discussing development of unlicensed bands and rise of Wi-Fi, Bluetooth,
and Home RF).
25 See supra notes 1 and 3 and accompanying text. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 9  3-DEC-03 16:30
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Kevin Werbach, and Stuart Buck.26  They contend that a new para-
digm is now technologically possible, in which an effectively infinite
number of users can communicate without interfering with one
another.27  They envision low-power, computationally complex user
devices that receive and resend other people’s messages.  Wi-Fi still
relies on access points that act as antenna/transmitters, and receivers
that act as ordinary receivers.  Wi-Fi does not offer effectively infinite
spectrum, as it is subject to the same interference problems that limit
the growth of other networks and also does not scale (i.e., add nodes)
well.28  The new abundant networks (as I call them) seek to avoid
these problems by using complex algorithms and having each receiver
transmit other people’s signals, thus increasing capacity.  These net-
works offer a vision of spectrum that is no longer scarce, and that
allows us to communicate more freely.
Benkler, Buck, Lessig, Reed, and Werbach (to whom I will refer
as “the commons advocates”) further argue that these abundant net-
works will not arise if private parties obtain property rights in spec-
trum.  Abundant networks represent the most efficient use of
spectrum, in their view, but private owners will not create them.  They
claim that the costs of aggregating enough frequencies to support such
networks will be too great.29  A government-created abundant net-
work, they contend, is the most efficient outcome.30  They thus assert
26 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 43 (discussing implications of processing gain); Stuart R
Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.
2, ¶ 6, at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/02_STLR_2/article_pdf.pdf (noting devel-
opments such as spread spectrum and ultra-wideband transmissions); Lessig, The Future of
Ideas, supra note 3, at 230-31; David P. Reed, Comments for FCC Spectrum Policy Task R
Force on Spectrum Policy 11 (2002) (noting efficiency of networked systems transmitting
“at low power, with dynamic directivity and repeating of signals”), available at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513202407;
Kevin Werbach, Open Spectrum:  The New Wireless Paradigm 5-7 (New Am. Found.,
Spectrum Series Working Paper No. 6, 2002) (citing three efficiency enhancing technolo-
gies:  spread spectrum, cooperative networking and software-defined radio).
27 See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text on the properties of these proposed R
networks.
28 See Report of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, supra note 16, at 13 (noting R
interference in Wi-Fi transmissions); Hazlett, supra note 9, at 498-504 (noting interference R
problems with Wi-Fi and other networking standards); David P. Reed, Open Spectrum
Resource Page, at http://www.reed.com/OpenSpectrum/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2003) (“Fans
of 802.11 should realize that 802.11 does not in practice scale very well at all.”); Piyush
Gupta et al., An Experimental Scaling Law for Ad Hoc Networks 3 (2001), at http://
decision.csl.uiuc.edu/~prkumar/ps_files/exp.pdf (demonstrating declines in throughput in
an 802.11 network resulting from adding nodes); infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text R
(discussing prevalence of interference in citizens band radio).
29 See Benkler, supra note 1, at 364-65; Buck, supra note 26, ¶ 103.  See generally infra R
Part II.A.
30 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 2. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 10  3-DEC-03 16:30
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that the government should leave a large swath of spectrum unli-
censed and available for users to interact among themselves.
These commentators’ support for the idea of jettisoning spectrum
rights has given it new prominence.  All of them are serious technolo-
gists, and Benkler and Lessig are two of the leading academics in the
world of telecommunications.  The question, though, is whether they
are persuasive in asserting that the possibility of abundant networks
undercuts the arguments in favor of property rights in spectrum, and
that government rather than private ownership is the more efficient
means to create abundant networks.  My answer is that the possibility
of abundant networks calls into question one aspect of the govern-
ment’s allotment of spectrum—namely, the division of spectrum into
small parcels—but it does not cast doubt on the efficiency of private
ownership.  If spectrum is allotted in large swaths, there is every
reason to expect that private owners will create abundant networks
(assuming, of course, that these networks work as promised).
This raises the issue of how big a swath of frequencies abundant
networks would occupy.  Currently, radio stations are allocated 200
kilohertz each; television stations are allocated 6 megahertz; and
broadband PCS licenses (which are designed to allow users to send
and receive voice, video, and data) range from 5 to 15 megahertz.31
These license sizes are not mandated by technology.  Radio spectrum
is not a series of discrete chunks, and there is no set amount of spec-
trum that a given service requires.  Indeed, improvements in tech-
nology allow people to send more information over the same
bandwidth.32
Abundant networks do not require any particular size of spec-
trum frequencies.  At a minimum, they need enough spectrum to
allow for spread spectrum transmissions.  If they are as bandwidth-
efficient as current cellular networks that use spread spectrum, then
maybe all that is needed are the same 5-15 megahertz allocations that
broadband PCS networks use.  We should not necessarily be bound to
the size and capabilities of broadband PCS allocations, however.  A
greater size swath would allow for a greater data transfer speed.  The
31 See generally FCC Broadband PCS Band Plan, available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/
auctions/data/bandplans/pcsband.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
32 Television broadcasters, for example, can send five or more digital television signals
over their six megahertz allocations.  Advanced Television Systems, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, ¶
20 (1997); Advisory Comm. on Pub. Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broad-
casters, Charting the Digital Broadcasting Future, at xi-xii (1998), available at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf.  In short:  “With airwaves, as with all
other media, the more you spend, the more you can send; it all comes down to engineering
and smart management.”  Peter Huber, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace:  Abolish the
FCC and Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm 75 (1997).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 11  3-DEC-03 16:30
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projected size would depend mainly on the desired speed, and thus on
the intended use.  Commons advocates envision abundant networks as
allowing for Internet access and data transmission.33  Cable modems
and DSL currently provide such services at speeds of 1-2 megabits per
second.34  We might, though, want abundant networks to provide
faster service.  A 100 megahertz swath, for example, could allow for
data transfer rates 500 times as fast (or 1 gigabit per second).35
Although 100 megahertz would be sufficient for the uses of abun-
dant networks that their advocates foresee, we could of course set
aside still more spectrum for an abundant network:  200 megahertz, or
500, or 1000.36  Dedicating 500 or 1000 megahertz for a single network
raises three problems, however.  The first is efficiency:  The increase in
capacity created by adding spectrum to a given network that has suffi-
cient spectrum will be at best linear.  That is, for any given network,
doubling its spectrum will, at most, double its capacity—and in fact
due to practical considerations (power constraints at the network’s
nodes, or user devices) its capacity likely will be less than double.37
33 See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children:  Autonomy, Information, and
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 62 (2001) (stating that abundant networks “will not supplant
absolutely owned wired and wireless networks in delivering real time communications with
assured quality of service.  They will enable, however, a wide range of uses, from Internet
access to online games, overnight (or during dinner) delivery of video on demand, and,
potentially, local nonessential video conferencing among friends or for town hall
meetings.”).
34 See Stuart Minor Benjamin et al., Telecommunications Law and Policy 258 (Supp.
2003) (noting speeds of cable and DSL); see also Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access
to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 n.37 (2002) (noting speed of
cable modem).  Mbps stands for megabits per second, so 1 mbps means a data transfer
speed of one million bits per second.  Gbps, meanwhile, stands for gigabits per second (one
billion bits per second).  See Newton, supra note 1, at 351, 493. R
35 With user devices equipped with multiple antennas, a 100-megahertz bandwidth can
support 1 gbps or higher.  See Ashok Mantravadi et al., Spectral Efficiency of MIMO Mul-
tiaccess Systems with Single-User Decoding, 21 IEEE J. Selected Areas Comm. 382 (2003).
Even with a single antenna system, we can expect 150-200 mbps with 100 megahertz of
bandwidth.  See Theodore S. Rappaport, Wireless Communications:  Principles and Prac-
tice, 40-52 (2d ed. 2001).
36 Above 100 MHz, additional megahertz would be of limited value:  The limit on abun-
dant networks’ services would be the delay created by the many hops, not the data transfer
(or bit) rate.  The delay in multihop networks is nontrivial, and, importantly, the bigger the
network, the longer the delay.  See Sanjay Shakkottai et al., Unreliable Sensor Grids:  Cov-
erage, Connectivity and Diameter 10 (2003), available at http://www.ece.utexas.edu/
%7Eshakkott/Pubs/sensor-ton.pdf.  That is, abundant networks would be optimized for
asynchronous uses and real-time transfers of small amounts of data (e.g., voice conversa-
tions), but they would not be optimized for real-time video because the delay created by
the many hops would undermine quality of service.  See supra note 33; see also infra note R
89 and accompanying text.  And as the network expands in size, delays increase.  See R
Shakkottai et al., supra, at 10.
37 See Piyush Gupta & P. R. Kumar, The Capacity of Wireless Networks, 46 IEEE
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Second, the greater the size of an abundant network, the greater the
cost of the government dedicating spectrum to such a network.  These
costs raise particular concerns in light of the possibility of an abundant
network not developing as hoped; in that case, dedicating hundreds of
megahertz of spectrum to one would be a huge misallocation of
resources.38  Third, setting aside hundreds of megahertz for a single
abundant network makes it less likely that there will be competition
between such networks.
The choice of how much spectrum—if any—to allocate for any
given abundant network, and for abundant networks in toto, is there-
fore primarily a policy choice, rather than a technological choice.  Sig-
nificantly, the more spectrum that is dedicated for a given abundant
network, the more likely that there will be enough room for only one.
As I discuss in Part III.D, hundreds of megahertz of spectrum are
unutilized or underutilized.  These massive swaths of spectrum are
available for dedication as abundant networks.  If spectrum were allo-
cated in parcels of 100 megahertz, or even 200, there would be enough
room for five or more competing abundant networks.  In light of the
benefits of competition, allowing for multiple networks seems to be
the wiser course.
That still leaves the question of how those networks will be con-
trolled:  Each could be controlled by a private entity;39 each could be
controlled by the government; or some could be controlled by private
entities and others by the government.  There are real advantages to
having private entities provide them—private entities have both a
greater incentive to choose the best protocols and a greater ability to
respond quickly to changes in technology or in the marketplace.
Indeed, Benkler and Lessig do not suggest that the entire available
spectrum should be commons, but rather propose that there be both
commons and private ownership.40  But once there are competing pri-
vate networks, what is the advantage of adding a government net-
work?  We don’t do that with newspapers, television stations, or colas
(and there are only two major companies that make colas), so why do
it here?
I find that the advantages of having the government create an
abundant network are outweighed by the disadvantages.  Having a
single abundant network would provide greater capacity, but at the
cost of competition.  And having a government-created network com-
pete alongside private ones would avoid the danger of monopoliza-
38 See infra notes 263-68 and accompanying text. R
39 A private entity could be a consortium, of course.
40 See Lessig, The Future of Ideas, supra note 3, at 222, 226, 242; Benkler, supra note 2, R
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tion, but at the cost of diminished incentives to create the best
network.  Given the uncertainties regarding whether these networks
will develop as hoped, it makes more sense that shareholders, rather
than taxpayers, bear the risk of failure.
Part I of this Article discusses the nature of the proposed abun-
dant networks.  Such networks will require significant control on the
part of some regulator—whether public or private.  Absent such con-
trol, interference problems would arise, defeating the vision of effec-
tively infinite spectrum.  In Part II, I address the commons advocates’
arguments that private entities will not create abundant networks.
Their main argument relies on the transaction costs of aggregating
spectrum, but those costs can easily be overcome through allotment of
spectrum in large swaths.  As for economic incentives, creators of
abundant networks should have at least as great an ability to capture
the value of those networks as do creators of other kinds of networks.
Given that the question for a spectrum owner is a comparative one
(which network will be most remunerative), there is every reason to
expect that an owner will create an abundant network if such a net-
work is as valuable as its advocates suggest.
The fact that private firms will create these networks does not
mean that they are the most efficient means of doing so.  Part III con-
siders the comparative advantages of private versus government con-
trol.  There are many choices and tradeoffs in the design of protocols,
which allows for competition among protocols.  And competition
seems desirable, as it stimulates innovation and allows for more niches
to have their interests met.  The profit motive, meanwhile, gives pri-
vate companies an advantage in determining the state of the art,
implementing it, and responding to technological and market develop-
ments.  Government control, on the other hand, has the advantage of
preventing any private entity from gaining monopoly power, but
would open up the possibility of rent-seeking in the choice of proto-
cols.  As to whether private or government control will respond better
to the needs of users, there is little reason to prefer one over the
other.  These considerations suggest that competition among private
firms is the most desirable outcome.  Part IV considers the question
whether, on balance, it is a good idea for the government to allot spec-
trum in large enough swaths to make room for abundant networks.
That discussion highlights the uncertainties regarding whether these
networks will work as planned—uncertainties that, in my view, further
tip the balance against government control of abundant networks.
Part V considers the implications of my arguments.  Commons are
appropriate when interference is not a problem and private ownership
would create high transaction costs.  They also may make sense when\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 14  3-DEC-03 16:30
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the proposed use is a secondary service that would not interfere with
the main service.  But abundant networks would be the only use of the
spectrum devoted to them, and the commons advocates have failed to
make the case for the government providing them.  Rather than the
government foisting such networks upon us, we should let private
entities choose whether to create them (and, of course, take the risk of
them failing).
My conclusion should not obscure the fact that the commons
advocates have contributed significantly to the debate on spectrum
policy.  Before they laid out their arguments, the debate was over how
to transition from a command-and-control regime to property rights;
the idea of a commons was not taken very seriously.  The commons
advocates changed that—focusing attention on new forms of commu-
nication that challenged old paradigms of spectrum usage, and putting
forward a set of arguments why a commons might make more sense.
Their arguments, however, rely on a set of idealized decisionmakers.  I
would agree with them that the best possible decisionmaking process
entails the government creating a commons that gives maximum
freedom to users, utilizing protocols that reflect the state of the art
and allow for the maximum range of services consistent with avoiding
interference, and updating those protocols as circumstances warrant.
The problem is that this first-best process is not the one that is likely
to arise with government creation of an abundant network.41  In this
paper I try to look realistically at the choice between public and pri-
vate sponsorship, and between single and multiple networks, in order
to determine what option is most attractive in light of the abilities that
government and private entities have and the incentives that they
face.  Ultimately, in my view, this is a choice between second-bests,
and the more efficient option is competition among private firms.
I
ABUNDANT NETWORKS AND CONTROL
A major question for the use of spectrum, or any resource, is
whether some entity will exercise any control over it.  The notion of
unlicensed spectrum may seem to entail transmission without any con-
trolling agents.  This would represent a stark alternative to a world of
either government control or private control (via, most obviously,
property rights).  Instead of having any gatekeeper, the airwaves
would be a medium through which users could communicate with
41 Huber, supra note 32, at 75 (“Markets find ways of reassembling private pieces into R
public spaces when that is the most profitable thing to do.  They may take more time than
an omniscient central authority, but finding [such] authority takes even longer.”).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 15  3-DEC-03 16:30
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each other as they saw fit.  Users might choose to constrain their
actions in a variety of ways, but no regulator—public or private—
would impose limits on them.  The first question, then, is whether such
an unregulated world is consistent with the abundant networks pro-
posed by the commons advocates.  The answer is no.
A. The Importance of Interference
One key aspect of wireless transmissions is that they are subject
to interference—and the danger of interference undercuts arguments
for totally open access.  Every transmitter creates some interference.
Each time a person uses a cordless telephone, or even turns on a light,
there is a transmission of energy through the air that thereby creates a
tiny amount of interference for nearby users of nearby frequencies.42
In some cases the interference is so small that it does not create a
noticeable loss of signal quality.43  The real fear is of more significant
interference—one set of radio waves overlapping with another set to a
sufficient degree that a receiver can hear neither clearly.
Insofar as such harmful interference is likely to arise in any given
band, truly open access—in which anyone can transmit as she sees
fit—is unattractive.44  The reason is that any given user has an interest
in ensuring that her message gets through, even if that means
increasing power and/or the number of messages sent (to create
redundancy) such that others’ messages cannot be heard.  The costs
created by the sender are borne by the users as a whole, but the bene-
fits accrue to the sender.45  This is, of course, a variation on the theme
42 See Benjamin, supra note 6, at 11; Bruce M. Owen & Gregory L. Rosston, Spectrum R
Allocation and the Internet, in Cyber Policy and Economics in an Internet Age 197, 215
(William H. Lehr & Lorenzo M. Pupillo eds., 2002).
43 See Benjamin, supra note 6, at 11-12. R
44 In using this terminology, I am distinguishing open access from a regulated com-
mons.  See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons:  The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action 23, 222 n.23 (1990) (distinguishing between open access regimes, which
are open to all, and commons, which are often limited to specific users); Siddhartha Raja &
Francois Bar, Transition Paths in a Spectrum Commons Regime 5-6 (2003) (paper
presented at Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 2003) (“While open spec-
trum is open to anyone to use as they wish and please, commons spectrum is in fact, not
open to everyone freely.  To use the commons, one must belong to a group of users who
follow certain rules, such as transmission power restrictions, politeness and pre-certifica-
tion of devices by the FCC.  Open spectrum does not have any such restrictions.”), avail-
able at http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2003/235/Raja-Bar-TPRC2003.pdf.
45 As Ellen Goodman, Stan McCoy, and Devendra Kumar note:
When an unlicensed user decides to transmit in a shared spectrum band, the
benefits from the transmission go solely to the transmitting party, while the
harms caused by the potential interference are felt equally by all users of the
spectrum.  Thus, each individual user, acting rationally, would decide to
increase transmissions in the shared band (because that user does not absorb
the interference costs incurred by others as a result of its increased transmis-\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 16  3-DEC-03 16:30
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of the tragedy of the commons; each individual is tempted to defect,
and enough do so that the resource becomes overwhelmed.46  There is
every reason to expect such a tragedy of the commons if constraints
are not placed on communications.47
The government recognizes as much:  The unlicensed spectrum
that the FCC has created is not an unregulated commons in which
anyone can transmit as she pleases.  The FCC imposes transmission
standards and requires that it certify all equipment used on this spec-
trum.48  Significantly, even with these limits, users have often encoun-
sion), resulting in congestion in the band when all users acted accordingly—the
so-called “tragedy of the commons.”
Ellen Goodman et al., An Overview of Problems and Prospects in U.S. Spectrum Manage-
ment, in Telecommunications Convergence:  Implications for the Industry & for the Prac-
ticing Lawyer 2002, at 327, 354 (PLI Patents, Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course, Handbook Series No. 698, 2002).
46 See, e.g., Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Sharing Without Licenses:
Opportunities and Dangers 1 (1996), http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu/usr/dsaq/web.pdf
(stating that unlicensed spectrum is subject to “Tragedy of the Commons resulting from the
fact that device designers lack an incentive to conserve the shared spectrum resource”);
Report of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, supra note 16, at 40 (“Because there is no R
price mechanism in the commons model to use as a tool for allocating scarce resources
among competing users, there is always the risk that free access will eventually lead to
interference and over-saturation, i.e., the ‘tragedy of the commons.’”); Thomas W. Hazlett,
Spectrum Flash Dance:  Eli Noam’s Proposal for “Open Access” to Radio Waves, 41 J.L.
& Econ. 805, 815-16 (1998) (noting that open access systems fail because of congestion and
costs of “collision avoidance”).
47 See Gregory L. Rosston, The Long and Winding Road:  The FCC Paves the Path
with Good Intentions 22 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No.
01-08, 2001) (“The introduction of unlicensed spectrum requires a central planner to set
out the ‘rules of the road’ or protocols to ensure that unlicensed users are good citizens.”),
available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/01-08.pdf; see also Durga P. Satapathy &
Jon M. Peha, A Novel Co-Existence Algorithm for Unlicensed Fixed Power Devices (2000)
(paper presented at the IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference,
Sept. 2000), available at http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~peha/WCNC2000.pdf; Durga P.
Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Etiquette Modifications For Unlicensed Spectrum:  Approach
and Impact, 1 Proc. 48th Ann. Int’l IEEE Vehicular Tech. Conf. 272-76 (1998); Durga P.
Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Performance of Unlicensed Devices with a Spectrum Etiquette,
Proc. 1997 IEEE Globecom 414-18; Jon M. Peha, Wireless Communications and Coexis-
tence for Smart Environments, IEEE Pers. Comm., Oct. 2000, at 66; S. Michael Yang et al.,
On the Use of Unlicensed Frequency Spectrum, Use Rule Evolution, and Interference
Mitigation 1 (2001), at http://www.jacksons.net/tac/First%20Term/On%20the%20use%
20of%20unlicesed%20frequency%20spectrum%20research%20paper4.pdf; see also infra
note 69 and accompanying text. R
48 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.407 (2002) (listing technical requirements for “Unlicensed
National Information Infrastructure Devices”); 47 C.F.R. § 15.247 (2002) (listing technical
requirements for unlicensed spread spectrum devices); U-NII Order, supra note 21, ¶¶ 32- R
55; Benkler, supra note 1, at 332-33 (noting constraints placed on unlicensed spectrum); R
Buck, supra note 26, ¶ 53 (noting that “the FCC’s equipment regulations for the Unli- R
censed National Information Infrastructure specify that all transmissions in the 5.15-5.25
GHz band must have a peak power spectral density of less than 2.5 mW/MHz, that any
emissions in the adjoining bands must be attenuated by at least 27 decibels, and so on ad
nauseam” (citations omitted)).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 17  3-DEC-03 16:30
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tered considerable interference on the unlicensed spectrum.49  This
phenomenon is particularly striking with respect to the FCC’s main
attempt at creating a commons where ordinary people could commu-
nicate with one another—citizens band (CB) radio.  The idea behind
CB radio was that anyone could buy a simple transmitter and then
communicate freely with her fellow citizens.  A citizen who wanted to
operate an amateur (or ham) radio was obligated to get a license from
the FCC, and could receive that license only if she passed a test.50  By
contrast, those who wanted to operate a CB radio did not have to take
any test, and after 1983 they did not even have to obtain any license,
but instead could operate freely without a license.51  The FCC did,
however, attempt to exercise control over CB users by mandating the
power levels and equipment that could be used on the citizens band.
Notwithstanding this degree of control, a tragedy of the commons
occurred:  Some users operated amplifiers at power levels above those
that the FCC permitted; their messages got through, but at the cost of
interfering with the messages of other users.52  CB users, in other
words, behaved exactly as economic theory would predict, with the
result that many users became crowded out.53
49 See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 9, at 429 (noting that “[w]hen unlicensed entry thrives, R
the characteristic pattern is that over-crowding ensues,” and citing repeated congestion of
unlicensed bands).
50 See 47 C.F.R. §  97.17.
51 See 47 U.S.C. § 307(e)(1) (2000); Elimination of Individual Station Licenses in Radio
Control Radio Services and Citizens Band Radio Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,884 (June 3,
1983) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 95.401, 95.407(f), 95.420 (1994)).
52 See Amendment of Parts 2 and 97 of the Commission’s Rules to Require Type
Acceptance of Equipment Marketed for Use in the Amateur Radio Service and Amend-
ment of Part 2 of the Commission’s Rules to Prohibit the Marketing of External Radio
Frequency Power Amplifiers Capable of Operation on Any Frequency from 24 to 35 MHz,
67 F.C.C.2d 939, ¶¶ 5-8 (1978) (noting serious interference caused by illegal use of pow-
erful amplifiers on citizens band); Radio Frequency (RF) Interference to Electronic Equip-
ment, 70 F.C.C.2d 1685, ¶¶ 3-4, 7 (1978) (noting concerns that amplifiers that boost output
power of CB sets in violation of Commission Rules have created significant interference);
Order to Show Cause Why the License for Radio Station KQQ-8472 in the Citizens Band
Radio Service Should Not Be Revoked, 75 F.C.C.2d 294, ¶ 5 (1979) (noting that illegal
high-power amplifiers create interference, resulting in degradation of CB service and “a
‘domino effect,’ i.e., many licensees, in attempting to outperform their CB neighbors, com-
pete with one another via impermissible equipment to ensure that their transmissions are
not drowned out by others with more powerful operations”); Type Acceptance of Equip-
ment Marketed for Use in the Amateur Radio Service, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,979, ¶¶ 2-3 (Mar.
27, 1981) (noting serious interference both within and without citizens band created by
illegal high-powered CB amplifiers); Press Release, FCC, Compliance and Info Action:
Federal Communications Commission Unveils Joint Criminal Investigation (1997) (noting
problems created by CB amplifiers operating at illegally high power levels), 1997 WL
602954.
53 See, e.g., Wayne Overbeck & Rick D. Pullen, Major Principles of Media Law 284
(1985) (noting that radio broadcast band in 1926 had same problem as citizens band
today—both had “layer upon layer of signals, with the louder ones covering up weaker\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 18  3-DEC-03 16:30
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Commons advocates, too, recognize the dangers posed by inter-
ference.54  Their argument is not that commons arrangements are
attractive despite significant interference.  Rather, they contend that
new network designs can eliminate the dangers posed by interference,
with the result that a commons is an efficient—indeed, the most effi-
cient—option.  That is, they assert that fears of interference need no
longer drive spectrum allocation policy, such that a commons is a
viable solution.
B. The Design of Abundant Networks
Commons advocates put forward analogies intended to illustrate
the folly of sales of spectrum rights.  Eli Noam has analogized selling
spectrum rights to selling flying rights for planes.  He notes that we
could sell various “lanes” between cities to the highest bidder, leaving
those who want to fly planes to negotiate with the owners of various
lanes, but that this would make little sense.55  Benkler similarly sug-
gests an analogy to trade rights.  He notes that, at the time that Britain
was beginning to trade with India, it could have decided to create 1000
exclusive property rights to trade with India and then auctioned those
rights.  He suggests that:
Free trade, an absence of property rights in the act of trading with
India, is the correct economic solution, not a market in exclusive
rights to trade, no matter how flexible or efficient.  We do not
believe that there is a naturally-bounded resource called “the act of
trading with India” whose contours could efficiently be delineated
for clearance through property-based markets.56
ones”); Jon M. Peha, The Path Towards Efficient Coexistence in Unlicensed Spectrum,
IEEE 802.16 WirelessHUMAN (Wireless High-Speed Unlicensed Metropolitan Area Net-
work) Standards 2 (2000) (“When utilization [of CB radios] became high, and interference
great, many users responded by buying radios with greater transmit power.  This reinforced
the scarcity, causing even more users to increase their transmit power.”), available at http://
www.ieee802.org/16/human/contrib/80216hc-00_03.pdf.
54 Indeed, in a recent essay Eli Noam stated flatly:
Eventually, any resource whose utilisation is of value, yet whose use is without
a charge, will be over-utilised.  Just as in an earlier generation Citizens Band
radio became an intolerably congested airwave Babel, so will the open spec-
trum also become used by anybody who wants to broadcast TV pictures to
their neighbourhood, video-cam the front door of their shop, or bounce signals
from large amplifiers known as repeaters.  This is the classic problem of the
“tragedy of the commons,” in which the open pasture became overgrazed.
Inevitably, the open spectrum will be squeezed into a few overgrazed fre-
quency patches while the “real” applications take place on more orderly bands.
Eli Noam, The Third Way for Spectrum, Fin. Times (London), March 13, 2003, http://
msl1.mit.edu/ESD10/docs/ft_spectrum_policy_e_noam_mar_14_2003.pdf.
55 Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions:  Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s
Anachronism, 41 J.L. & Econ. 765, 765-66 (1998).
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The key to both analogies is that the relevant resources are effec-
tively limitless.  If, as seems plausible, a greater number of ships can
travel to India than actually want to go there, and a greater number of
planes can fit in the air than want to fly, there would seem to be no
reason to confer any exclusive rights at all.  Property rights are useful
as a means of protecting resources that are limited in some way.  If
shipping and air lanes are effectively infinite, creating any sort of
property system seems inappropriate.  The problem is that network
capacity57 is not limitless—or, more precisely, its capacity is limitless
only in limited circumstances, and thus is not truly infinite—and
therefore these analogies do not fit.58
The commons advocates tell an important story about the way
that people traditionally have viewed uses of spectrum.  For most
wireless services, the main consideration has been transmitting with
enough power to get a clear signal to a receiver.  The model here has
been broadcasting, in which a radio or television station sends out a
single programming stream along a channel (which is just a specified
range of frequencies).  The main consideration limiting the number of
potential channels is interference.  So regulators dedicate a given
channel to just one broadcaster, and in fact may create buffers around
that channel, in an attempt to minimize interference.  Having broad-
casters using nearby frequencies (or, of course, the same frequencies)
might lead to interference that would make it hard for viewers/lis-
teners to pick up a clean signal.59
57 I am distinguishing here the capacity of a given abundant network, which can
increase with the addition of new users, from the capacity of any given user device, which
actually decreases with the addition of new users.  See infra note 70 and accompanying R
text.
58 Indeed, Noam and Benkler’s analogies do not quite work in their test cases.  Air
lanes may be effectively infinite (in that there is an adequate supply for all conceivable
levels of demand), but landing spots are not.  So some mechanism must exist in order to
apportion airport runways and airport gates.  We could imagine leaving runway space as an
open resource available to anyone, but that might result in more planes trying to land than
can be accommodated (there are a lot of small planes out there), massive confusion and
delays, and quite possibly crashes, as each plane attempted to land on its own.  The more
obvious answer here is to create some sort of mechanism for regulating the timing of land-
ings and access to airport gates, and indeed that is exactly what has happened.  See Hazlett,
supra note 9, at 421 n.482; Hazlett, supra note 46, at 815-19.  Similarly, there are plenty of R
shipping lanes, and probably plenty of docks, but almost assuredly some docks are better
located than others and thus have greater value.  Thus it is probably the case that the
supply of well-placed docks is not infinite; if so, then a sorting mechanism for those docks
might be appropriate.  So it may be that air and shipping lanes are effectively infinite, but
that still leaves other aspects of air travel and trade with India subject to interference.
59 See Benjamin, supra note 6, at 11-16 (discussing allocation of channel, fear of inter- R
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As the commons advocates point out, this story is correct as far as
it goes but is radically incomplete.  There are other possible para-
digms.  One obvious alternative is that there need not be one signal
that is transmitted from a single location.  Cellular telephony presents
an example.  Cellular service providers install base stations that create
“cells” throughout a city, allowing callers to transmit only between
themselves and the nearest base station.  Users send transmissions to
each other via these stations, so many different relatively low-power
conversations occur on the same wavelength.
Significantly, transmissions are not the only relevant measure of
power.  The computational power of receivers can also be relevant.
We can see this by examining basic radios.  Radios often have fairly
crude receivers that are not sophisticated enough to pick out the
desired signal from undesired signals on nearby frequencies.  The
receivers lack the ability to differentiate among signals, and the FCC
has responded by allowing only one signal on each channel in a given
geographic area.60  More sophisticated receivers would create oppor-
tunities for more signals to be transmitted in any given range of fre-
quencies; the more selective receiver would have a greater ability to
pick out the desired signal from among all the other transmissions
being sent out.
More dramatically, much more sophisticated receivers, combined
with the breaking up of a given message into packets, can bring about
a quite different set of possibilities.  The main example here is a tech-
nology known as spread spectrum, which uses low-power transmis-
sions that hop or spread among a wide range of possible frequencies.61
The transmitter sends small packets of data accompanied by sophisti-
cated codes across a wide range of frequencies.  Receivers monitor
that range of frequencies, listening for the code.  A transmitter can
send packets at very low power, because the receiver does not need to
be able to receive consistently a single streaming radio wave at a fixed
point on the spectrum.  Instead, it need only pick up the various
packets that are sent out and reassemble them.  Such reassembling
can work as long as the receiver has the relevant algorithm and the
computational power to put the pieces of the message together.62
60 The FCC has done a good deal more, as well, to keep the airwaves clear.  In fact,
there is a strong argument that its actions unnecessarily have created idle spectrum.  I
argue that such actions are inconsistent with the First Amendment in Benjamin, supra note
6. R
61 See Newton, supra note 1, at 748 (defining “spread spectrum”); see also Amendment R
of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Transmitters, 12
F.C.C.R. 7488, ¶ 3 (1997) (describing spread spectrum devices).
62 See Kevin Werbach, Here’s a Cure for Bandwidth Blues, ZDNet, Nov. 28, 2001 (dis-
cussing properties of spread spectrum), at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-531165.html.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 21  3-DEC-03 16:30
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As Benkler notes, this involves a tradeoff of computational
power for transmitting power.63  The transmission can be at low power
because so much work is being done by the receiver.  In contrast with
ordinary broadcasts, which involve a relatively crude receiver, spread
spectrum relies on the existence of a receiver that can quickly process
signals on a wide range of frequencies and decipher the messages that
contain the appropriate codes.  Another way of looking at this is that
the conventional way for a transmitter to distinguish its signal has
been to boost its power so that it can be differentiated from the back-
ground noise; spread spectrum, instead, allows for distinguishing sig-
nals via algorithms, so that the signal’s power need not rise above the
level of background noise.
Spread spectrum technologies are widely used today.  To return
to the cellular telephony example, the most widely used form of dig-
ital cellular transmission is code division multiple access (CDMA), a
form of spread spectrum technology.  Each call is given a unique code
and is then transmitted in pieces over a range of frequencies, which
are reassembled on the receiving end so quickly that real-time conver-
sations are possible.64
One final technological development completes the “abundant
capacity” story:  the ability of receivers to enhance the capacity of the
network.  This idea (sometimes called “cooperation gain”)65 is that
the consumer device will not only send and receive its own messages
but also will help to process others’ messages.  The end-user devices
would both communicate the owner’s transmissions and serve as a
repeater of others’ transmissions.  Each packet would be relayed from
device to device until it reached its intended recipient.
The vision of abundant capacity depends on both of these devel-
opments.  Without the computational complexity, low-power trans-
missions would not be deciphered.  Ordinary (e.g., traditional
broadcast) low-power transmissions can be heard only if they are the
highest power transmissions in a given frequency range.  To put the
point differently, if the networks do not rely on smarter receivers,
then old-fashioned dumb receivers will continue to pick out the
strongest signal, and the number of signals that can be sent on any
given set of frequencies will be low.
But computational complexity is not sufficient to create networks
of significant size (and therefore usefulness).  Without cooperation
gain, if a user of a device wants to send a message to someone who is a
63 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 43. R
64 See Qualcomm, How CDMA Works, at http://www.qualcomm.com/ProdTech/cdma/
training/cdma25/m5/m5p01.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
65 See Reed, supra note 26; Benkler, supra note 2, at 44-45. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 22  3-DEC-03 16:30
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few dozen miles away, the device will have to transmit at a high
enough power level for the transmission to traverse that distance—a
level high enough to create the dangers of interference that reduce the
number of potential users.  Put another way, low-power spread spec-
trum devices on their own (i.e., without base stations or repeaters) do
not allow for communications from one end of a metropolitan area to
another, because the signal weakens the longer it travels.  Cellular
telephony avoids this problem by having base stations located
throughout a community, as those base stations serve to relay the
messages to other stations.  If, as the commons advocates propose, we
want to have community networks that do not rely on base stations,
then other repeaters will have to exist—in the form of the devices
themselves.66  The key to creating networks that can accommodate as
many users as want to communicate is having user devices that help
others’ messages to be sent.
The idea, remember, is that engineers could design networks such
that many more messages could be communicated—so many that
spectrum constraints would no longer be relevant.  With everybody
forwarding everyone else’s low-power messages, the limit on the
number of users we could add might be higher than the number of
devices that would ever be in use.  Every user device would create
additional capacity (because of its role as a repeater), so there would
be no reason to fear additional users.  Even if at some point the net-
work could not handle any more devices, that point would be so high
that it would be irrelevant to the actual networks—it would be an
abstraction.
Thus, creating networks with effectively infinite capacity (in the
sense that the transport capacity of the network increases when users
are added) relies on having devices that (a) have great computational
abilities, (b) transmit at low power levels, and (c) help to forward
others’ messages on to their desired destinations.67
This highlights that the envisioned networks would need to be
controlled.  The notion of a spectrum commons might conjure up
visions of a world in which everyone can transmit as she sees fit,
without any external constraints.  But the desired network will not
arise under these conditions.  The reason is a classic collective action
66 If instead we have base stations serve this function, then the network is just an ordi-
nary cellular network.
67 All the devices would have to transmit at low power and have sophisticated compu-
tational capabilities.  It may not be that every device needs to enhance others’ communica-
tions (through forwarding them), but repeaters will need to be ubiquitous throughout the
network so that the devices can transmit at low power and still get their messages through,
and such ubiquity will require a very high number of repeaters.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 23  3-DEC-03 16:30
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problem:  It may be in the interest of all users to use low-power
devices that repeat others’ messages, but it will be in the interest of
any given user that everyone else abide by these constraints while she
transmits at higher power, and without repeating.  As to power, at
least some users are likely to decide that they would rather not rely on
repeaters and/or would like to send real-time video to a friend, and so
will want to operate at higher power;68 and some entrepreneur will
create high-powered devices for them.69
A similar point applies to the forwarding of others’ messages.
Many consumers will, if given the choice, prefer devices that allow
them to communicate but do not forward others’ messages.  An
important point bears noting here:  In an abundant network, the trans-
port capacity of the network increases as users are added (and thus is
effectively infinite), but the transmitting capacity per user is not.
Instead, users’ ability to transmit their own messages decreases as the
network becomes larger.70  When a device uses its transmission
capacity to forward another’s message, it is not using its capacity on its
own messages.  Forwarding a packet occupies some of the capacity
that could otherwise be used for the individual’s own packets.71  Sig-
nificantly, the bigger the network, the more repeating any given node
has to do.72  Adding nodes increases network transport capacity, but
for each device it creates greater repeating burdens.
68 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text; supra note 36; infra note 89 and R
accompanying text.
69 See Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 San Diego L.
Rev. (forthcoming February 2004) (manuscript at 74, on file with New York University Law
Review) (“Unlicensed devices, if unconstrained, are likely to adopt a greedy approach to
the consumption of these spectrum resources.”).
70 See Gupta & Kumar, supra note 37. R
71 See Atul Adya et al., A Multi-Radio Unification Protocol for IEEE 802.11 Wireless
Networks 1 (Microsoft, Research Technical Report No. MSR-TR-2003-44, 2003) (noting
that user devices cannot receive and transmit at same time:  “A fundamental reason for
low network capacity is that wireless LAN (WLAN) radios cannot transmit and receive at
the same time.  Consequently, the capacity of relay nodes is halved.”), available at ftp://
ftp.research.microsoft.com/pub/tr/tr-2003-44.pdf.  Indeed, “[e]arly simulation experience
with wireless ad hoc networks suggests that their capacity can be surprisingly low, due to
the requirement that nodes forward each others’ packets.”  Jinyang Li et al., Capacity of
Ad Hoc Wireless Networks, 2001 Proc. 7th ACM Int’l Conf. on Mobile Computing &
Networking 61, available at http://www.pdos.lcs.mit.edu/papers/grid:mobicom01/paper.pdf.
72 See Gupta & Kumar, supra note 37.  One can try to avoid this decrease in user R
capacity, but, as always, there are tradeoffs.  One idea is to substitute the mobility of user
devices (i.e., the fact that the owners of them move around) for immediate forwarding.
Avoiding a decrease in user capacity thus comes at the expense of a great increase in the
time it takes for a message to be communicated, because the network is relying on the
physical circulation of user devices, which might take minutes or hours.  See Matthias
Grossglauser & David Tse, Mobility Increases the Capacity of Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks,
10 IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 477 (2002) (exploring multiuser diversity as
method of increasing per-user throughput), available at http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 24  3-DEC-03 16:30
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Serving as a repeater also consumes battery power.  Not only for-
warding others’ packets but also idle time—in which a user device is
listening for other packets so that it can repeat them—will consume a
considerable amount of the user device’s energy and therefore battery
power.73
Note further that the burdens are greater if others defect.  If a
user’s neighbors configure their devices so that they do not repeat (or
turn them off), her device will have to devote that much more of its
capacity to repeating others’ messages.  The only way for her to avoid
that burden is to refuse to repeat, which increases the burden on eve-
ryone else and encourages further defection.
In light of the costs to a user of serving as a repeater, and the
absence of direct benefits, it would be stunning if some users did not
seek to rely on others’ willingness to forward messages.  Indeed, we
have seen similar free riding in other cooperative networks.74  In the
networks envisioned by the commons advocates, however, having
access to a few other devices will not be sufficient (and indeed would
be little different from a cellular network).  Low-power transmissions
~dtse/ton_mob_final_3.pdf; David Tse, Capacity of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, at http://
www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~dtse/adhoc.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (suggesting that node
mobility allows tradeoff between user capacity and delay, and might be appropriate for
services that tolerate delays of minutes or hours); see also infra notes 110-21 and accompa- R
nying text (discussing tradeoffs involved in the design of abundant networks).  This is dif-
ferent from the proposed abundant networks, in that messages are moved not so much
through repeating as through actual movement.  In any event, it would not appear to
achieve the goals of the commons advocates, as it does not allow for any isochronous com-
munications (instant messaging, telephone calls, etc.), and thus excludes many of the most
desired forms of communication.  See Newton, supra note 1, at 436 (“Isochronous trans- R
mission means ‘two-way without delay.’  Normal everyday voice conversations are
isochronous.”).
73 See, e.g., Vikas Kawadia & P.R. Kumar, Power Control and Clustering in Ad Hoc
Networks (2003) (paper presented IEEE INFOCOM 2003) (“For current off-the-shelf
hardware, the power consumption in the transceiver electronics for transmitting, receiving
or even remaining idle, but awake, is almost an order of magnitude higher than the power
consumed when sleeping, i.e., turning the radio off.”), available at http://
decision.csl.uiuc.edu/~prkumar/ps_files/clustering.pdf.
74 Napster, for instance, was a system that allowed users to download music files stored
on others’ computers.  Significantly, users could download music files from other com-
puters without having to give other computers access to their music files.  That is, users had
the choice of using Napster only for their own benefit or also helping others to get copies
of music.  The users knew that the system depended on the willingness of computer users
to make their music files available, but nonetheless the data indicate that seventy percent
of Napster users did not make their computers available for others’ downloading.  See
Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, First Monday, Oct. 2000,
at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_10/adar/index.html.  Napster worked because a
relatively small percentage of computers opened themselves up to all comers (indeed
almost fifty percent of files were supplied by a mere one percent of users, id.), and no more
was necessary for the system to work.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 25  3-DEC-03 16:30
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over great distances require a mesh of repeaters; widespread defection
(i.e., refusal to forward messages) will undercut the system.75
A commons without controlling agents thus would not achieve
the goal of effectively infinite spectrum—or anything close to it.  We
could still have an unconstrained commons, but it would not look like
the network that commons advocates envision and instead likely
would be a jumble of frequently interfering devices.  This is an instan-
tiation of the tragedy of the commons discussed above.76  Here, such
overwhelming comes in the form of people both grabbing (using
higher power devices than everyone should use) and free riding
(relying on others to repeat messages but failing to do so themselves).
The discussion above demonstrates that the commons advocates’
vision of abundant networks entails a controlled environment.
Indeed, the commons advocates acknowledge this point:  Their envi-
sioned networks entail a central regulatory authority that would
impose requirements on all device manufacturers designed to ensure
that the devices use an appropriate set of protocols and standards.77
They are not proposing true open access, but instead a regulated
commons.78
75 See, e.g., Li et al., supra note 71 (“[F]or total capacity to scale up with network size R
the average distance between source and destination nodes must remain small as the net-
work grows.  Non-local traffic patterns in which this average distance grows with the net-
work size result in a rapid decrease of per node capacity.”); see also Feng Xue & P.R.
Kumar, The Number of Neighbors Needed for Connectivity of Wireless Networks, at
http://decision.csl.uiuc.edu/~prkumar/ps_files/connect.pdf (2002) (noting disagreement
among wireless engineers over number of neighbors to which each node must be con-
nected for mobile multihop network to operate successfully).
76 See supra text accompanying notes 45-53. R
77 See Benkler, supra note 1, at 362 (noting the importance of “administrative regula- R
tions by the FCC or protocols and standards set by the industry to prevent defection and
degradation of the quality of performance all industry members can deliver to their cus-
tomers”); Benkler, supra note 2, at 77-78 (discussing regulation of wireless commons by R
FCC or public trust); Buck, supra note 26, ¶¶ 37-41 (suggesting regulation by FCC along R
with management by local spectrum management group).
78 See supra note 44 (distinguishing open access from regulated commons).  Werbach’s R
most recent paper disagrees with Benkler’s suggestion of ex ante rules, and proposes
instead that people transmit freely and use tort law to sort out interference concerns.  See
Kevin Werbach, Supercommons:  Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication
58-62 (Aug. 29, 2003), available at http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2003/196/
Supercommons.pdf.  In order to determine whether the defendant has tortiously interfered
with the plaintiff, however, a judge will have to determine what rights against interference
the plaintiff has.  Once tort law enters the picture, in other words, there will be rules for
wireless transmissions.  Instead of being ex ante rules, they will be post hoc and may be
more case specific.  It bears noting that Werbach also proposes that one who transmits
according to acceptable protocols be protected from liability.  Id. at 62-63.  Insofar as
judges rely on those protocols to determine tort liability, there is little difference between
Benkler’s and Werbach’s proposals.  Perhaps more important, if Werbach’s proposed
system yielded a much less controlled system, in which people really could transmit fairly\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 26  3-DEC-03 16:30
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And the level of regulation involved is significant.  To return to
the example of repeating, it will not be sufficient for a device to be
able to forward others’ messages; it must actually do so.  This is rele-
vant because a user might want to set up a use (such as a webcam)
that occupies all of her device’s transmission capacity.  In theory the
device would be available to serve as a repeater, but in reality it would
be using all its capacity to send its own messages, and thus would not
repeat others’ messages.  This problem can be avoided only if the con-
troller of the abundant network mandates not only power limits and
repeating capability but also minimum amounts of listening time and
quiet time.79
The upshot is that, in order to create a “commons” with effec-
tively infinite network transport capacity, an entity will have to be
able to exercise meaningful control over the design of the user devices
(and thus of the network).80  In order for the system to work, some
sort of regulator (whether public or private) will need to be in a posi-
tion to ensure that the devices operate at low power, that they utilize
authorized methods of encoding, and that many (if not all) of the
devices provide cooperation gain by helping others’ messages along
their way.  The promise of abundance depends on significant control.
So the transport capacity of a given network is extraordinarily abun-
dant—or, more accurately, it might be extraordinarily abundant, if the
technology develops—only under a set of fairly tightly prescribed and
enforced rules.
freely, we would expect the interference discussed above.  See supra notes 45-54 and R
accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text for more detail on protocols for abun- R
dant networks.
80 The Report of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force stated:
Although the commons model is in many ways a highly deregulatory
“Darwinian” approach, as its proponents point out, productive use of spectrum
commons by unlicensed devices, particularly in lower spectrum bands, typically
requires significant regulatory limitations on device transmitter power that
preclude many other technically and economically feasible spectrum uses that
rely on higher-power signal propagation over longer distances, or that require
greater protection from interference.
Report of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, supra note 16, at 40; see also Mike R
Chartier, Enclosing the Commons:  A Real Estate Approach to Spectrum Rights, in Prac-
tical Steps to Spectrum Markets 14 (2001) (noting Lessig’s proposal for abundant networks
characterized by “smart” devices and stating that “[t]he problem with this is that right now
the FCC decides what ‘smart’ is.  Contrary to a free space where innovation can flourish,
the current system requires literally micro-management by the FCC to precisely define the
algorithms these alleged ‘smart’ devices must use.”).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 27  3-DEC-03 16:30
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II
THE COMMONS ADVOCATES’ ARGUMENTS AGAINST
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPECTRUM
These abundant networks sound wonderful, and the advocates
stress how valuable users might find them.81  Nonetheless, the advo-
cates worry that they won’t be created if there are private property
rights in spectrum.  Why would that be?  Why wouldn’t entrepreneurs
rush to create them?  The contention is that aspects of private prop-
erty rights create costs, such that the most efficient route is not the
one that is taken.  Commons advocates contend that, although an
abundant network is the optimal use of spectrum, certain costs apply
that end up making private abundant networks unattainable.
A. Costs of Allocating Spectrum in Small Allotments
The main argument commons advocates marshal against property
rights in spectrum involves transaction costs.  The basic point is fairly
straightforward.  Imagine, for instance, that the FCC decides to divide
100 megahertz of spectrum into 100 separate units of one megahertz
each.  If someone wants to create an abundant network that will cover
100 megahertz, she will have to undertake negotiations with each
owner of a one-megahertz slice.82  Such negotiations would be quite
expensive, and thus would add considerably to the cost of creating the
envisioned network.83
81 Buck elaborates:
A commons in the spectrum could offer several benefits, including greater
freedom to experiment with local variations on spectrum usage, a greater
incentive to develop technologies for spectrum sharing (such as spread spec-
trum radios or ultra-wide-band technology), and a greater harnessing of
widely-dispersed information about spectrum usage.  Additionally, regulating
the spectrum as a commons might facilitate efficient transactions among com-
peting users, and make economies of scale feasible for cross-boundary uses.
Buck, supra note 26, ¶ 11.  And Benkler explains: R
As best we can foresee, these [spectrum commons] networks will not supplant
absolutely owned wired and wireless networks in delivering real time commu-
nications with assured quality of service.  They will enable, however, a wide
range of uses, from Internet access to online games, overnight (or during
dinner) delivery of video on demand, and, potentially, local nonessential video
conferencing among friends or for town hall meetings.
Benkler, supra note 33, at 62. R
82 I use 100 megahertz as an illustrative bandwidth for an abundant network.  As I
noted above, there is nothing magical about 100 megahertz (or any other number of
megahertz), and an abundant network could cover a much smaller, or much bigger, range.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text. R
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Closely related to this argument is a concern about the possibility
of holdouts.84  Not only would the creator of a broadband network
have to negotiate with dozens of spectrum owners, but if any one of
them refused to agree, then the network could not exist as planned.
Each spectrum owner has an incentive to let others sell first, and then
hold out for a price that allows it to appropriate the bulk of the sur-
plus created by the aggregation of spectrum.85  The possibility of such
strategic behavior is an added cost of creating abundant networks.86
84 Indeed, holdout costs are often treated as a subset of transaction costs.
85 See, e.g., Buck, supra note 26, ¶ 103 (noting that with allotment of spectrum into R
small parcels “the holdout problem might arise, as a license holder of a prime area of
spectrum could demand too much money for relinquishing his license to the would-be
aggregator”).
86 At least in theory, holdout costs per se should not transform abundant networks
from a profitable to an unprofitable proposition for aggregators.  Such problems will arise
if the holdout overestimates the available surplus to be divided and thus asks for a fee that
would transfer all the aggregator’s profit to the holdout.  (If the aggregator refused, there
would be no network; if it agreed, it would operate at a loss.)  If we assume that both
parties are rational, they should reach an agreement that leaves the aggregator able to
make a profit, and thus with an incentive to create an abundant network.  In this way,
holdout costs should be a purely distributional issue—how much of the value will the
aggregator have to surrender to the holdout.  By contrast, even with rational bargainers,
transaction costs may well exceed the surplus created by the value of the network, because
each bargainer would want to be compensated for its time; if no deal could result because
of the costs of those negotiations, any given negotiator still will prefer that option to one in
which it negotiates and is not paid for its time.  Holdout fees, on the other hand, are
designed not to capture the costs of negotiating, but instead to capture some of the value
that the enterprise creates.  Such fees are above and beyond any actual expenses incurred
by the holdout.  The result is that a rational holdout generally would not prefer an option
that prevents the creation of an abundant network, because then it would be losing out on
a potential windfall.  Thus, assuming rationality, transaction costs may well outweigh the
value created by an abundant (or any other) network, but holdout costs should not.
This reasoning only goes so far, however.  Even if a rational holdout would not want
to prevent the network from being created, the mere fact of the possibility of holdouts
increases transaction costs.  That is, the costs of negotiation with a holdout may be high, in
part because the buyer has to present evidence to the holdout of how much surplus is
created and convince her that it is accurately assaying those costs.  See Kenneth J. Arrow,
The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation Under Incomplete Information, in
Economics and Human Welfare:  Essays in Honor of Tibor Scitovsky 23, 29-34 (Michael J.
Boskin ed., 1979).  The very fact that someone tries to hold out, in other words, increases
costs.  And by the time the rational holdout realizes that the remaining surplus in the
project is sufficiently low that even its minimal demands for additional negotiation and
information about that surplus impose a cost on the buyer that outweighs that remaining
surplus, this cost will have been incurred; the holdout will receive this information only in
the course of such costly negotiations in the first place.
So if holdout costs are higher for one option than for another, they may have the same
distorting effect as transaction costs in leading entities to choose the option with lower
holdout costs.  See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Literature 1067, 1078 (1989) (“The problem of
dividing the surplus created by settlement is a source of instability that can lead to bar-
gaining breakdowns.”).  Holdout costs are thus relevant to the analysis in this Article
insofar as they decrease the likelihood that an entity will prefer to create an abundant\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 29  3-DEC-03 16:30
December 2003] SPECTRUM ABUNDANCE 2035
These costs are real:  Transaction and holdout costs will add to
the expense of creating abundant networks.  In some cases a partic-
ular use will be so much more profitable than the alternatives that,
even if the proposed use has high transaction costs and other options
have few or no such costs, the value of the use outweighs the added
costs involved.  But that will not always be so.  The challenge
presented by transaction and holdout costs is that sometimes the most
efficient alternative will not be undertaken because its superiority
over other options does not outweigh these costs.87
The important point to recognize, though, is that these costs are
not inherent in the selling of property rights in spectrum.  They are
purely a function of the allotment of spectrum into small pieces.  If the
government chooses to allot spectrum in large (say, 100-megahertz)
units, rather than much smaller ones, then an abundant network can
be created with small transaction costs (one negotiation or auction)
and no holdout costs.  And, crucially, the government can create such
allotments under either a public or a private ownership scheme.  If the
government wants to reduce the barriers to creating the capacious
networks envisioned by the commons advocates, it can allot spectrum
in big chunks and then assign them as it sees fit.
This does not necessarily mean either that spectrum should, in
fact, be allotted in big chunks or that abundant networks will arise if
spectrum is so allotted.  As I will discuss in Part IV, the first conten-
tion is a contestable policy question and the second is an uncertain
prediction.  The point here is that transaction and holdout costs are
not a result of property rights, but instead result from the division of
spectrum into small slices of frequencies.88
network, given the other options available to that entity.  That is, holdout costs (like trans-
action costs) entailed by the most efficient alternative may lead an entity to choose instead
a less efficient alternative, if the latter has lower holdout costs.
87 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal Stud.
13, 27 (1972) (noting that transaction costs can cause “the foreclosure of the use of possibly
cheaper cost-avoidance techniques”); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Pat-
ents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698-99
(1998) (noting that transaction costs of obtaining agreements from many different property
owners can thwart efficient development).
88 Benkler makes an additional argument about the alleged inconsistency of private
property rights and abundant networks—namely that with private property rights “the dif-
ficulty of assembling a broad swath of frequencies would render unlikely the initial devel-
opment of more than one such band [i.e., abundant network].”  Benkler, supra note 1, at R
363.  Benkler suggests that this likely will lead to equipment manufacturers controlling that
single band, and that “[w]ithout regulatory intervention, it is unlikely that these manufac-
turers would offer competitors nondiscriminatory access to their spectrum.”  Id. at 363-64.
The results of having only one band for an abundant network may or may not produce the
effects that Benkler predicts, see infra Part III.D, but the important point here is that his
assumption of having only one band rests on his presupposition that the spectrum will be\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 30  3-DEC-03 16:30
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B. Fears that, Even with Big Allotments,
Property Rights Will Not Result in Abundant Networks
A different argument against having property rights in spectrum
is that, even if spectrum is allotted into chunks sufficiently large that
each can support an abundant network, the private owners of such
chunks will not have sufficient incentive to create such a network
because it will be less remunerative for them.  The argument in the
previous section that transaction and holdout costs may effectively
preclude otherwise efficient uses of spectrum is quite different from
the argument that private owners of spectrum rights will not have suf-
ficient incentive to create the desired networks even if they do not
have to aggregate spectrum.
If each allotment of spectrum were big enough to support one of
the envisioned networks, why wouldn’t owners of those allotments
create them?  Why wouldn’t it be more remunerative for an owner to
create such a network?  At the outset, note that there are no costs
associated with aggregating spectrum (it has already been aggregated
into sufficiently big pieces), and instead transaction costs now apply to
the disaggregation of spectrum.  If the owner wants to divide its spec-
trum into smaller units (e.g., so that firms can offer an entirely dif-
ferent service, such as traditional television broadcasting),89 it will
incur the transaction costs of auctioning (or negotiating the transfer
of) those smaller units.90  Given that, all else equal, it would be less
allotted in small slices, giving rise to “the difficulty of assembling a broad swath of frequen-
cies,” id. at 363.  As the previous discussion in text highlights, however, allotment of broad
swaths of frequencies—so that each allotment is big enough to support an abundant net-
work—is totally consistent with property rights in spectrum.  The aggregation hurdle that,
in Benkler’s view, will lead to the development of only one band with an abundant net-
work and thus to equipment manufacturers blocking potential competitors need not exist
in a property rights regime.
89 Abundant networks almost certainly would not be optimized for real-time video with
high quality of service, and, in any event, would not be consistent with traditional, high-
power television broadcasting.  See Shakkottai et al., supra note 36 (discussing increases in R
delay flowing from increases in size of multihop network); see also Yochai Benkler, From
Consumers to Users:  Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable
Commons and User Access, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561, 577 (1999-2000) (arguing that abun-
dant networks will work well for some communications, “[w]hile such a system may not
perfectly serve all real-time communications with assured quality of service”); Benkler,
supra note 33, at 62 (acknowledging that abundant networks likely would “not supplant R
absolutely owned wired and wireless networks in delivering real time communications with
assured quality of service”); supra note 36 (discussing fact that abundant networks will not R
be optimized for real-time video).  Regarding traditional high-power broadcasting, one of
the central aspects of abundant networks is that no one will transmit at high power over
the spectrum dedicated to such networks.  See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. R
90 In addition, the owner will incur the cost of determining what size allotments will
maximize the total amount of money that it receives for its spectrum.  Both this cost and
the cost of auctioning currently consume a fair amount of energy within the government,\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 31  3-DEC-03 16:30
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costly for owners of large swaths to use their full allotment for a single
purpose—such as an abundant network—than to subdivide it, why
wouldn’t owners create those networks?
One possible answer is that although an abundant network would
create significant value for users, spectrum owners would be unable to
capture this value.  Maybe people will want to use the system and will
derive great benefits from it, but spectrum owners will not profit from
these abundant networks and thus will not create them.  There is no
reason, however, to assume that this will be the case.  The owner of
spectrum can find remuneration from a variety of sources.  It might,
for example, charge on a per-minute basis for transmission time used,
or per message sent.91  Commons advocates might respond that usage
will be difficult to track and perhaps not be worth tracking, because
each communication will be too cheap to meter.92  On this reasoning,
regimes relying on such usage charges either will not work or will
impose such significant transaction costs that they will undermine the
efficiency of the scheme.93
Assuming this is true, however, there are other ways of reaping
revenues that would not pose these problems.  The owner of an abun-
dant network might charge a flat monthly fee for all the capacity that
a person wants to use.  Or, if the spectrum owner found that con-
sumers wanted to avoid the hassles of monthly charges, it might
charge a royalty fee on the end-user equipment (i.e., the device that
sends and receives messages) that compensates it for its spectrum.94
and in this scenario the private owner would take on this task.  See infra Part IV.A on the
relevance of the costs of disaggregating the spectrum to proposals to allot the spectrum in
big chunks.
91 Eli Noam suggests another possibility—a spot market in which people pay instanta-
neously for the messages they want to send.  See Noam, supra note 55, at 765.  Noam R
proposes such a system as an alternative to property rights, but there is no reason why a
spectrum owner could not create such rolling instantaneous auctions.
92 Metering would be possible even in a distributed network (i.e., where messages did
not go through a central gateway).  Each user device, for example, could be equipped with
a program that counted each message that a user initiated and sent.  The program could
have the device automatically contact a billing agent periodically (say, every month) during
a moment of quiet time to give the count for that period, allowing the billing agent to bill
the user on a metered basis.
93 This conclusion is by no means ineluctable.  A number of commentators have noted
that the technology exists to support instantaneous micropayments that would be fairly
cheap to administer; the real question is whether there is a market for such a system.  See
Ronald J. Mann & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce 460-61 (2002) (discussing
micropayments, and noting that micropayment systems have been developed); Noam,
supra note 55 (proposing instantaneous spectrum auctions and micropayments). R
94 See Kwerel & Williams, supra note 17, at 7 (“A market system would also provide R
the opportunity for private spectrum licensees in flexible bands to compete with the gov-
ernment for the provision of spectrum for low-power devices, just as private facilities that
charge admission compete with public parks.  Licensees might find it profitable to do so by\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 32  3-DEC-03 16:30
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Using either method, an owner can capture revenue from a service
that is too cheap to meter.
It bears noting, in this regard, that Benkler suggests that the
pricing of government-created abundant networks would be via end-
user devices, that charging customers this way is the most efficient
means of paying for abundant networks, and that such pricing is
inconsistent with private ownership.95  The first proposition seems
correct and the second is plausible (though highly questionable),96 but
the third is untenable.  There is no reason to think that private compa-
nies (and the capital markets that supply them with funding) could not
utilize royalty fees.97  This is not mere speculation.  We have seen all
manner of compensation—including royalty fees, flat monthly
charges, and usage pricing—with existing wireless (and, for that
matter, wired)98 services.  Spectrum licensees have, for example, man-
aged to get remunerated for cellular telephony, satellite services,
Internet access, etc. through combinations of these revenue streams.
And other players as well (such as companies like Qualcomm that
create the algorithms by which communications are transmitted) have
found ways to earn revenue that need not depend on per-minute
usage.  Indeed, Qualcomm receives income via the sort of royalty fees
that Benkler advocates.99  Simply stated, there are many different bus-
charging manufacturers of such devices to operate on their spectrum.”); see also id. at 31
(“One possible arrangement would be for a licensee or group of licensees covering a par-
ticular band throughout the U.S. to charge manufacturers a fee for the right to produce
and market devices to operate in that band.”).
95 See Benkler, supra note 1, at 351 (“[T]he value of communications over time using R
an unlicensed device is expressed in the price of the equipment.”); Benkler, supra note 2, R
at 51-52, 54, 69 (suggesting that private ownership will result in usage pricing and that with
government networks, costs will be bundled into price of user device; stating that usage
pricing is inefficient).  As I discuss below, however, the lack of pricing flexibility is actually
a disadvantage.  See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. R
96 See infra note 179 (discussing advantages of pricing flexibility). R
97 Indeed, it is not at all clear (to put it mildly) why one should assume that an actor not
subject to the profit motive—such as a government entity—would be more likely to find
the most efficient pricing mechanism than a profit-seeking entity would be.  I can make an
educated guess about what combination of royalty fees, monthly charges, per-minute
charges, etc. would be most efficient, but those with an economic stake have at least as
much insight plus a greater incentive to find the most efficient mechanism.  See Part III.B.
98 Wire, after all, is just “spectrum in a tube.”  See Hazlett, supra note 9, at 338; see also R
Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property Rights to
Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & Econ. 581, 584 n.11 (1998) (“Fiber-optic transmission is high-
frequency radio in a glass conduit.”).
99 See Eric Nee, Qualcomm Hits the Big Time, Fortune, May 15, 2000, at 213, 216
(noting that “Qualcomm collects a royalty of about $10 for each CDMA phone sold”);
Yonhap English News, Qualcomm Rakes in 1.52 Trillion Won in CDMA Royalty in South
Korea (Sept. 17, 2003) (noting that “[u]nder a royalty-bearing agreement, South Korean
handset manufacturers . . . should pay Qualcomm 5.25 percent of every CDMA cell phone
sold at home and 5.75 percent for exports”), 2003 WL 56870894.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 33  3-DEC-03 16:30
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iness models that allow for compensation for wireless services,
including abundant networks.  There is no reason to believe that spec-
trum owners will not be able to receive compensation for the value
that they create.
One might refine the problem by casting it as one of differential
ability to realize potential gains:  Perhaps capturing the value of an
abundant network is more difficult than capturing the value of other
kinds of wireless services, with the result that companies will choose
somewhat less valuable services that allow for greater capture of
value.  But why would realizing revenue from abundant networks be
any more difficult than realizing revenue from other systems?  Indeed,
the means for capturing the value of abundant networks seem compa-
rable to those for services like Internet access and easier than those
for over-the-air broadcasting.  As to the former, some forms of
Internet usage are probably too cheap to meter; but for Internet
access, as for abundant networks, revenue streams are available via
monthly flat fees or fees embedded in equipment charges.
Broadcasting, meanwhile, does a notoriously bad job of capturing
consumers’ willingness to pay because it relies on advertisers.  If
broadcasters charged per person or per program, they would get some
sense of how much value consumers placed on the programming.
Instead, broadcasters charge viewers nothing and rely on advertising
revenue as a proxy.  As many scholars have pointed out, this creates a
big disconnect between value to users and payment to spectrum
owners, as users do not pay directly.100
This might suggest another argument:  Maybe there are imple-
mentation costs that would apply to an abundant network and not to
other uses of spectrum.  This is almost assuredly true.  Every possible
wireless use entails some costs that are unique to it.101  The cost struc-
100 Advertisers pay per eyeball, so the revenue stream to broadcasters does not capture
increments of viewer interest beyond the willingness to watch.  That is, advertisers gener-
ally focus on the size and demographics of the audience, and so pay based on who is
watching.  Even if the same number of viewers like program A just enough to watch it but
love program B, the broadcaster will receive the same revenue for both.  The value created
by a program that viewers particularly love is not reflected in the revenue received by
broadcasters.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 62-63
(1993) (describing failure of advertising-driven model of broadcasting to reflect consumer
preferences); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 311,
319-22 (1997) (same).
101 The same point applies to a related argument, namely that abundant networks might
not appear because they require a large number of subscribers, and an entrepreneurial
company might not be willing to underwrite a massive investment knowing that it needs a
large number of subscribers before it breaks even.  That is, abundant networks would be
profitable only if they had lots of subscribers, so the start up costs are significant.  The
problem with this argument is that the same is true for almost all networks:  The fixed costs
entailed in creating the infrastructure are very great (and the marginal cost of adding sub-\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 34  3-DEC-03 16:30
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ture of broadcasting is different from that of wireless telephony, which
is different from that of satellites, etc.  A claimed advantage of abun-
dant networks, however, is that their costs are lower than the costs for
other networks:  The idea is that abundant networks use spectrum
more efficiently (they allow for many more communications on a
given slice of spectrum) and have minimal infrastructure costs
(because each user device is also a repeater).  The differential costs of
setting up various networks should work in favor of abundant net-
works.  And, if they do not, that suggests that these networks in prac-
tice do not meet their potential in theory.
A different possible argument is that no spectrum owner would
participate in the creation of one of these abundant networks, out of
fear that such a network would be so successful that it would over-
whelm the existing market.  That is, owners would refrain from cre-
ating abundant networks as a way of protecting their networks already
in place.  There is evidence that entrenched incumbents in highly con-
centrated—particularly monopoly—markets are often slow to imple-
ment new technologies that might threaten their existing service.102
But the market for wireless services has many competing players—
including established cellular companies, new entrants, and formerly
new entrants that have established themselves—that have offered a
continuing supply of new wireless services.103  This competition is sig-
scribers is low), so the cost of supplying service to the first few customers is extraordinarily
high.  The creator of such a network must have the stomach to operate at a loss until
enough subscribers join the network.  Network creators—and the capital markets—are
willing to do this for other kinds of networks, and there is no reason to believe that the
same would not be true for abundant networks.
Indeed, this point applies with particular force in light of some of the advantages of
abundant networks:  They have much less infrastructure than conventional networks do,
and they scale easily.  Each added user also represents added capacity.  As a result, the
start up costs, and the break-even point in terms of the number of subscribers, should be
lower for abundant networks than for other networks.
102 See Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S.
Telecommunications, 2000 U. Chi. Legal F. 85.  Professor Shelanski looked at the imple-
mentation of ten sample technologies—four that were deployed under monopoly condi-
tions, three under concentrated oligopolies (with two or three firms in competition), and
three under competitive oligopolies (markets with more than three competing firms).  He
found that “[w]hile there is substantial variation in deployment times for different technol-
ogies under a given market structure—from four to fourteen years under monopoly, four
to twelve years under duopoly/triopoly, and two to seven years under competition—
average deployment times speed up as markets become more competitive.”  Id. at 115; see
also Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 534, 581 (2003) (noting that “incumbent monopolies will often fail to
develop and deploy radically new technologies”).
103 Some of these new services are offered by existing incumbents (such as the recent
introduction of video over cellular phones and the combination of PDAs with cellular
phones).  Others are offered by former upstarts that became established players because of
the success of a new product (such as Research In Motion Limited, the maker of Blackber-\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 35  3-DEC-03 16:30
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nificant, because studies have also shown that disruptive technolo-
gies—and innovations more generally—are introduced more rapidly
in competitive markets.104  For example, analog cellular dramatically
weakened the market position of pagers, and digital cellular is doing
the same to analog cellular.105  Indeed, some companies are deploying
wireless broadband mesh networks that are similar to abundant net-
works (although they do not meet abundant networks’ promise of
effectively infinite spectrum).106  Simply stated, there is no reason to
expect that all the players would refrain from introducing abundant
networks.  If these abundant networks will be so successful, we should
expect someone to create them and reap the rewards from a better
system.107
Maybe the problem instead is that these abundant networks will
not be as remunerative because people will simply pay more money
for other services.  The problem would be that abundant networks
were not sufficiently valuable to people, rather than that their value
could not be captured.  If, after all, the demand for Britney Spears
music broadcasts is at all levels of supply greater than the demand for
the capability offered by abundant networks, then we should expect
that no abundant networks will be created; Britney Spears will rule
the airwaves.
ries, see Blackberry, About Us, at http://www.blackberry.net/about/index.shtml (last vis-
ited Aug. 24, 2003); Blackberry, Key Features, at http://www.blackberry.com/products/
blackberry/key_features.shtml (last visited Aug. 14, 2003)).  Still others are offered by com-
panies that remain relative upstarts (such as personal broadband service via antenna arrays
by ArrayComm, see ArrayComm, iBurst System Overview, at http://www.arraycomm.com/
prods/ib_sys_overview.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2003)).
104 See Shelanski, supra note 102, at 114-18; Weiser, supra note 102, at 585 (suggesting R
that competition produces more innovative, and more disruptive, technologies); see also
Richard N. Langlois, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities:
Toward a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach, in Dynamic Competition and Public
Policy:  Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues 193, 207 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001)
(“[I]nnovation normally proceeds fastest when a large number of distinct participants are
trying multiple approaches simultaneously.”); infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text. R
105 Indeed, in the cellular market, both new entrants and existing players are offering
the disruptive technology.  That is, companies providing the older service also provide the
newer one, even though by doing so they cut into the market share of the older service.
106 See Invisible Networks, Cost-Effective Rollout of Wireless Broadband Networks, at
http://www.invisible.uk.net/how/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2003); MeshNetworks, Inc., Ad
Hoc Peer-to-Peer Routing Technology, at http://www.meshnetworks.com/pages/help/
printable_pages/technology/intro_technology.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2003); Nokia Net-
works, Nokia Rooftop Wireless Routing:  White Paper (2001), at http://www.americasnet
work.com/americasnetwork/data/articlebrief/americasnetwork/412002/34898/article.pdf;
Radiant Networks, Extend the Reach of Your Broadband Network, at http://
www.radiantnetworks.com/meshworks/mwlesummary.asp (last visited Aug. 14, 2003); see
also Adya et al., supra note 71, at 1. R
107 See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the related concern R
that one firm might buy all the available spectrum.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 36  3-DEC-03 16:30
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If people simply will pay more for services other than those pro-
vided by abundant networks, then the entire case for those networks
is undermined.  That lack of popularity should tell us something.  The
reason that cellular telephony providers will be able to bid more for a
given slice of spectrum than will companies that want to broadcast
shows about law professors is that consumers value the former more
than the latter.  Willingness to pay provides a unit of measurement for
determining which services people actually value most highly.  This is
a basic reason to have auctions:  People can claim that all sorts of
services are valuable, but willingness to pay has proven to be more
reliable than mere conjecture as an indicator of value.
The case for abundant networks is that they will be immensely
valuable to people.  Each of us will be able to transmit as much infor-
mation as we would like, to whomever we choose.  Indeed, this is a
key element of the advocates’ arguments for such networks:  They
would be the best possible use of spectrum because they would allow
people to communicate far more freely and efficiently.  And, in light
of the considerable amounts of money that people are willing to pay
for cellular telephones, there is every reason to believe that users
would be willing to pay for their use of these new abundant networks.
Moreover, abundant networks have a huge advantage:  Conven-
tional networks have a limit on the number of users they can add,
because of the danger of interference.  The whole point of abundant
networks is that they eliminate this limit.  This means, as I discussed in
Part I, that abundant networks can accommodate many more users
than conventional networks can—effectively everyone who would
want to transmit.  For a potential creator of such a network, this
means that it can receive much less money per user than a conven-
tional network does and still be able to outbid the conventional net-
work proprietor for spectrum because it will have so many more users.
Instead of, say, 100,000 cellular telephones producing thirty dollars a
month in revenue, it can have 10,000,000 abundant network devices
producing fifty cents a month; if so, it will be able to bid more for
spectrum.  Moreover, the creator of the abundant network would
have every reason to believe that it would, in fact, gain lots of cus-
tomers.  Who wouldn’t willingly, or even happily, pay fifty cents a
month for access to a network that provides everything a cellular net-
work does?
Perhaps the concern is that bids at auctions will not fully reflect
the value of these abundant networks, because willingness to pay does
not reflect the preferences of those who are unable to pay.  It is true
that willingness to pay excludes those without disposable income.
And the less disposable income a person has, the less her views will be\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 37  3-DEC-03 16:30
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reflected in the bid for a good.  This point, of course, is not limited to
spectrum auctions, but instead applies to all auctions—indeed all eco-
nomic activity.  But the commons advocates have given us no reason
to suppose that abundant networks will be any more subject to this
distortion than any other network is.108  More important, there is no
reason to assume so.  All wireless services tend to skew toward those
with disposable income.  Because they allow for so many people to
communicate, however, abundant networks support a business model
that involves lower prices and more users.  Bids from cellular prov-
iders will not reflect the value of their networks to those who are
willing to pay ten dollars a month for a cellular telephone; such poten-
tial payers will not be able to afford cellular service and thus will con-
tribute nothing to the cellular company’s business plan (and therefore
to its bid for spectrum).  Bids from providers of abundant networks
will capture those who would pay ten dollars a month, as well as those
who can afford to pay much less than that.
III
EVALUATING GOVERNMENT VERSUS PRIVATE CONTROL
OF ABUNDANT NETWORKS
The discussion so far indicates several things:  As to the networks
themselves, it may be possible for engineers to develop networks that,
through computational complexity and cooperation gain, can accom-
modate an effectively infinite number of users.  Such a system would
work, however, only if the devices deployed on the network are
designed according to fairly tight specifications.  With respect to the
question of who might create these networks, either private ownership
or government control can produce abundant networks.  As long as
spectrum is allotted in large enough slices, there are no costs that
108 Note that if we decide that having auctions for spectrum rights is unattractive, that
does not condemn property rights in spectrum.  Auctions are one way that the government
can distribute property rights, but there are other mechanisms that do not involve mone-
tary payment for spectrum.  Indeed, the FCC has utilized two of them—comparative hear-
ings to choose the most meritorious applicant and lotteries.  See Benjamin et al., supra
note 4, at 81-86, 144-45 (discussing FCC’s use of hearings and lotteries); supra note 18 R
(noting that some advocates of property rights do not push for auctions).  When discussing
the distribution of spectrum rights in this Article, I often simply refer to “auctions”—in
part because they are the dominant current mode of governmental distribution, in part
because that is how buyers of spectrum licenses dispose of them to third parties, in part
because auctions are my preferred means of distribution, and in part because saying “auc-
tions, lotteries, comparative hearings, or bestowing rights on current incumbents” would be
ungainly.  See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 13 (noting prevalence of auctions as R
means of distributing spectrum); supra note 13 (noting that licensees transfer their licenses R
via private auction); see also Kwerel & Felker, supra note 13 (discussing advantages of R
auctions).  But auctions and property rights need not stand or fall together.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 38  3-DEC-03 16:30
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would inhibit private owners’ creation of abundant networks.  And if
the abundant networks are as efficient as their advocates suggest, we
should expect that private owners of spectrum rights will create them.
Just because private owners can create these networks, however,
does not mean that they are the best entities to control spectrum.  The
next step is to compare different models of control.  As I noted in the
introduction, there are five possible models:  a single abundant net-
work controlled by the government; a single network controlled by a
private entity; multiple networks controlled by the government; mul-
tiple networks controlled by private entities; or multiple networks,
some controlled by private entities and others by the government.
Assuming that someone could design and implement a successful
abundant network,109 how should we evaluate these various options?
The conventional arguments for preferring competition among
private owners as a means of allocating a given resource are well
known.  Private companies in a competitive market, motivated by a
desire for profits, have a great incentive to find the most efficient and
popular uses of a given resource.  Government entities have no similar
incentive, because a better use will not enrich them.  Instead, govern-
ment actors respond to their own constituencies and influences.  This
may be fine insofar as those influences reflect the public interest, but
it is more troubling if instead they reflect well-organized private inter-
ests (or government actors’ own interests).  The main disadvantage of
private ownership is the danger of private concentrations of power.  A
monopolist lacks the appropriate incentives, so the likelihood of a
monopoly is a serious problem.  On the other hand (and related to the
point above), government participation in the market can lead to rent-
seeking behavior on the part of companies vying for the government’s
favor.
These familiar arguments play out in distinctive ways in the spec-
trum context, and specifically in the context of commons advocates’
proposals for abundant networks.  Much of this distinctiveness flows
from the nature of the protocols that will define the network.  I begin,
then, with some relevant features of those protocols specifically, and
protocols more generally.
109 To be clear, for purposes of this Part, I am assuming that the commons advocates are
correct in suggesting both that the engineering of these networks will work as planned and
that users will value these networks and thus will want to use them.  In Part IV.B, I will
address the question whether these networks will be as successful as planned, and the sig-
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A. Protocols and Lobbying
Any protocol entails some limitations and encodes some techno-
logical choices.  This is a function of having a protocol.  If we are
going to have truly open access (where anyone can transmit as she
pleases), then there is no need for any limiting protocols.  But once we
decide to limit usage to those who follow certain rules, those limita-
tions are embodied in the protocols we adopt.
The limitations entail choices that may benefit some services at
the expense of others.  To pick one obvious example, there may be
power limits (as there are in the FCC’s unlicensed bands and as there
would be in abundant networks).110  These limits may make some ser-
vices impossible (e.g., traditional broadcasting) and others difficult
(e.g., point-to-point communications over long distances), while
having no effect on, and therefore optimizing on that network, other
forms of communication (e.g., multi-hop packetized transmissions, as
in an abundant network).
As I discussed in Part I.B, the protocols for abundant networks
will have to be designed with fairly tight specifications in order for the
networks to work as planned, and they will have to cover a wide range
of issues.111  One example arises from the fact that user devices must
not only be capable of repeating but also must have minimum
amounts of listening and quiet time (so that they actually serve as
repeaters).112  How long and how frequent would the periods have to
be during which a device was not trying to send or receive its own
messages and thus was able to repeat others’ messages?  What sort of
queuing would be required?  Would the protocol include a require-
ment of listen-before-talk (requiring the user device to determine
whether a neighbor is trying to send a message before sending its
own), or listen-while-talk (requiring collision detection while the mes-
sage is being sent), or some other means of collision avoidance?
Under what, if any, circumstances could a device refuse to act as a
repeater even though it was otherwise able to do so (e.g., if the battery
was low)?
110 The FCC’s current unlicensed bands are usable only by devices with certain power
limits.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text; supra note 48. R
111 See Theodore S. Rappaport et al., Wireless Communications:  Past Events and a
Future Perspective, IEEE Comm. Mag., May 2002, at 148, 158 (“The multi-hopping tech-
nique increases the network capacity by spatial domain reuse of concurrent but physically
separated multihop sessions in a large-scale network (i.e., reduces interference), conserves
transmit energy resources, and increases the overall network throughput at the expense of
a more complex routing-protocol design.”).
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These are only a few of the many choices that are entailed in the
selection of protocols for an abundant network.  There are also ques-
tions of antenna design, standards and techniques for error correction,
and strategies to overcome signal propagation effects, to name just a
few.113  The list of potential limits is long, and the choices are very
complex.114  There are three major annual international conferences
that focus on the design of these networks, each presenting papers
that debate these questions and put forward competing approaches.115
Indeed, there are competing approaches on almost every issue rele-
vant to the protocols for abundant networks.116  Deciding what needs
to be included in a protocol, what approaches to take, and what the
permissible ranges will be, is a daunting undertaking, involving dozens
of choices.
Just as importantly, the choices underscore the fact that there are
always tradeoffs, and there is no perfectly neutral platform.117  Each
aspect of the protocols will create winners and losers among the kinds
of devices that use the network and the services they offer.118  Some
services will be easy to provide, others more difficult.119  And this will,
in turn, mean that some companies’ products and services will be win-
ners and others will be losers.  In mobile telephony, for example, the
choice was first between analog standards, then between CDMA,
113 See Ian F. Akyildiz et al., A Survey on Sensor Networks, IEEE Comm. Mag., Aug.
2002, at 102, 105, 108, 111-13 (describing some of numerous open research questions per-
taining to design of low-power multihop mesh networks).
114 See Rappaport et al., supra note 111, at 158-60 (discussing many choices and trade- R
offs entailed in abundant network design).
115 There is IEEE Infocom, see IEEE Infocom, IEEE Infocom:  The Conference on
Computer Communications, at http://www.ieee-infocom.org (last modified Mar. 12, 2003)
(an annual joint conference of the IEEE computer and communications societies);
MobiCom, see MobiCom, MobiCom:  The ACM Annual International Conference on
Mobile Computing and Networking, at http://turing.acm.org/sigs/sigmobile/mobicom/ (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003) (annual conference on mobile computing and networking); and
MobiHoc, see MobiHoc, MobiHoc:  The ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad
Hoc Networking and Computing, http://sigmobile.org/mobihoc/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2003)
(annual conference on mobile ad hoc networking and computing).
116 See Akyildiz et al., supra note 113. R
117 See Hazlett, supra note 9, at 498 (“Disputes over standards underscore that ‘open R
access’ is only nominally open, and that scarcity continues to force trade-offs between radi-
ated power levels, equipment cost, functionality (e.g., mobile vs. fixed), bandwidth, and
signal reliability.”).
118 See Goodman, supra note 69, at 76 (“[I]nherent in any agreement to abide by certain R
technical protocols is a bias towards a set of technical architectures that can be sup-
ported.”); Rappaport et al., supra note 111, at 153-60 (discussing ways that different pro- R
tocol designs enable, and optimize, different kinds of services).
119 Benkler, for example, envisions protocols that probably would not allow for real-
time streaming video, but would optimize other forms of communication.  See supra note
33 and accompanying text; supra note 89 and accompanying text. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 41  3-DEC-03 16:30
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TDMA,120 and GSM,121 and now between various third-generation
platforms.  Not only the creators of various standards but also the
companies that supply products and services based on those standards
have a huge amount at stake in the choice between them.  Even the
more minimally specified standards for ultrawideband service pro-
duced winning and losing companies.
These aspects of protocols open the door to lobbying.122  The
determination of which networking standards will be approved for an
abundant network has great consequences for potential providers of
products and services.  Each potential provider has an interest in the
controller of the network creating a standard that favors its own
devices and services—ideally excluding (or at least not optimizing) the
devices and services of other providers—so that the favored provider
can have a privileged status, enabling it to charge supracompetitive
prices.123  Each provider thus would want to lobby to gain a regulatory
advantage.  The incentives of potential service providers are the same
whether the network regulator is the government or a private entity
that controls spectrum; either way, a provider would want preferred
status.  A private network owner that competes with other private
network owners, however, would have no reason to respond to lob-
bying by artificially limiting the vigor of competition among service
providers.  The network owner’s interest in maximizing its profits
gives it an incentive to choose the standard that consumers value most
highly.124  The government, by contrast, lacks that incentive, as the
rewards for government actors are not directly tied to market success.
Other forms of currency become relevant, and lobbyists are adept at
120 TDMA stands for “time division multiple access.”
121 GSM stands for “global system for mobile” communications.
122 See James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet Openness by Government Fiat, 96 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1553, 1573 (2002) (reviewing Lessig, The Future of Ideas, supra note 3) (“A secon- R
dary cost of creating spectrum commons is the residual government authority retained,
creating opportunities for rent-seeking political behavior.”).  As Speta pointedly notes,
Lessig acknowledges as much in the very book that argues for spectrum commons.  See id.;
Lessig, The Future of Ideas, supra note 3, at 74 (“It is an iron law of modern democracy R
that when you create a regulator, you create a target for influence, and when you create a
target for influence, those in the best position to influence will train their efforts upon that
target.”); id. at 237 (“It is an iron law of politics that the organized beat the unorganized
and that the vested have interests that get organized over the unknown.”).
123 See Speta, supra note 122, at 1573 (noting that “incumbents are much more suc- R
cessful, over the long-run, at using law than markets to protect themselves”).
124 Note that this applies to vertically integrated companies as well as those that are not
vertically integrated.  See infra text accompanying notes 153-54. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 42  3-DEC-03 16:30
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supplying them.  The result is that the providers’ attempts at lobbying
are more likely to be successful.125
This has been borne out in practice.  Not for nothing is the FCC
called—as even an FCC chairman acknowledged—“Firmly Captured
by Corporations.”126  The history of government spectrum policy is
filled with examples of successful attempts at gaining preferential
status via regulation.  Broadcast licenses are perhaps the most noto-
rious example with respect to spectrum allocation, but there are also
examples involving standards.127  When the government has chosen
standards to be used on a given set of frequencies, private entities
have lobbied furiously to obtain a privileged position.128  A good
recent example is the standard for digital television.  There were com-
peting standards, and the companies involved devoted huge lobbying
resources to persuading the FCC to choose their standard and not that
of their competitors.129  Even after the creators of the competing stan-
dards converged on a shared standard, the battles did not end:  A new
battle arose over the question of how specific the standard would be.
Television manufacturers wanted the standard to cover a broad array
of attributes, and with some specificity (i.e., narrow permissible ranges
within those attributes), which would have had the effect of protecting
their market from encroachment by computer manufacturers.  The
computer industry, meanwhile, pushed for a minimally specified stan-
dard that would provide greater flexibility, in the hope that this would
allow them to make monitors that would work for both computers and
125 See Speta, supra note 122, at 1571 (arguing that “both government funding and gov- R
ernment regulation are subject to capture that itself is likely to impede innovation more
than markets would”).
126 Reed E. Hundt, The Progressive Way, Speech at the Center for National Policy (May
6, 1996), available at http://www.benton.org/Policy/TV/rhundt_ progressive.html.
127 See Hazlett, supra note 7, at 166-71 (noting that incumbent broadcasters sought, and R
obtained, preferred status and barriers to entry via regulation).  Indeed, Lessig acknowl-
edges this point about the power of broadcast incumbents (and incumbents more gener-
ally).  See Lessig, The Future of Ideas, supra note 3, at 74 (“[C]ommercial broadcasters— R
NBC and CBS in particular—were effective in getting the government to allocate spectrum
according to their view of how spectrum should be used.”); see also supra note 122 (noting R
Lessig’s stated concerns about power of vested interests).
128 See Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition:  Implications for the Future
Structure of the Computer Industry, in Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft
Monopoly:  Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace  155, 200-01 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach &
Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999) (“The information needed to decide on the appropriate
technological direction is very difficult to understand, and key parts of the information are
proprietary.  Rather than being secret, the proprietary parts are spin controlled by inter-
ested parties.  These are bad conditions for collective decision making; the individual deci-
sion with money on the table is the best option.”).
129 See Benjamin et al., supra note 4, at 340.  For a description of the digital television R
battles, see generally Joel Brinkley, Defining Vision:  The Battle for the Future of Televi-
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television.130  Each side, in other words, pressured the government to
create a standard that would enhance its competitive position.  The
FCC decided to try to devise a standard that would have the minimum
specification necessary to ensure that digital television would work as
planned, but it found that determining that level of specificity was
hard to do—especially as the dueling parties did not agree on the
identity of the essential categories of specifications.
Indeed, politically powerful players might push for not only a
highly specified standard but also a short (and unnecessarily con-
stricted) list of authorized providers, on the theory that the govern-
ment would choose entities for this list not on the basis of formal
payments (as we would expect a private firm to do), but instead based
on influence.  That is, rather than auction a given benefit (such as the
right to sell user devices) to the highest bidder, the government might
choose its beneficiaries through a process in which no direct compen-
sation is paid.  If so, companies will have an incentive to make private
bids for the benefits, in the form of whatever currency the choosing
government entity prefers—campaign contributions, in-kind contribu-
tions, whatever.  The revenues foregone by the government become
rents that bidders seek, and those bidders will confer some of these
rents on the government in order to gain the preferred position.  This
has long been the case with spectrum allocations that the government
distributes gratis:  The government does not receive monetary contri-
butions, but instead in-kind contributions from its grateful licen-
sees.131  And there is little reason to expect otherwise here.132
Significantly, this pattern also results in ossification of the network,
because government beneficiaries will have an incentive to entrench
themselves, and the rents they receive will help them to do so.133
130 See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, ¶¶ 4-19 (1996).
131 See, e.g., Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid Pro Quo:  What Broadcasters Really Want, 66
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 686, 688 (1998) (reviewing A Review of Rationales & Rationalizations:
Regulating the Electronic Media (Robert Corn-Revere ed., 1997)).  Note that this is not a
problem that is limited to one governmental entity.  The FCC has often acted at the behest
of powerful rent-seeking groups, and Congress has been even worse.  See Benjamin et al.,
supra note 4, at 325-67; Benjamin, supra note 6, at 16-17 (noting that incumbent broad- R
casters enjoyed greater success in Congress than in FCC in their battle against low-power
radio); Rubin, supra, at 688.
132 Note that this would also apply to the potential continuation of a company’s status as
a chosen supplier:  The beneficiary would have an incentive to maintain its privileged posi-
tion, and the government would lack a profit incentive to auction the position to the
highest bidder.
133 This possibility of entrenchment is not merely a matter of theory:  On many occa-
sions in spectrum policy, incumbents have been able to forestall planned changes in spec-
trum use.  See Benjamin, supra note 6, at 70-71.  Broadcast television provides a vivid R
example.  Broadcasters (who had been given their spectrum gratis and recognized that they\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 44  3-DEC-03 16:30
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The potential for lobbying and rent-seeking is greatest in the con-
text of a single government-controlled abundant network, but it arises
whenever the government controls a network (even if others are pri-
vately controlled).  The more control the government has, the greater
the payoff for favored providers.  And, from the perspective of such
providers, having a preferred position on one network among many is
still preferable to having no preferred position at all.
B. Benefits of Private Competition
The previous section highlights that there can be competition not
only within protocols (i.e., among devices complying with a given set
of protocols) but also among protocols (because different protocols
will optimize different uses and thus will offer different options to
device manufacturers and users).  Commons advocates frequently
extol the benefits of competition, but the competition on which they
focus occurs only in the space that has been created by a set of proto-
cols after they have been chosen.134
Competition among protocols—or any platforms—imposes sig-
nificant costs if we are going to end up with a single standard in the
end, as the resources spent on the failed standards could have been
spent on the successful ones.  In particular, if a given standard is better
than all the others, and will not be improved in the course of competi-
tion, then competition among several standards is a deadweight loss:
Firms will spend resources on developing (and users will spend time
familiarizing themselves with) a bunch of inferior standards that will
would not be compensated if some of “their” spectrum were transferred to another use)
successfully thwarted the transfer of spectrum to land mobile use in the 1980s by arguing
for high-definition television.  In 2006, they are supposed to surrender the extra spectrum
allotment that each received for digital television (the original goal of high-definition tele-
vision has morphed into the current digital-television scheme, see Benjamin et al., supra
note 4, at 359-60), but no one expects that to happen.  See Benjamin et al., supra note 34, R
at 111; Jenna Greene, Digital TV a Remote Possibility, Legal Times, July 30, 2001, at 1
(quoting representative Ed Markey as saying, “There’s no longer a soul in the industry who
thinks the transition will be over by 2006.”).
134 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 28 (suggesting wireless commons with competition R
among device manufacturers working within set of protocols).  In his work on the Internet,
Lessig has emphasized the benefits that come from competition on many different vertical
layers.  An article he wrote with Mark Lemley on the benefits of broadband competition
notes the different layers of the Internet market and states that “we have no good way to
know which layer in this chain of services will become the most crucial.  Thus, multiplying
the layers of competition provides a constant check on the dominance of any particular
actor.”  Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925, 942 (2001).
Applying that principle here would seem to suggest competition among protocols.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 45  3-DEC-03 16:30
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fade away.  The resources spent on those weaker standards are
wasted.135
More broadly, no matter how the market develops, or how much
knowledge we have about standards, competition entails a broader set
of inefficiencies.136  That is, there are still costs inherent in having dif-
ferent platforms.  A device manufacturer, for example, will have to
spend more resources making a given product compatible with five
different standards than it would making it compatible with one.  And
if the devices using these different standards do not interconnect,137
users will either have to purchase services on all the platforms or
forego communicating with some people.
The most significant of these costs arise only to the extent that
the market in fact converges on a single standard.  Insofar as com-
peting protocols will exist, the resources spent developing, imple-
menting, and using them are not wasted.  But the market may indeed
converge on a single standard, and in any event the costs inherent in
competition will exist.
The conventional wisdom is that the benefits of competition out-
weigh its costs.  In the case of protocols for abundant networks, the
benefit-cost ratio favors competition even more than usual.  That is
because the benefits of competition are particularly great in an
industry characterized by innovation and uncertainty about which is
the best approach (i.e., set of protocols).138  The inefficiencies
described above loom large insofar as we are confident both that the
protocol chooser (whether public or private) can identify the best
standard in advance and that the standard will not improve as a result
135 See Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Prac-
tices in Antitrust Law, 66 Antitrust L.J. 1, 74 n.323 (1997) (stating that “before [some]
markets settle on a single winning product, there can be a period of competition among
several products, which can result in considerable wasted investment by buyers in the even-
tual losing competitors”).
136 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 870 (1990) (stating that “rivalrous inventive efforts generate
a great deal of inefficiency”).
137 See infra notes 207-12, 220-22 on the importance of interconnection, the possibility R
that companies will voluntarily interconnect, and the possibility of mandating it.
138 Note that there are different ways to define the “best” system.  Is it one that opti-
mizes the services that the greatest number of potential users would want?  Should it focus
on actual users of other wireless services?  Should it take into account strength of prefer-
ence (e.g., what if a relatively small percentage of users would strongly prefer one design,
because it optimized their dream use, but a much higher percentage had a slight preference
for a different design?)?  The difficulties with defining “best” highlight the benefits of com-
petition:  With competing protocols, no central decisionmaker (whether public or private)
has to answer those questions.  Every entity can choose to utilize whatever metric it
pleases.  See also infra notes 201-19 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood of com- R
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of competition.  If we can have confidence in both propositions, then
competition holds little allure.  With respect to abundant networks,
however, it is difficult to know in advance which is the best system.
That’s why we have competition—to provide real-world feedback, and
to spur innovation.
There is little reason to think that any single entity will be able to
know in advance which is the best set of protocols to choose.139  The
engineering is too complex, and the tradeoffs too numerous, for us to
have confidence in a particular protocol-chooser.140  Multiple net-
works have the advantage of allowing for competition among stan-
dards and real-world trials.  With competition among several
networks, the market gains the most valuable kind of information—
knowledge about what consumers actually want, and what actually
works best when implemented on a massive scale.  If there is only one
network, there will be one set of protocols and we will never know if
other protocols would be more desirable.  If a number of abundant
networks are created, however, different standards can compete, and
users can choose among them.  Engineers can see which protocols
work as planned, and users can choose which features they value the
most.  And, as new protocols become available, they can more easily
be introduced by a competitor.141
Relatedly, competition among network protocols also will likely
produce greater innovation, or dynamic efficiency.142  As I noted
above, studies have found that monopolies tend to retard innova-
tion.143  The same is true with respect to networking standards.144  In
139 See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text. R
140 See Bresnahan, supra note 128, at 155, 200 (noting that in standards race “it is R
extremely difficult to forecast the future.  Brilliant people are about to invent a great many
new things, which will interact in a complex system to determine the outcome.  No one,
and certainly no policymaking body, has the cognitive capacity or the knowledge to pick
‘better.’”); Dale N. Hatfield, The Current Status of Spectrum Management, in Balancing
Policy Options in a Turbulent Telecommunications Market:  A Report of the Seventeenth
Annual Aspen Institute Conference on Telecommunications Policy 29, 41 (Robert M.
Entman ed., 2003), available at http://www.aspeninst.org/AspenInstitute/files/
CCLIBRARYFILES/FILENAME/0000000137/balanceturbtelecom.pdf (noting difficulty
for any decisionmaker of sorting through competing engineering studies).
141 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
Econ. Persp. 93, 110 (1994) (noting that selecting single standard necessarily limits product
variety by “prevent[ing] the development of promising but unique and incompatible new
systems”).
142 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing 144, 156-60 (1971) (stating that compe-
tition is best catalyst for innovation); Langlois, supra note 104, at 217 (noting that competi- R
tion among platforms creates “more possible entry points for innovation”); supra note 104. R
143 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. R
144 See Weiser, supra note 102, at 585 (“In the Internet context in particular and the R
information industries more generally, standards competitions can often be procompetitive\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 47  3-DEC-03 16:30
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other words, a competitive wireless market is not only likely to pro-
duce valuable new services (such as abundant networks, if they are as
wonderful as promised), but also a competitive market for abundant
networks is likely to produce continuing innovation.145
This has been the case with respect to wireless telephony stan-
dards.  The European Community’s government standard-setting
body selected a single standard (GSM) as the only permitted standard
for European wireless telephony, whereas the FCC made no selection
and instead allowed for a standards competition.  The FCC’s approach
led to competition that is now widely regarded as having brought
greater innovation (in the form of competing standards, most notably
CDMA and TDMA), the benefits of which exceed the costs.146
Europe’s approach had the advantage of ensuring compatibility from
the start, but at the great cost of settling on an inferior standard.  The
same is true with respect to video game platforms.  The fierce compe-
tition among the dueling standards—including Nintendo, Sega, Sony,
and Microsoft—produced both static efficiency (in the form of falling
prices) and dynamic efficiency (in the form of innovation).147  Indeed,
such valuable competition is currently occurring with respect to wire-
less networking standards.  Both private firms and private standard-
setting bodies have rolled out innovative standards and upgraded
by increasing innovation in a manner that would not occur under cooperative efforts that
settle on a lowest common denominator standard.”); see also Robert J. Aiken & John S.
Cavallini, When Are Standards Too Much of a Good Thing?  Will They Provide Interoper-
ability for the National Information Infrastructure?, in Standards Policy for Information
Infrastructure 253, 261 (Brian Kahin & Janet Abbate eds., 1995) (stating that “the over-
zealous creation and use of [official] standards, either through formal standards processes
or by government purchasing practices, poses the risk of impeding the introduction of nec-
essary new technologies and services”); Lemley & Lessig, supra note 134, at 942-46, 961 R
(discussing benefits of competition, and noting that “the empirical evidence suggests quite
strongly that it is competition, not monopoly, that best spurs creativity”).
145 It bears noting that Benkler treats having more than one abundant network as valu-
able.  His stated concern is that private ownership will not produce this useful competition,
because of the difficulty of assembling spectrum.  See Benkler, supra note 1, at 363 (stating R
as drawback of private ownership that “the difficulty of assembling a broad swath of fre-
quencies would render unlikely the initial development of more than one such band”).  As
I discussed in Part II.A, supra, however, the difficulty of assembling a broad swath of
frequencies can be overcome via the simple measure of auctioning large swaths.
146 See Kathleen M.H. Wallman, The Role of Government in Telecommunications Stan-
dard-Setting, 8 CommLaw Conspectus 235, 246-47 (2000); Weiser, supra note 102, at 586; R
Rappaport et al., supra note 111, at 148-49, 151-53 (discussing “brilliant system concepts R
that ultimately failed” and eventual universal acceptance of CDMA).
147 Indeed, that is only a partial list of the major innovators in the video game market.
See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 Yale J.
on Reg. 325, 365 (2003) (noting that “[i]n the case of video games in the US, there was
successive entry by Magnavox (1972), Atari (1975), Coleco (1976), Fairchild (1976), Mattel
(1979), Nintendo (1985), Sega (1989), Sony (1995), and Microsoft (2001)”).  On the bene-
fits of this competition, see Weiser, supra note 102, at 587-89. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 48  3-DEC-03 16:30
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them in response to competitive pressures, resulting in more and
better choices for users.148
Competition also has the advantage of promoting greater product
differentiation.149  The more networks there are, the more likely they
are to respond to the desires of relatively small segments of the popu-
lation.  Maybe only ten or twenty percent of the population would
want the capability to use their wireless networks in a particular way
(say, having a multiuser real-time dissection of the latest episode of a
favorite television show as it is airing).  If there is a single protocol,
and having the capability for a multiuser discussion would create sig-
nificant tradeoffs,150 then that segment might find that its interest is
not met.151  Or, even worse, maybe this small segment would have
sufficient political and economic power to persuade the protocol-
chooser to select standards that optimize their preferred service, at the
expense of services that would be more popular with less powerful
groups.  Having a single set of protocols encourages battles over those
protocols (because the stakes are so high), and makes it more likely
that less powerful groups will not have their interests attended to.  But
the more networks, the more likely that someone will cater to each
niche preference in the way that it structures its protocols.
These advantages of competition are sufficiently great that, even
assuming that there ultimately will be one network standard (and thus
one network), there are still good reasons to have this standard
chosen via competition.  We will not know in advance whether abun-
dant networks will converge on a single standard, and in any event the
competition is likely to produce a better standard.  As long as there is
going to be a single controlling entity (either the government from the
outset or the biggest network after the competition), we might well
148 The IEEE promulgated a number of different 802.11 standards (e.g., 802.11a,
802.11b, 802.11g) in response both to user demand and changes in wireless technology.
Meanwhile, private firms have continued to offer (and upgrade) their own standards.
Airgo Networks, for example, has introduced a wireless networking standard that increases
transport capacity via MIMO (multiple-input, multiple-output) antennas, and other com-
panies are developing still other standards.  See John Markoff, Start-Up Plans to Introduce
Alternate Wi-Fi Technology, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 2003, at C2 (describing Airgo’s offering
and noting that other companies are planning their own new offerings).
149 See Langlois, supra note 104, at 217 (noting that competition among platforms allows R
for “experimenting with organizational and design alternatives”).
150 And, of course, there are always tradeoffs.  See supra notes 110-21 and accompa- R
nying text.
151 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 141, at 110 (stating that “the primary cost of stand- R
ardization is loss of variety:  consumers have fewer differentiated products to pick from”);
see also Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation,
16 Rand J. Econ. 70, 71 (1985) (stating that “reduction in variety” is one of “important
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prefer the competition option, because it would be more likely to pro-
duce the highest valued network.152
C. Benefits of Private Control of Abundant Networks
1. Implementing and Updating Successful Protocols
The previous Section discussed the benefits of competition, in
light of the enormous technical complexity that is entailed in creating
protocols for an abundant network, and the range of choices that is
involved.  These aspects of protocols also suggest reasons to choose
private firms over government actors.  That is, even absent competi-
tion, private ownership entails some advantages.  Private firms, in
addition to being better able to marshal the force of competition, are
better suited than government actors to operate in an environment of
rapidly changing technology.  The engineering resources within the
FCC, for example, are fairly small compared with those in the private
sector, and private firms have no incentive to share their knowledge
with government actors if they will not benefit by doing so.153
More importantly, private control presents particular advantages
in terms of implementing and updating desired protocols.  Designing a
network that operates as planned is only part of the story.  In addition
to these technical matters are ones involving users’ responses—do
they flock to the network, do they use it as intended, do they like the
152 See Weiser, supra note 102, at 585 (stating that “even if the industry structure will R
ultimately rely on a single standard, competition policy should still err on the proprietary
side of the line, allowing rival standards to battle it out in the marketplace”); see also
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Exter-
nalities, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 822, 825, 838-39 (1986) (discussing question whether market
chooses socially optimal standard).
153 According to Jeffrey Rohlfs:
[G]overnment setting of technical standards is often proposed, but government
setting of standards involves a whole set of problems of its own.  The most
obvious problem is that public policymakers may be clueless about which is the
best technology.  The technological choice inherently involves uncertainties on
the forefront of technical knowledge.  Public policymakers do not generally
have the high level of technical expertise required to evaluate such uncertain-
ties.  The problem is compounded, because the most knowledgeable persons
(viz., those whose jobs are to develop the competing technologies) usually
have incentives to deceive the policymakers—in particular, to exaggerate the
strengths of their own technology and the weakness of the opposing tech-
nology.  Because public policymakers lack sufficient knowledge, they may
choose the wrong technology and get an important new industry off on the
wrong foot.
Jeffrey H. Rohlfs, Bandwagon Effects in High-Technology Industries 49 (2001); see also
Kalpana Srinivasan, FCC Knows It Doesn’t Know, San Antonio Express-News, March 13,
2001, at 5E (noting concerns among FCC Commissioners about lack of engineering exper-
tise in FCC, and finding that “[i]n the FCC division responsible for wireless matters, about
100 of the 315 employees are lawyers.  Only 35 are engineers.”); supra note 128. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 50  3-DEC-03 16:30
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services offered, would they prefer that other services be optimized
for use on the network, etc.  Moreover, over time the state of the art
changes as new technologies become available.  Consumer prefer-
ences also change, sometimes in response to technological changes
and sometimes for other reasons.  These facts pose great challenges
for the creator of a network, as it must adopt protocols that not only
will work but also will have features that users desire, and then must
decide whether and how to update protocols as technology and/or
consumer preferences change.
For purposes of this Part, I am assuming that an abundant net-
work can work as planned.154  But that still leaves the questions of
who has a greater incentive and ability to implement the most suc-
cessful system, and who has a greater incentive and ability to make
changes to the system as new possibilities arise.  It makes a great deal
of sense to ensure that whoever controls a given set of wireless fre-
quencies has the ability and incentive to make the best choice at the
outset and to change the use of those frequencies as circumstances
warrant.
These considerations cut in favor of private ownership.  As to
incentives, the profit motive comes to the fore:  A private owner’s
choice of the best system, and its modification of that system as new
opportunities become available, will enhance its profitability; and the
desire for profits is a strong stimulus.  This is a basic precept of eco-
nomic theory, and there is every reason to believe that the profit
motive will have the same effect on spectrum usage that it has in other
areas of economic activity.  As to ability, a private owner can change
its uses as quickly and frequently as it desires, subject only to those
limitations imposed by the government or to which it agrees via con-
tract.  Assuming that the government gives private firms broad flexi-
bility to create and modify networks as they see fit, a firm could adopt
a protocol as quickly as its directors could meet.  Private companies
can and do change technologies and business models rapidly.
Upgrades in cellular telephony and the embrace of wireless Internet
access are only two of many examples.  Simply stated, private firms
would have every incentive to upgrade their networks to the most effi-
cient use (so as to beat their competitors), and they would have the
ability to do so quickly.
Government officials will never have the same incentives to find
the most efficient solution.  The profit motive is absent.  Political
154 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 51  3-DEC-03 16:30
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forces replace market forces as the relevant stimuli.155  This is a
familiar point from political theory, but it bears noting here that, for
government actors, upgrading a network simply means more work for
the same pay.
As to ability, government officials generally will not have the
same flexibility that private owners would have.  Government agen-
cies are subject to requirements of public deliberation.  For example,
the Government in the Sunshine Act prohibits multimember agencies
like the FCC from meeting unless they give seven days’ advance
public notice and the meeting is held in public.156  Moreover, setting
out protocols for a new network is the sort of significant agency action
with prospective effect that would be subject to the requirements of
notice-and-comment rulemaking.157  Such rulemaking requires a
notice of the proposed rulemaking, an opportunity for interested par-
ties to comment, and a final rule issued with a statement of its basis
and purpose, but those requirements have been interpreted to require
a fairly lengthy and exhaustive process.  Such ossification of agency
processes means that many decisions that seem straightforward take
years to satisfy all the procedural hurdles.  Most significant agency
155 See also supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text (discussing rent-seeking R
behavior, government control, and entrenchment).
156 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e)(1) (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 552b(c) & (d)(1) (permitting agen-
cies to close meetings, but only if majority of members vote to do so).  Moreover, a
meeting is defined as “deliberations of at least the number of individual agency members
required to take action on behalf of the agency where such deliberations determine or
result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business,” so three members of
the FCC cannot deliberate together unless they call a formal meeting (with advance notice,
of course).  5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2).  For criticism of these requirements, see Jim Rossi, Par-
ticipation Run Amok:  The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decision-
making, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 173, 230 (1997) (arguing that “[t]he Sunshine Act’s
requirements impair the ability of agency members to deliberate, adversely affect the
establishment of agency agendas, and promote inefficient practices within agencies”).
157 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining “rule”); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (setting out requirements for
informal, or notice-and-comment, rulemaking); see also Jeffrey H. Rohlfs & J. Gregory
Sidak, Exporting Telecommunications Regulation:  The United States-Japan Negotiations
on Interconnection Pricing, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 317, 352 (2002) (noting that “[t]he vast
majority of the FCC’s policy initiatives advance through the notice-and-comment process
of the Administrative Procedure Act.  With few exceptions, the agency does not announce
major policy shifts through adjudication.”).  There are exceptions to the requirement of
notice-and-comment rulemaking, but none would appear to apply here.  See 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b) (listing exceptions for interpretative rules, general statements of policy, rules of
agency organization, and situations in which agency, for good cause, finds that rulemaking
is impracticable); U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that
standards are substantive rules requiring notice and comment, rather than policy state-
ments, if agency intends to bind itself to particular legal policy positions); Tenn. Gas Pipe-
line v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that good cause exception is
limited to emergency situations).  And the FCC seems to agree, as it has consistently
employed notice-and-comment rulemaking in setting out standards for new networks.  See
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actions now require a few years (and thousands of person hours) to
complete—and then the litigation begins.158  There is no reason to
expect otherwise with respect to the adoption of protocols for abun-
dant networks.  The FCC decisionmaking process is therefore likely to
be painfully slow, occupying many months.159
This disparity in flexibility between private and government
actors is not carved in stone, of course.  Congress could eliminate it by
allowing the FCC (or some other government agency) to choose pro-
tocols for abundant networks without any procedural constraints.  But
such an action would be unattractive (not to mention unlikely).  Pri-
vate owners are constrained by the market, but government actors
face no similar constraint.  Procedural requirements supply constraints
in the form of public-regarding obligations designed to increase trans-
parency and accountability.160  Giving a set of government officials
unconstrained authority seems difficult to defend, and it is not sur-
prising that Congress has in fact never made such a grant.
Perhaps more realistic, and palatable, is Benkler’s suggestion that
the government provide by statute or regulation that all uses of spec-
158 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory Reform, 10 Admin. L.J. 81,
82-83 (1996) (“There is a broad consensus among scholars that ossification of the
rulemaking process is the largest single implementation problem today.  The notice and
comment rulemaking process requires an agency to commit at least five years and tens of
thousands of staff hours to the process of issuing or amending a single major rule.” (cita-
tions omitted)); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992); Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossifica-
tion—A Modest Proposal, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 453 (1995).
159 As Rohlfs and Sidak note:
On any rule making of substantial importance, the FCC will publish a notice of
proposed rule making (NPRM), which may be dozens of pages long.  In
response, interested parties file detailed comments and reply comments, often
accompanied by expert affidavits of economists or engineers. . . . Equipped
with a voluminous public record, the FCC’s staff then writes for the Commis-
sion a “report and order” that may run a hundred pages or more. . . . The
report and order carefully footnotes arguments and factual propositions raised
or challenged by commentators.
Rohlfs & Sidak, supra note 157; see also ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1581 (D.C. Cir. R
1987) (“Notice and comment rulemaking procedures obligate the FCC to respond to all
significant comments, for ‘the opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the agency
responds to significant points raised by the public.’” (citations omitted)); Lisa
Blumensaadt, Horizontal and Conglomerate Merger Conditions:  An Interim Regulatory
Approach for a Converged Environment, 8 CommLaw Conspectus 291, 307 (2000) (noting
that “the FCC’s public notice and comment rulemaking process is lengthy and can be cum-
bersome”); Hatfield, supra note 140, at 36 (noting that “major reallocations proceedings R
can take years to resolve”).
160 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1669-76 (1975) (describing traditional means of cabining agency discre-
tion, including agency conformance to “specific legislative directives,” availability of judi-
cial review, and application of “decisional procedures” designed to both ensure agency
compliance with directives and facilitate judicial review).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 53  3-DEC-03 16:30
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trum be reviewed every ten years.  Thus Benkler suggests that, given
the experimental nature of such a system, the government should
create an abundant network but reconsider its decision after ten
years.161  At such time, the government should be prepared to
abandon its commons if the network fails to develop as hoped.162
Indeed, this is part of a larger plan of reconsideration for Benkler; he
proposes that any auctioned spectrum rights be reevaluated after ten
years to see if that spectrum would be better used as a government-
sponsored abundant network.163
This does not, however, provide for the same level of flexibility as
a private firm would have.164  Most obviously, it does not allow for
changes at anything other than the prescribed intervals, even if it is
clear by year five or seven that an abundant commons has not devel-
oped as planned.  Moreover, unless the review entails no deliberative
process and is utterly unconstrained (in which case we are back to the
problems identified above), it will take a fair amount of time and
energy for such a review to occur in year ten.  Even statutorily man-
dated periodic reviews can go on for years.  Indeed, the FCC’s bien-
nial reviews of media regulations often drag on for more than two
years after they are due,165 and the first triennial review of the AT&T
161 Benkler, supra note 2, at 35. R
162 Id.
163 Id.  Of course, he assumes that the private rightsholder will not have created a pri-
vately-sponsored abundant network.  See supra Part II.
164 Furthermore, it may inhibit investment incentives.  If the government sells spectrum
rights but reserves the right to reclaim the spectrum ten years later without compensating
the rightsholders, the rightsholders’ fear of uncompensated losses will limit their incentive
to invest in the use of their spectrum.  This is a familiar point from economic theory:
Diminishing an occupant’s expectation of long-term ownership also diminishes the occu-
pant’s willingness to make long-term investments.  See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 123, 133-34, 153 (1996) (arguing that
statutory right of renewal of radio and television licenses allows licensees to make “better
long-term investments in programming and talent”).  Indeed, the government recognized
as much in deciding to give spectrum incumbents a very strong renewal expectancy.  See
Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Development
of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, ¶ 20 (2000); Benjamin et al., supra note 4, at R
111-12.  That is, after the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbents know that their
license will be renewed unless they commit “serious violations” of the Communications
Act or the FCC’s rules, or commit other violations “which, taken together, would consti-
tute a pattern of abuse.”  47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1) (2000).
165 See, e.g., 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 3002 (2003) (taking actions as part of 1998 biennial
review); 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—47 C.F.R. Part 90—Private Land Mobile
Radio Services, 17 F.C.C.R. 9830 (2002) (same).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 54  3-DEC-03 16:30
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breakup spent so many years bouncing between courts and agencies
that the planned succeeding triennial reviews never took place.166
The proposed ten-year reviews also do nothing to enable govern-
ment actors to respond to changes in technology and/or consumer
preferences.  It is important not only that the government be able to
change from government to private control and vice-versa, but also
that government actors have the ability and incentive to update net-
work standards.  The proposed ten-year reviews leave the government
in the same position as it would be in without such reviews:  having to
invoke cumbersome processes to make changes, and having little
incentive to do so.
2. Adjusting Spectrum Usage and Pricing Schemes
One consistent development in wireless technology has been the
decrease in the amount of spectrum that is required to send a given
signal over the airwaves.167  Indeed, this is one of the key develop-
ments behind the push for abundant networks:  Sophisticated engi-
neering is permitting greater and greater data transfer rates over the
same bandwidth, making abundant networks more feasible today than
they were yesterday.168  And the progress is ongoing.169
If 100-megahertz abundant networks were created, and a few
years later improved network designs allowed for abundant networks
that had the same functionality but occupied only 20 megahertz, the
benefits of updating the network design and freeing up 80 megahertz
would be considerable.  Those 80 megahertz could be used to provide
valuable new services—perhaps services that abundant networks do
166 See Jerry A. Hausman et al., Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Tele-
communications Benefit Consumers?, 70 Antitrust L.J. 463, 466 (2002) (noting that parties
to AT&T divestiture agreed to triennial reviews, but “[b]ecause of various appeals to the
D.C. Circuit and subsequent remands . . . the first triennial review was not completed by
either 1990 or 1993, when the next reviews were scheduled to take place.  A second trien-
nial review never happened.”).
167 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. R
168 Commons advocates seize on this progress; indeed, they rely on further develop-
ments in network design as enabling the creation of abundant networks.  But their focus is
on the advances that will have to occur in order for abundant networks to work.  They fail
to focus on the significance of the possibility that, after abundant networks are created,
continued advances will enable abundant networks to occupy fewer megahertz.
169 Engineers are working on network designs that would allow 1 gbps network
throughput over 25 MHz, rather than 100 MHz.  The projects have been submitted in
response to a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Advanced Technology Office
request for proposals for networks with such capability.  See Proposed Information
Pamphlet for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Advanced Technology
Office 7, http://www.eps.gov/EPSData/ODA/Synopses/4965/BAA03-31/BAA03-31%
28PIP%29FINAL.doc (last modified June 6, 2003) (listing metrics for throughput and
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not optimize, or four new competing abundant networks, or some-
thing else entirely.170
This possibility favors private control of the original 100-
megahertz swath.  The problem for government actors is that they
have little incentive to economize on spectrum, because they do not
profit from such conservation.  (And, as I noted above, the procedures
entailed in changing the use of spectrum are cumbersome.)  This is a
familiar point from property theory; one of the main arguments for
transferable spectrum rights is that they create an incentive for the
rightsholders to use the most bandwidth-efficient technologies,
because every bit of bandwidth they conserve in their service is
bandwidth from which they can reap additional revenue by selling it
to someone else for another service.171  Commentators have made this
point with respect to unlicensed uses of spectrum, noting that unli-
censed or otherwise shared spectrum creates no incentive for system
170 One might imagine that abundant networks could render spectrum so abundant as to
be valueless.  If so, opening up 80 megahertz for other uses would not have much value
(although, even then, adding four 20-megahertz networks would enhance competition and
thus have value).  But the notion that abundant networks will so fully serve all our needs
that there is no demand for other uses of spectrum is pretty far fetched.  See infra notes
231-32 and accompanying text. R
171 Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Devel-
opment of Secondary Markets, FCC 03-113 ¶¶ 7-8 (2003) (report and order) (allowing
most wireless radio licensees to lease spectrum usage rights to third parties, in furtherance
of “spectrum policy under which licensees have much greater ability and incentive to make
unused spectrum—whether by frequency bandwidth, geographic area, or time (or any
combination thereof)—available to third parties”), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-03-113A1.doc; Dale N. Hatfield, Perspectives on the Next Generation of
Communications, Keynote Address at the Opening Plenary Session of the Vehicular Tech-
nology Conference (Sept. 26, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.fcc.gov/oet/
speeches/perspec_next_generation.doc) (stating that transferability of licenses will give
“existing licensees a greater incentive to employ more spectrally efficient technologies
since they could profit directly by leasing the additional spectrum for other uses”); Gregory
L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the
Public Interest (FCC Office of Eng’g Tech., Working Paper, 1997), available at http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Informal/spectrum.txt (stating that “flexi-
bility increases users’ incentives to expand spectrum capacity by enabling them to profit
from investments in more efficient use of spectrum, either by using spectrum for additional
purposes or by transferring the authorization to use part of the spectrum to a party that
values it more highly”).
The FCC has listed numerous benefits of auctions.  See FCC Wireless Telecomm.
Bureau, FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions 14 (1997) (“[T]he competitive
bidding process provides incentives for licensees of spectrum to compete vigorously with
existing services, develop innovative technologies, and provide improved products to
realize expected earnings.  In this way, awarding spectrum using competitive bidding aligns
the licensees’ interests with the public interest in efficient utilization of the spectrum.”),
available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/fc970353.pdf; id. at 2
(“The Commission’s auctions program has demonstrated the ability to award licenses to
productive users, to encourage the emergence of innovative firms and technologies, to gen-
erate valuable market information, and to raise revenues for the public.”).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 56  3-DEC-03 16:30
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designers to conserve bandwidth, and that private ownership would
create such an incentive.172  And this is not just a matter of theory.
Actors that do not have this profit motive—including both govern-
ment entities and private licensees that are not permitted to transfer
extra spectrum or use it for any other purpose—have a history of
wasting spectrum.173  Given the incentive structure, such failures to
conserve bandwidth should not surprise us.174
Closely related to the possibility of a network needing fewer
megahertz as technology improves is a possibility raised by commons
advocates:  Even without changing protocols, the amount of spectrum
necessary for an abundant network to work as planned would change
from moment to moment.175  Allowing for varying usage requires flex-
ibility among controllers of spectrum rights:  Private owners can nego-
tiate agreements in advance that allow for instantaneous sharing, or
set up mechanisms for such sharing.  The government could, similarly,
set up such arrangements, but (a) again, greater procedural hurdles
would lie in its path, and (b) it would have a limited incentive to go to
the trouble.  The flexibility advantages of private ownership discussed
above thus apply here as well:  A private owner has greater incentive
and ability to create spectrum uses that allow for instantaneous
changes in spectrum usage as a way of maximizing the value of
spectrum.
One last example involves pricing.  As I noted above, Benkler
suggests that the cost of the technology behind abundant networks
would be built into the price of the user device, and then everyone
could transmit free of additional charges; indeed, no company would
be in a position to charge anything for use of the network.176  This
might be the most efficient form of pricing (and a private owner could
utilize it),177 but of course it might not.178  Flexibility in pricing
172 See Rosston & Steinberg, supra note 171, at 7, 17 (stating that unlicensed and shared R
spectrum users have less incentive to use spectrum efficiently than would private holders of
exclusive licenses); Satapathy & Peha, supra note 46, at 5 (noting that unlicensed spectrum R
presents no incentive for system designers to conserve bandwidth).
173 See Benjamin, supra note 6, at 19-20, 97-98 (discussing examples of wasting of spec- R
trum, all by entities without economic incentive to do otherwise).
174 Note that this incentive structure exists even if surplus spectrum is sold at auction.
Government actors do not reap those revenues, so they lack a profit incentive to find
surplus spectrum.  If the spectrum owner (here, the government) does not share in the
bounty created by improvements in technology, its incentive to act on these improvements
is dulled.
175 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 57-60.  Benkler treats this as an argument against pri- R
vate property rights in spectrum, but, as the text indicates, it actually seems to support such
rights.
176 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. R
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regimes would allow for experimentation in business models to deter-
mine the most efficient system and might well produce a more suc-
cessful build-out of an abundant network.179  The profit motive gives
178 Benkler suggests that the unavailability of other pricing models would be an advan-
tage of government control.  See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  He seems to R
believe that usage pricing necessitates a single gatekeeper for all messages, but usage
pricing is not inconsistent with a distributed system.  See supra note 93 and accompanying R
text.  Benkler argues that usage pricing would not confer any advantages on an abundant
network (because it could only slow things down), but in so asserting he fails to focus on
the possible importance of such pricing for the successful development of the network in
the first place.
179 Abundant networks depend on the operation of many user devices, as each user on
the network creates additional capacity.  If I want to send a message across the city but
there is no nearby user who can repeat my signal, then my message may not reach its
destination.  It is crucial, then, to the success of an abundant network that user device
manufacturers are enticed to enter the market, and that the network appeals to a wide
range of users.
Price differentiation aids this cause in three ways.  First, it allows companies to subsi-
dize the up-front costs as a way of building out the network.  In light of the importance of
companies making, and people buying, the user devices, this can be crucial to the ease of
building out a network, and therefore to the likelihood that it will be built out.  Potential
buyers of user devices are often hesitant to pay significant amounts of money to join a new
network, and a common way for networks to overcome that is through subsidizing the
price of the hardware via higher charges for usage.  This is, for example, the pricing
strategy that most cellular telephony, cable television, and direct broadcast satellite prov-
iders have used:  They offer the initial equipment for low cost and recoup their losses on
subsequent charges.  This makes the build-out of a network more likely.  See Michael
Weingarten & Bart Stuck, The Upcoming Revolution in Consumer Demand, Bus. Comm.
Rev., May 1999, at 53-54 (noting that companies provided discounts on end-user products
as way of encouraging build-out of their networks, and discussing why this is good strategy
for build-out).  Note that this also benefits those who do not have the funds available to
pay the full costs up-front.  That is, those with less money will benefit from a lower start up
cost.
Second, and relatedly, pricing differentiation allows for the accommodation of the
preferences of more users.  If the only way to utilize an abundant network is to buy a $200
user device, and then use it free of charge, those who would use such a device only rarely
might not purchase one.  Even if the network was fully built out and successful, some
potential users who have the $200 might nonetheless conclude that access to the network is
worth only, say, $50.  If an owner could offer different packages (e.g., pay $200 for the
device and get your usage free, or pay only $10 for the device but also pay $0.01 per
message you generate), then it could attract users who wanted to use the network only
sparingly.  See David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
1151, 1169 (1998) (“The more flexible the pricing options, the easier it is for the seller to
charge a high price to the high-volume, high-value user, and a low price to the low-volume,
low-value user, capturing revenue from the former without losing sales to the latter.”); Eli
M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II:  The Impending Doom of Common Carriage, 18
Telecomm. Pol’y 435, 442-45 (1994) (noting advantages of differentiated pricing); Eli M.
Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the Telecommunications Act
of 1996?, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 955, 967 (1997) (same).
Third, flexibility allows for greater capture of revenue via peak load pricing.  That is, a
company could charge more for transmissions at times of peak usage—which, notably, is
how Noam’s proposal of spot markets for access would operate, but not how the proposed
government-created abundant networks would operate.  This would allow the company to\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 58  3-DEC-03 16:30
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competitive firms an incentive to find the most efficient pricing
regime, and the one most conducive to the successful deployment of
the network.  Government actors would lack a similar incentive.
D. Concentration of Private Power
The Sections above indicate that the benefits of competition are
great, and that private ownership has several advantages over govern-
ment regulation.  But what if we can’t have both private control and
competition?  That is, there is a significant potential disadvantage to
private ownership of abundant networks:  concentration of economic
power leading to anticompetitive behavior.  If the available spectrum
is controlled by one entity, that entity may have an incentive to freeze
out potential competitors as a way of capturing monopoly profits.  The
idea is that if, say, company X controls the one slice of spectrum that
is available for creating an abundant network, it may try to block
other companies from gaining access to its network.  Benkler articu-
lates this as the fear that a vertically integrated, monopolist spectrum
owner would want to manufacture all the user devices itself, rather
than leaving room for competitors to sell them as well.180
It is not at all clear that a monopolist owner of spectrum would
discriminate in the equipment market, however.  There is a robust
debate about the circumstances under which a vertically integrated
entity that controls supply would have an incentive to harm potential
competitors in related markets, and many commentators contend that
no such incentive exists as long as the monopolist can capture the
value of its monopoly in the primary market.181  Assuming, though,
that a monopolist would have such an incentive, there is still little
reap more revenue from those willing to pay a higher price and thus enable it to charge
lower prices at other times.  See Noam, supra note 55. R
180 See Benkler, supra note 1, at 363-64. R
181 See, e.g., David Gilo, Retail Competition Percolating Through to Suppliers and the
Use of Vertical Integration, Tying, and Vertical Restraints to Stop It, 20 Yale J. on Reg. 25,
43-54 (2003) (discussing this debate); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media
Regulation in the New Economy, 19 Yale J. on Reg. 171, 187-205 (2002) (same).  There is
disagreement, for example, about the degree to which cable Internet providers will have an
incentive to prevent unaffiliated Internet service providers (ISPs) from providing Internet
service to customers with cable modems.  The argument is that cable Internet providers
might not be able to capture all the value of their networks simply by renting out their
cable lines, in large part because of fears about regulation of the prices they can charge for
those lines, and that cable Internet providers might fear losing control over their network
and thus want the control afforded by having an affiliated ISP.  See Glenn A. Woroch,
Open Access Rules and the Broadband Race, 2002 L. Rev. Mich. St. U.-Det. C.L. 719, 734-
41; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 134, at 948-51.  These arguments, though, would not apply R
to spectrum.  Spectrum ownership rights presumably would entail control over the prices
that the owners can charge, and the whole point of the algorithms for abundant networks is
that there is nothing to fear from adding users (because each additional user adds capacity)\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 59  3-DEC-03 16:30
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reason for such discrimination to occur because such a monopoly can
and should be avoided in the first place.
The government can, and should, auction enough spectrum rights
to support five to ten abundant networks.  As I noted above, there is
no magic number of megahertz necessary for an abundant network.  It
could be 10 or 1000 or anything in between.  But, as I also noted, 100
megahertz would allow for massive throughput (1 gigabit per second
or more).182  One hundred megahertz is a big slice of frequencies.
Fortunately, there are huge swaths of spectrum that are unutilized or
underutilized.  If spectrum rights were auctioned as private property,
those swaths could be available for abundant (or other) networks.
A recent paper from the FCC’s Office of Plans and Policy identi-
fied portions of spectrum that can easily be restructured.183  They lim-
ited themselves to big bands that are currently underutilized, are not
allocated to broadcasting, are not set aside for governmental use, and
are located in the “prime beachfront” of the spectrum—so designated
because it is the frequency range that is currently most in demand—
covering the 2700 megahertz from 300 MHz to 3 gigahertz (GHz) (or
3000 MHz).184  Even with those limitations, the paper identified 438
megahertz that would be available and suitable for highly valued new
services, and that we could expect would be devoted to such services if
the owners had the flexibility to provide them.  That alone would
create room for several 100-megahertz-wide abundant networks.
Then there is the spectrum devoted to broadcast television.
Nicholas Negroponte long ago noted that wireless frequencies are
more appropriate for services that require mobility (such as
telephony) than for services that rarely use it (such as broadcast tele-
and no reason to fear heavy users (because those users would not transmit at high enough
power levels to create interference problems).
More generally, as long as the spectrum owner could gain its profit (whether
supracompetitive or not) from its control over the spectrum, it would have little reason to
try to monopolize the equipment market.  A spectrum owner presumably would be able to
capture all of its rents from its control over the spectrum, and thus should be happy to let
other companies make the user devices.  See Yoo, supra.  In fact, having other companies
make those devices could increase the market for the owner’s spectrum, and thus increase
its profits more quickly, and to a greater extent, than single-source supply would.  See
James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?:  A Critique of Open Access
Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 39, 80 (2000).  Indeed, cellular service
providers have generally followed this model, reaping their profits from the purchase of
cellular time and letting other companies make the telephones that can access their
spectrum.
182 Moreover, higher bit rates would be of limited use because the real difficulty with
abundant networks of any size is the delay due to the many hops.  See supra note 36. R
183 See Kwerel & Williams, supra note 17, at 25. R
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vision).185  Thomas Hazlett persuasively argues that society would be
better off if we auctioned the spectrum used for broadcast televi-
sion.186  Auctioning all spectrum currently devoted to broadcast televi-
sion would easily fund the provision of multichannel (i.e., cable or
satellite) service to the fifteen percent of households that lack it and
still leave many billions of dollars left over for the public fisc.187  That
would free up another 324 megahertz.
This does not even touch the spectrum above 3 GHz.  Commons
advocates have proposed abundant networks for frequencies in the
upper part of the 5 GHz band.188  This puts on the table another 3000
or so megahertz that would be suitable for many uses, including abun-
dant networks.  The frequencies between 3 GHz and 6 GHz are less
heavily utilized than the frequencies below 3 GHz, and can more
easily be restructured (and therefore auctioned).  Most of the govern-
ment’s relatively mild steps toward spectrum flexibility, and its rela-
tively few instances of restructuring existing services in order to make
room for new ones, have generally occurred in the 3 GHz to 6 GHz
range.189  The relatively free spectrum above 3 GHz should thus yield
hundreds more megahertz that could be auctioned.
Yet another big category is spectrum controlled by the military,
which consists of hundreds of megahertz, much of which is rarely, if
ever, utilized.  The military has been reluctant to release much of this
spectrum, for fear of losing it forever.190  As a result, there has been
little use of huge swaths of spectrum.191  But the military can always
185 See Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital 24 (1995) (identifying “Negroponte Switch”
as idea that “the information currently coming through the ground (read, wires) will come
in the future through the ether, and the reverse.  Namely, what is in the air will go into the
ground and what is in the ground will go into the air.”).
186 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The U.S. Digital TV Transition:  Time to Toss the
Negroponte Switch 21-22 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working
Paper No. 01-15, 2001).
187 The FCC found that, in 2002, slightly more than eighty-five percent of households
subscribed to multichannel video (principally cable and satellite).  See Annual Assessment
of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming, 17
F.C.C.R. 26,901, App.B (2002).
188 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 76-77. R
189 Indeed, the government’s creation of unlicensed spectrum (effectively a regulated
spectrum commons) has been in the 5 GHz range, specifically 5150-5350 and 5725-5825
MHz.  See U-NII Order, supra note 21.  Unfortunately, this experiment with unlicensed R
spectrum has not had the success that its backers had hoped to achieve.  See Buck, supra
note 26, ¶ 87; Hazlett, supra note 9, at 498-501; see also supra note 28. R
190 See, e.g., Thomas Frank, A Failure to Communicate, Newsday, Dec. 8, 2002, at A6
(noting Defense Department’s reluctance to give up any of its unused spectrum).
191 See, e.g., Glenn Bischoff, Gasping for Air, Wireless Rev., Mar. 1, 2002, at 50 (noting
FCC Commissioner Kevin Martin’s identification of broadcasters and Department of
Defense as entities “sitting on large swaths of spectrum that are underutilized or not used
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obtain spectrum via eminent domain, and much quicker methods also
are available.  For instance, a recent paper by an engineer and an
economist from the FCC suggested that the military could instantane-
ously reclaim spectrum it wanted to use via a beacon system that it
would control.192  The military would send out a signal over its fre-
quencies every few seconds, and the devices using those frequencies
would not work if the military stopped sending this signal.193  The
spectrum would thus be interruptible, but given the rarity of the mili-
tary’s use of most of its spectrum those interruptions likely would be
few and far between.  In this way, the system would be similar to
interruptible electricity and interruptible gas, both of which are widely
used for delivering services but allow for government preemption in
an emergency.  The upshot of all this is that, even short of a massive
“big bang” auction (in which all spectrum rights would be available
for sale as private property), the government could fairly easily make
enough spectrum available to supply many networks, abundant or
otherwise.194
All the arguments about the dangers of vertical integration rely
on the existence of a monopoly or collusive oligopoly.195  But in this
case there is no reason to leave ourselves in a position where any
entity has such market power.  There can be a bunch of available
slices large enough to support an abundant network.  And, given that
supply, there is no reason to assume that this market will operate any
differently from any other competitive market.  We worry about ver-
tical integration, and losing the benefits of competition more gener-
ally, only when a monopolist is present, and here there would be none.
But, a skeptic might ask, what if one company buys up all that
spectrum?  There is no more reason to expect such a development
than there is to expect that one company will buy up all of Manhattan.
It is simply too expensive, especially given the presence of so many
bidders who will not want to be frozen out of the lucrative markets
offered by abundant (and other) networks.  Experience supports this
192 Mark M. Bykowsky & Michael J. Marcus, Facilitating Spectrum Management
Reform via Callable/Interruptible Spectrum (2002), available at http://intel.si.umich.edu/
tprc/papers/2002/147/SpectrumMgmtReform.pdf; see also Report of the FCC Spectrum
Policy Task Force, supra note 16, at 20 (recommending that government allow access to R
underutilized spectrum on interruptible basis).
193 See Bykowsky & Marcus, supra note 192, at 18 (explaining how beacon system R
would work).
194 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of big bang auction). R
195 See Richard A. Posner & Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust 870 (2d ed. 1981);
Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers:  A Post-Chicago
Approach, 63 Antitrust L.J. 513, 516-19 (1995); Sam Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integra-
tion Policy, in Public Policy Toward Mergers 167, 169-70 (J. Fred Weston & Sam Peltzman
eds., 1969) (discussing foreclosure of market to rivals).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 62  3-DEC-03 16:30
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point.  Right now a good deal of spectrum is available for sale via
private auctions (i.e., by buying it from the current licensee).  And yet
no one entity owns more than a small fraction of the available spec-
trum.  Even with free transferability of spectrum, no one can afford to
buy even a significant portion of it.  And there is no reason to believe
that a private company would have more success at purchasing all the
spectrum at public auction than at private auction.
Moreover, insofar as there is any danger of one party gaining
control of too much spectrum, the government can easily prevent such
concentration.  Antitrust law would kick in if a company tried to buy
up all the spectrum, or tried to collude with other spectrum owners
(and remember that collusion becomes dramatically more difficult
with each new owner added to the equation).  But we need not stop at
antitrust law.  If we wanted a limit on concentration below what anti-
trust would prevent, the government could easily impose one.  That is,
the government could limit the amount of spectrum that any one
entity could control.  This is not mere theorizing:  The government in
fact imposed limits—“spectrum caps”—on the amount of spectrum in
which any given mobile wireless licensee could have an attributable
interest.196  These spectrum aggregation limits might not be necessary,
but they should be sufficient, as they prevent a company from having
an interest in entities that control more than a defined portion of the
available spectrum.197  Indeed, the FCC abandoned its spectrum limits
for mobile wireless licenses because it found that they were more
restrictive than was necessary to prevent concentration.198  Spectrum
caps are a straightforward and direct means of prohibiting any com-
pany from obtaining a dominant market position.199
196 See 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review—Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Commer-
cial Mobile Radio Services, 67 Fed. Reg. 1626, ¶¶ 1-2 (Jan. 14, 2002) (explaining aggrega-
tion limits and “attributable interest”).
197 See Owen & Rosston, supra note 42, at 212-13 (noting that spectrum caps could R
ensure competitive market structure, but adding that such caps may not be necessary in
light of availability of standard antitrust enforcement).
198 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review—Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Commercial
Mobile Radio Services, 67 Fed. Reg. 1626, ¶¶ 18-34  (determining that spectrum caps were
no longer necessary because of competitive nature of marketplace, and that caps were
interfering with marketplace’s creation of incentives regarding choice of technology).
199 As I mentioned in the text, spectrum aggregation limits should be sufficient to pre-
vent one company from acquiring monopoly power.  It bears noting, though, that there are
additional tools in the policymaker’s arsenal.  For instance, the government could impose
upon the owners of these big blocks of frequencies an obligation to take the highest bidder
for any given service that it allows on its spectrum.  So if, for example, an owner created an
abundant network and let companies pay it royalties for the right to make user devices that
would work on that spectrum, the owner could not refuse a company that offered to pay
higher royalties than one of the manufacturers that the owner approved.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 63  3-DEC-03 16:30
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A different possibility bears mentioning:  That competition may
exist in the beginning, but that network effects may result in a single
entity having monopoly power.  The notion is that, for some goods,
their value to consumers increases to the extent that others use it.200
With respect to networks, a big part of the value of being on any given
network is the possibility of communicating with others on that net-
work.  The fear is that this might lead to market dominance by a single
player.201  If one network has a large market share and does not allow
its competitors to interconnect, then it might become a monopolist:
New users (and existing users of its competitors) will join the big net-
work, because it has more users and thus more value, and the process
will continue until the big network controls virtually all the market.202
Alternatively, the government could sell spectrum to “band managers” who would act
as brokers of the spectrum but would not be affiliated with any of the companies that
actually provided services over it.  See, e.g., Service Rules for 746-764 and 776-794 MHz
Bands, 15 F.C.C.R. 5299 (2000) (setting out plan for band managers for certain frequen-
cies); Implementation of Sections 309(j) and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934 as
Amended, 16 F.C.C.R. 6803 (2000) (same).  That is, the government would hold an auction
for one or more bands, but would impose limits on the winning bidders—chief among them
that the winning bidder could sell spectrum rights to companies that wanted to provide
services but would not be allowed to provide those services itself.
This should eliminate any danger of anticompetitive behavior, but if the government
wanted to add a level of assurance it could explicitly prohibit the band manager from dis-
criminating among service providers.  See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 27.603 (2002) (“A Guard Band
Manager may not engage in unjust or unreasonable discrimination among spectrum users
and may not unreasonably deny prospective spectrum users access to the Guard Band
Manager’s licensed spectrum.”); Service Rules for 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands, 15
F.C.C.R. 5299, ¶¶ 63-67 (2000) (suggesting mechanisms by which it can ensure “fair and
nondiscriminatory access” to spectrum controlled by band managers).
Band managers thus represent a mechanism to preserve the main benefits of private
ownership—the profit incentive to put spectrum to its most valued and efficient use com-
bined with great flexibility in changing users and services—while also ensuring nondiscrim-
inatory access for potential service providers.  That said, the limitation on affiliation with
service providers limits the revenue models available to band managers and thus may miti-
gate the profit motive and its attendant advantages.  See Rosston, supra note 47, at 11-13 R
(discussing problems that FCC has faced with incentives for band managers). It also
increases transaction costs insofar as a spectrum owner would be inclined to use some of its
spectrum for its own purposes but would be prohibited from doing so.  And utilizing band
managers seems unnecessary in light of the likelihood of meaningful competition; even
without band managers, there is little reason to expect discrimination against unaffiliated
providers.  But this system would prevent abuses arising from vertical integration by
preventing vertical integration in the first place.
200 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Effects, 86
Cal. L. Rev. 479, 483 (1998) (“[A] network effect exists where purchasers find a good more
valuable as additional purchasers buy the same good.”).
201 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 141. R
202 As Gerald Faulhaber explains it,
[I]f a network industry is dominated by a large provider, that provider could
refuse interoperability, driving its competitors’ customers toward its larger cus-
tomer base and eventually (near-) monopolizing the industry.  This phenom-
enon is colloquially referred to as the market “tips” in favor of the largest\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 64  3-DEC-03 16:30
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There are a number of reasons why network effects should not
produce a monopoly in the context of abundant networks.  One
problem with this argument is that it assumes little differentiation
among network providers.  Total domination by one firm is unlikely to
arise if networks offer differing services.  If some consumers particu-
larly value the services offered on each of several networks, then we
would expect that each network would retain those customers.
Having many different network providers increases both the
probability of some networks providing distinctive services and the
incentives for networks to do so.  It is a smart business strategy for a
network to offer its users capabilities that their competitors cannot
match.  Differentiation increases the chances of a network becoming a
major player, and it reduces the chances of it losing its user base; con-
sumers who value those services will likely remain with the network
even if its competitor has more customers.
Moreover, even without these incentives we should expect that
networks will have different capabilities.  Separate from the desire to
differentiate themselves for reasons of preserving market share, at
least some networks are likely to choose standards that differ from
others’ standards, either because they believe their standard will work
better or because the creator of the standard will not license it to them
(e.g., if the creator has an exclusive licensing arrangement with
another network provider).  The relevance of this point is that dif-
ferent standards will have different properties.  As I noted in Part
III.A, there are lots of choices that lead to differences in protocols
that impact the sorts of communications that a given set of protocols
optimizes.  These choices entail tradeoffs, making some forms of com-
munication easier and others more difficult.203  All the major wireless
provider.  “Tipping” occurs when a single provider reaches a critical mass of
customers that are so attractive to others that competitors must inevitably
shrink, in the absence of interoperation.
Gerald R. Faulhaber, Network Effects and Merger Analysis:  Instant Messaging and the
AOL-Time Warner Case, 26 Telecomm. Pol’y 311, 316 (2002).  Note that the network
effects would flow from the popularity of the network, not the mere fact of ownership of
the spectrum.  Property rights in spectrum could and should result in hundreds of available
megahertz, so the fact of ownership would not pave the way for market dominance.  Any
dominance would flow from the desirability of a particular application that operated over
the airwaves.  See supra notes 182-95 and accompanying text. R
203 This is borne out by current events.  Right now there are many different wireless
networking standards, each with its own properties.  Two leading wireless networking pro-
tocols, for example, are Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.  Wi-Fi allows for greater distance between
wireless devices, and greater download speeds, but at the cost of greater power consump-
tion.  See, e.g., Ken Noblitt, A Comparison of Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11, at http://
www.btdesigner.com/pdfs/KenNoblittComparison.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003); The
Kerton Group, A Businessman’s Comparison of Bluetooth and Wi-Fi (802.11b) (2001),
available at http://www.kerton.com/papers/bluetooth-wifi.pdf.  Bluetooth thus might be\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 65  3-DEC-03 16:30
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networking standards have their own advantages and disadvan-
tages.204  We should similarly expect that different abundant networks
will have different protocols, with their own tradeoffs; and these pro-
tocols probably will optimize different kinds of uses.
The differing capabilities of different protocols should ensure the
viability of competing networks.  If users value a function that is opti-
mized on a given network and provided less successfully on other net-
works, they will not lightly abandon that network.  Even if a particular
network has a majority of users among its customers, other networks
can remain viable by responding to the desires of the market segment
that values their services.  Note that there are two possibilities:  Con-
sumers who value particular services may stay with their provider and
no other, or they may choose to stay with their provider and join the
big network.  The difference between these two possibilities depends
in part on the power of network effects, and in part on the differences
between services.  If the pull of being on the same network is very
great for a particular user, but she still values the services available on
a smaller network, she may choose to subscribe to both.  This may
sound strange—why would people pay twice to be on two different
networks?  But people do that with regularity.  Users of text mes-
saging still make telephone calls, because each service offers a dif-
ferent capability.  Even when services are closer to being substitutes—
for instance, text messaging and e-mail—people often stay on both
networks.  Indeed, even if the same service is involved, many con-
sumers subscribe to more than one provider.  Many consumers, for
example, have Internet access through a home PC and a cellular
phone or PDA.  And most cellular phone users retain a landline
phone as well.205  The point is that network effects may lead some to
abandon their original provider for the biggest one, but others will
better for uses involving short-distance communications without access to a backup power
source, whereas Wi-Fi might work better for longer-distance communications.  See
Michelle Man, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi 8-11 (2000), available at http://www.socketcom.com/
pdf/TechBriefWireless.pdf.  These sorts of differences are typical.
204 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Carter et al., Unlicensed and Unshackled:  A Joint OSP-OET
White Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues (FCC Office of Strategic
Planning & Office of Eng’g Tech., Working Paper No. 39, 2003) (comparing Bluetooth, Wi-
Fi, and Home RF, and noting that each has different tradeoffs in terms of power versus
speed and in terms of speed versus effective range), available at http://
www.socketcom.comhraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/doc-234741A1.pdf; Man,
supra note 203, at 2 (comparing characteristics of Wireless Personal Area Networks (such R
as Bluetooth), Wireless Local Area Networks (such as Wi-Fi), Wireless Wide Area Net-
works (such as CDMA), Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (such as Sprint fixed wire-
less), and Wireless Global Area Networks (such as GlobalStar)).
205 See FCC, Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking:  In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 30 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1 (Aug. 21, 2003)\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 66  3-DEC-03 16:30
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stay with their provider, either alone or in conjunction with a subscrip-
tion to the biggest one.206
There are other reasons to doubt that network effects will pro-
duce a monopoly.  Network effects will result in monopoly only if the
biggest provider denies interconnection to its competitors.  In a com-
petitive market, however, firms will want to interconnect, because it
will be in their interest:  A service provider that interconnects with
another provider offers its customers more value—it offers them more
people with whom they can interact.207  The enhanced value created
by a bigger network leads providers to interconnect.208
(noting that only about three to five percent of wireless telephony subscribers use their
service to replace their traditional residential landline service), WL 22175730 ¶ 445.
206 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 141, at 106 (“Consumer heterogeneity and product R
differentiation tend to limit tipping and sustain multiple networks.  If the rival systems
have distinct features sought by certain consumers, two or more systems may be able to
survive by catering to consumers who care more about product attributes than network
size.  Here, market equilibrium with multiple incompatible products reflects the social
value of variety.”); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a
Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 283, 292 (1996) (“Where there are dif-
ferences in preferences regarding alternative standards, coexistence of standards is a likely
outcome.”); Willow A. Sheremata, Barriers to Innovation:  A Monopoly, Network Exter-
nalities, and the Speed of Innovation, 42 Antitrust Bull. 937, 966 (1997) (arguing that ser-
vice differentiation can overcome advantage of strong network effect); Weiser, supra note
102, at 575 (“In markets where the critical mass is small enough to accommodate multiple R
providers of a particular product or service, multiple firms will compete at the platform
level, as they currently do in the market for video game consoles and cell phones.  More-
over, it is quite clear that consumers’ demand for variety can compensate for a lack of a
strong network effect.”).
207 This raises an obvious question:  Can there be interconnection between different
abundant networks?  As I noted above, they probably will have different protocols and will
optimize different functions, so it might seem that there could be no interconnection.  But
interconnection is possible, because abundant networks would use packet-based transmis-
sions with a network standard superimposed on them.  The networking standard would be
at a higher layer of the protocol stack, allowing for interconnection of the packets at a
lower layer.  See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. Telecomms. &
High Tech. L. 37, 58-64 (2002) (discussing layers of protocol stack); see also Akyildiz et al.,
supra note 113, at 104-14 (same).  This is not a matter of theory.  The desire for intercon- R
nection of packet-based systems has led to the successful development of initiatives to
achieve this purpose, such as the Multiprotocol Label Switching initiative of the Internet
Engineering Task Force.  See Multiprotocol Label Switching, at http://www.ietf.org/
html.charters/mpls-charter.html (last modified Oct. 22, 2003).
208 See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Bottlenecks and Bandwagons:  Access Policy in the New
Telecommunications, in Handbook of Telecommunications Economics (Ingo Vogelsang &
Martin Cave eds.) (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 10), http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/
~faulhabe/Bottlenecks%20and%20Bandwagons.pdf.  Faulhaber notes that, in a competi-
tive market, interconnection is the norm:
Is it likely that only some (or even none) of the market participants will inter-
connect in equilibrium?  No; if two such firms interconnect, they will both offer
their customers a higher value than the remaining non-interconnecting firms.
These two firms will be in the enviable position of being able to charge higher
prices and attracting customers from the non-interconnecting firms!  In this\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 67  3-DEC-03 16:30
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A network has an incentive to deny interconnection only if it has
managed to amass a market share greater than fifty percent, or failing
that a market share near fifty percent and much smaller competitors
that have difficulty reaching interconnection agreements among them-
selves.209  This is because, absent high costs of reaching interconnec-
tion agreements, those smaller competitors will likely agree among
themselves to interconnect and thereby create a network with more
users than the biggest provider has; the biggest provider will then find
that it offers less value to its customers (unless it agrees to intercon-
nect), because its customers will have access to a smaller network.210
Denial of interconnection is the exception, not the rule:  Gener-
ally, a number of providers offer a service and none gains dominance,
so none has an interest in denying interconnection.  That is how e-mail
networks have worked, and how the Internet backbone market has
worked.211  In the context of abundant networks, with hundreds of
megahertz sold at the same time and many different networks being
created as a result, there is little reason to expect that any one net-
case, an interconnection arrangement helps each firm grow and increases its
profitability.  Non-interconnecting firms face a choice of interconnecting with
the other firms or losing their customers to the more valuable interconnected
network.  In this case, the only stable outcome (that is, the market equilibrium)
is for all firms to interconnect.
Id.
209 Id. at 11.  Faulhaber suggests two additional requirements for a market leader to
adopt a policy of denying interconnection:  “The network effect must be strong, so that
switching to the largest provider adds substantial value for customers.  [And c]ustomer
switching costs (‘stickiness’) must be low, so that switching to the largest provider is not too
costly for customers.”  Id.
210 See id. at 10-13.
211 See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:  Connecting Internet Backbones 15-16
(FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 32, 2000) (noting that, in absence of
dominant provider, we would expect interconnection, and that this is exactly what has hap-
pened in Internet backbone market), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/
working_papers/oppwp32.pdf; Patrick D. Curran, Standard-Setting Organizations:  Pat-
ents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 983, 983, passim (2003) (noting
that competing providers often want interoperability).
It bears noting that the MCI-WorldCom merger, and the proposed MCI/WorldCom-
Sprint merger, raised concerns among antitrust regulators that the merged entity would
have a dominant market position that might lead that market to tip toward monopoly.  See
James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 Fed. Comm.
L.J. 225, 226-27, 231-32 (2002); Marius Schwartz, Competitor Cooperation and Exclusion
in Communications Industries, in E-Commerce Antitrust & Trade Practices:  Practical
Strategies for Doing Business on the Web 41, 48 (2001).  The government responded by
requiring the divestiture of MCI’s backbone.  This highlights the fact that, if one service
provider does attempt to gain dominance and then deny interconnection, the government
is able to respond.  Ordinary antitrust law gives the government sufficient tools at its dis-
posal.  See A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 147, 157 (1999) (stating that antitrust enforcement is available as means of elimi-
nating anticompetitive behavior in network industries (as well as nonnetwork industries)).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 68  3-DEC-03 16:30
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work will achieve sufficient market share to make denial of intercon-
nection an attractive option.212
Let’s assume, though, that, for whatever reason, one network
does gain almost all the subscribers.  Imagine that, whether because of
network effects, the failure of competing networks to offer protocols
with different capabilities, or the disinterest of consumers in sticking
with networks that offer those capabilities, one company does become
a monopolist.  There is still no good reason why it should remain so.
First, its dominance may be short-lived.  A number of commenta-
tors argue that where the rapidly changing technological world pro-
duces monopolists, they will produce serial monopolists.213  One
person or company develops a product or service that people value
highly, and consumers flock to it.  It becomes dominant.  But then
212 The most famous example of denial of interconnection—AT&T’s—differs because it
involves a complementary good, and it was the complementary good that empowered
AT&T.  The company successfully employed denial of interconnection as a strategy only
when it had a complementary good—long distance service—to which its competitors did
not have access (because AT&T had patents on the technology for long distance).  See
Peter W. Huber et al., Federal Telecommunications Law 11-17 (2d ed. 1999).
The most visible recent example of a firm resisting interconnection was AOL’s pop-
ular instant-messaging (IM) service.  As the FCC noted, however, AOL was indeed the
dominant player in the market, with a clear majority of the users.  See Time Warner Inc.,
16 F.C.C.R. 6547, ¶ 160 (2001) (stating that “AOL has a mass of users . . . that is several
times larger than any other provider’s and is larger than all other providers’ combined”);
id. ¶ 129 (stating that “AOL, by any measure described in the record, is the dominant IM
provider in America”).  Thus its hesitation to interconnect was not surprising.  It also bears
noting that the FCC ordered AOL to interconnect its instant messaging with competitors
as a condition of its merger with Time Warner.  Id. ¶ 325; see also infra notes 221-22 and R
accompanying text (discussing mandatory interconnection).
213 See, e.g., David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of Anti-
trust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries 12 (Nat’l Bureaus of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W8268, 2001) (“[I]n many high-technology industries there are mul-
tiple, sequential races for market leadership.  Major innovations occur repeatedly, and
switching costs and lock-in do not prevent displacement of category leaders by better prod-
ucts. . . . It is not atypical for a fringe firm that invests heavily to displace the leader by
leapfrogging the leader’s technology.”), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/
w8268.pdf; see also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Devising a Microsoft Remedy
that Serves Consumers, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 691, 706 (2001).  Lopatka & Page note:
A competitive market characterized by network effects is likely to exhibit a
pattern of serial monopoly, with the winner in one period either giving way in
the next period to another supplier with a better product or retaining its posi-
tion by introducing a product better than the one developed by its competitors.
Id.; see also Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (2001) (stating that “firms compete through innova-
tion for temporary market dominance, from which they may be displaced by the next wave
of product advancements”); Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Winners, Losers and
Microsoft:  Competition and Antitrust in High Technology 10-11, 15-16 (1999) (arguing
that monopoly in high-technology industries is transitory).  But see Gerald R. Faulhaber,
ACCESS  ≠ ACCESS1 + ACCESS2, 2002 L. Rev. Mich. St. U.-Det. C.L. 677, 700-01
(arguing that case for serial monopoly is not yet proved).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 69  3-DEC-03 16:30
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someone else develops a better product or service, and users leave
their previous favorite for their new favorite; and so on.214  This may
sound overly optimistic, but in fact a similar pattern has already
occurred with a number of services.215  Pagers were a killer applica-
tion until analog cellular came along, and that was a killer app until
digital cellular.  Visi-Calc was the dominant spreadsheet until Lotus
introduced 1-2-3, and that was dominant until Excel came along.216
Similarly, Managing Your Money was the dominant personal finance
software until Quicken displaced it.217
More generally, the problems discussed above for a single stan-
dard and for a monopolist apply here as well.218  Dominant providers
tend to produce less innovation than their upstart rivals do.  They tend
not to modify their standard to accommodate newly developing
market niches.  And, in any event, no single standard can satisfy all
market niches, so there is always room for new ones.  The result is that
new entrants can arise and thrive even in the face of a seemingly
entrenched incumbent.219
214 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice:  Rapidly Changing
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 269, 296-97 (1999) (discussing this
phenomenon).
215 See Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 Antitrust L.J.
693, 721 (2000).  Muris notes:
Although the strong network effects theory emphasizes the difficulty that even
a superior technology has in replacing a “locked-in” one, evidence of change is
everywhere.  The 20th century has produced a blizzard of such change, from
prominent examples like the automobile replacing the horse and buggy to
more simple ones, such as ballpoint replacing fountain pens.  More recently,
cassettes replaced eight-track tapes, compact discs replaced vinyl records, and
video games have witnessed rapid change with Atari, Nintendo, Sony, Sega,
and others vying to be the standard.
Id.
216 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 213, at 21 (discussing these examples and sim- R
ilar examples in other fields, such as pharmaceuticals and handheld devices); Plugged into
a New Millennium, InfoWorld, Oct. 26, 1998, at 9 (noting that Microsoft Excel displaced
Lotus 1-2-3, which in turn displaced Visi-Calc).
217 See Muris, supra note 215, at 720-21; Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 213, at 60. R
Word processing programs constitute another example.  WordStar was the dominant word
processing program until WordPerfect displaced it, and WordPerfect was eventually dis-
placed by Word.  See Muris, supra note 215, at 720-21; Evans & Schmalensee, supra note R
213, at 21. R
218 See supra Part III.B.
219 Weiser notes that:
Even where an incumbent company establishes an early lead and installed base
of users, new entrants still will often find a niche and be able to enter the
market.  To be sure, switching costs will often limit the new entrant’s ability to
attract customers, but unless the economies of scale give the incumbent an
extraordinary cost advantage, the incumbent’s natural tendency to exploit its
installed base will create openings for new entrants.
Weiser, supra note 102, at 587-88. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 70  3-DEC-03 16:30
2076 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2007
Second, and more important, if policymakers conclude that a
monopoly will not be transitory, there are remedies available.220  Most
obviously, the government could mandate interconnection among net-
works.  The government could require that all networks allow for
interconnection with other networks (and, if necessary, that the domi-
nant network license its protocol to other providers).221  Mandatory
interconnection is a familiar tool in telecommunications law, and it
avoids the problems created by monopolies.  It eviscerates the lev-
erage that a monopolist can assert, and allows for multiple providers
to coexist.222  The availability of regulatory arrangements such as this
means that more interventionist solutions are not necessary.  Indeed,
the government could require interconnection before a company
gained a monopoly:  In this way, the government could avoid the
monopolization in the first place.  Interconnection is not only a solu-
tion to the problems created by monopolists but also a means of elimi-
nating the impact of network effects that would give rise to a
monopolist.223
E. Benefits of Government Control:  The Value of a Free Network
The discussion so far has indicated that there are costs to the gov-
ernment controlling an abundant network, benefits to having competi-
tion among abundant networks, and benefits to having that
competition be carried out by private firms.  But we have not squarely
addressed the advantages of the government creating an abundant
network.
Recall that there could be one or more government-controlled
abundant networks in addition to privately controlled ones, or one or
more government-controlled networks and no privately controlled
ones.  The latter possibility raises significant concerns about rent-
seeking and capture, and it raises the same sort of monopoly problems
220 See generally Melamed, supra note 211 (discussing availability of antitrust enforce- R
ment in context of industries subject to network effects).
221 On achieving interconnection with different protocols (thereby obviating need to
license the most popular one), see supra note 207.  Phil Weiser notes that a dominant R
network can be toppled from its position by removing intellectual property protections
against reverse engineering.  See Weiser, supra note 102, at 591. R
222 See Speta, supra note 211, at 252, 264-67. R
223 More drastic options are available to the government, but it seems unlikely that they
would be necessary.  But even if the government took the most heavy-handed approach
and simply took over the network (with payment, of course), that result would still seem
preferable to having a single network from the outset.  Either way, the government would
end up controlling the network, but by beginning with private control, the creators of the
standards would have a profit incentive to create the best ones possible, and users would
get to choose among those competing standards.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 71  3-DEC-03 16:30
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that apply to a single network (or set of networks) controlled by a
private firm.
Having a government-controlled network operate alongside pri-
vately-controlled ones eliminates the monopoly problem and reduces
the incentive for rent-seeking, but it creates distortions of its own.
Government control can have harmful effects on the market even if
the government actors seek only to maximize social welfare, as the
presence of a government network might lead private competitors to
offer less variety, or not to enter the market in the first place.224
Moreover, government actors would have reason to ensure that gov-
ernment-controlled networks were successful, and would have the
ability to create a regulatory environment that would facilitate this
goal.  Such success not only would ratify the decision to create the
network, but also, perhaps more importantly, would justify the con-
tinued involvement of the government actors.  And note that a gov-
ernment actor who, in good faith, believes that government-created
networks are valuable might well believe that doing what it takes to
keep that network operating has considerable value as well.  Private
firms thus might reasonably fear that the government would have an
interest in tilting the playing field on behalf of its own network, and
government actors would be in a position to create regulations to
achieve that end.225  More disturbingly, government actors might
pursue their own interests more directly.226  Instead of responding to
the public’s interest (or to the profit motive), they might respond to
their desire for more power, prestige, or rewards from those above
them in the political hierarchy.  In fact, studies indicate that this is
exactly what happens with government enterprises.227
More generally, having a government-controlled abundant net-
work alongside private competitors raises the obvious question of the
benefits that are likely to accrue.  Once there is a competitive market,
what is the benefit of adding the government to the mix?  Indeed, we
224 See Helmuth Cremer et al., Mixed Oligopoly with Differentiated Products, 9 Int’l J.
Indus. Org. 43, 44 (1991) (“[H]aving a public firm maximizing social surplus is not necessa-
rily socially desirable, even when this firm is as performant as its private competitors in
terms of costs . . . .”); Gianni de Fraja & Flavio Delbono, Alternative Strategies of a Public
Firm in Oligopoly, 41 Oxford Econ. Papers 302 (1989).
225 See David E. M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Incentives for Anticompetitive
Behavior by Public Enterprises, 22 Rev. Indus. Org. 183, 198 (2003) (noting that “[a] public
enterprise’s special position as a government entity can afford it power to set industry rules
that raise rivals’ costs directly”).
226 See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the possibility R
of government actors seeking to maximize their private interests.
227 See Andr´ e Blais & St´ ephane Dion, Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers?, in The
Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat:  Appraisals and Evidence 355, 357 (Andr´ e Blais &
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can frame the question a bit more broadly:  In light of the possible
costs of having a government-controlled abundant network, are the
benefits large enough to overcome them?
The central benefit that commons advocates suggest is that a gov-
ernment-controlled abundant network will be a free network.228  This
seems to incorporate several concepts, including that:  People will not
have to pay to use it; the network will serve us as citizens, rather than
as consumers; and people will be able to communicate without any
filters imposed upon them.
1. Should Spectrum for Abundant Networks Be Free of Charge?
Let’s begin with the first point:  Some commons advocates seem
to believe that these networks should be created so that people can
use them free of charge.229  On this reasoning, a major problem with
the auction model is precisely that there is an auction where someone
pays for the spectrum necessary to create an abundant network; and
the problem with spectrum rights more generally is that they allow
private owners to charge money for access to spectrum.  Isn’t it an
advantage of government control that no one will have to buy spec-
trum, and no one will have to pay to use it?  Why not have the govern-
ment simply create an abundant network and let people use it without
charge?
Commons advocates seem to believe that it is essential to these
networks that they not involve payment for spectrum or for access to
spectrum.  But why, exactly?  The government could take control
(after purchase, if necessary) of any resource and then turn around
and offer free access to it.  Why here?  One possible answer is that
these networks create additional capacity, and thus impose no costs.
But that entails too narrow a definition of “cost.”  The cost of creating
an abundant network is the lost opportunity for someone to create a
different kind of network.  That other network may not use spectrum
as efficiently, but it may provide a service—say, broadcast television—
that would not be provided with the same quality of service (if it was
provided at all) by an abundant network.230  Adding users to an abun-
228 See Benkler, supra note 33, at 84-85 (discussing benefits of free access to informa- R
tion); Werbach, supra note 26, at 3 (emphasizing that unlicensed spectrum involves free R
access to airwaves).
229 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 70-71 (discussing benefits of spectrum being used free R
of charge).
230 The viability of providing real-time streaming video might depend in part on the
protocols chosen.  See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  But the envisioned packet- R
based low-power transmissions would not have the same quality of service as a dedicated
stream.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting delays resulting from many R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 73  3-DEC-03 16:30
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dant network may not displace other users of that abundant network,
but it displaces other networks (and those who would use them).
A related possible answer is that abundant networks render spec-
trum valueless (in that no one would pay anything for it), and there-
fore there is no basis for putting a price on it, or on access to it.  But
that is pretty far-fetched.  Abundant networks will not be optimized
for all forms of communication.  Notably, transmissions that are sensi-
tive to delay will have a lower quality of service in abundant networks,
because of the delays that multiple hops introduce—delays that get
bigger as the network gets bigger.231  As I noted above, this means
that real-time transmission of messages containing many packets (for
example, streaming video) will be difficult on abundant networks, and
will not have the quality of service that television viewers have come
to expect.  Commons advocates do not assert that all services will be
sufficiently well-provided by abundant networks that the remaining
spectrum will lose value, and it is hard to imagine that this would
occur.  There will still be demand for services to be provided on net-
works other than abundant networks, so there will still be a positive
price for spectrum.232
hops); supra notes 33 and 89 and accompanying text (highlighting services that Benkler R
envisions for abundant networks).
231 See Shakkottai et al., supra note 36, at 10. R
232 Even if we indulge this assumption, however, this does not mean that we must jet-
tison auctions.  There are two possibilities:  Either abundant networks will render spectrum
worthless, and the bids for the remainder of the frequencies drop to zero; or they will not
leave spectrum with no value, in which case the bids will remain at positive prices.  If the
former occurs, then the commons advocates have nothing to fear from auctions, because
there will be no bids and no prices paid.  The prospect of abundant networks will have
ended the role for auctions, and all the spectrum will, effectively, be free.  If, instead, the
price for the remaining spectrum remains positive, then that will indicate that spectrum is
not worthless.  That is, if some uses are not fully accommodated by the abundant networks,
the providers of those services will bid in order to control frequencies to allow them to
provide those services.
There is a possible rejoinder (and third possibility):  Abundant networks would create
infinite spectrum if they were created, but they will never be created if spectrum is pri-
vately owned.  But, as I discussed at some length in Part II.B, there is every reason to
expect that a private owner would create such a capacious network.  If such networks work
as advertised, it is hard to imagine that no private owner will try to create one.
This relates to another possible argument against payment, namely that it would not
be fair for the creators of the abundant networks to have to pay for spectrum if they are
then going to render spectrum valueless.  On this theory, they are conferring a positive
externality on the rest of us (eliminating the price of all other frequencies) and are not
being rewarded for it.  This is a plausible argument, and it is even conceivable that a poten-
tial creator of an abundant network might refrain from creating one for fear of conferring
this externality and being unable to capture it.  This concern, however, entails a level of
wild success for abundant networks that seems fanciful:  They will be so successful that a
bidder will not be able to recoup its spectrum fees before it has driven the price of spec-
trum to zero and then will watch as new competitors create their own abundant networks
without being encumbered by those fees.  Still, if that really is a concern, there is a\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 74  3-DEC-03 16:30
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Commons advocates might concede that abundant networks will
not render spectrum valueless but nonetheless argue that the govern-
ment should let people use the frequencies for those networks gratis.
This would constitute a major subsidy to abundant networks.233  If
these frequencies retain value, the government could gain revenue by
selling the rights to that spectrum.  And, of course, the government
has done exactly this in recent years, receiving billions of dollars to
fund government activities.234  A government decision to forego such
revenues by giving the right to transmit—or any other valuable
good—to a given set of people or entities is a significant subsidy to
those recipients.  The government would be choosing to bequeath the
response tailored to the danger—one that applies to all positive externalities:  Let the com-
pany capture some of the value of that externality.  In some cases, it may be difficult to set
up a mechanism to capture some of that value, but here it would be easy.  The government
could stipulate for any auction that, in the event that any new network renders the spec-
trum valueless, the creator of that new network would be reimbursed for its bid.  This
would eliminate the disincentive created by the possibility (however remote) of the success
of an abundant network hampering its owner.  And, more important, it would leave auc-
tions in place for the possibility that, just maybe, the abundant networks did not render all
spectrum worthless.  Given the overwhelming likelihood that the spectrum will retain some
value, this is preferable to abandoning auctions altogether on the assumption that spec-
trum will be valueless.
233 The reference to a subsidy raises an issue of baselines.  Why should payment for
spectrum be the norm?  Why shouldn’t the presumption be that all spectrum rights (how-
ever configured) are distributed without charge, so that the real question becomes why
anyone would ever be charged for it?  There is no ultimate answer to this question:  As
with all questions of baselines, there is no reason why we couldn’t have a different default.
But there are good reasons for this baseline.  As I noted in the text, even if abundant
networks create effectively infinite spectrum for certain uses, spectrum will retain value
because other uses will require other kinds of networks.  In other words, spectrum is
rivalrous, and spectrum rights contain a good deal of value.  The government is going to
have to choose some mechanism for determining how those valuable rights are distributed.
So the government has something of value that it will distribute, and it seems fair to treat
those who benefit from that distribution as having received something from the
government.
This question of baselines also implicates the allocation of spectrum.  The government
could distribute spectrum rights without payment, for instance via comparative hearing or
lottery (which is how most spectrum was distributed until the 1990s).  See supra text
accompanying notes 12-13.  But distributing something free of charge does not deprive it of R
value; on the contrary, it just gives potential recipients a huge incentive to game the system
so that they can be the recipients of these valuable rights.  See supra note 131 and accom- R
panying text.  Indeed, the problematic incentives created by free distribution led the gov-
ernment to switch to a more transparent form of payment for spectrum, in the form of
auctions.  See Kwerel & Felker, supra note 13 (discussing advantages of auctions); Thomas R
W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users:  Why Did FCC License
Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & Econ. 529 (1998) (same).
234 See Buck, supra note 26, ¶ 15 (“As of March 5, 2002, the [FCC] had conducted 45 R
separate spectrum auctions with a total of 21,853 licenses awarded and governmental
receipts of nearly $42 billion.”).  The FCC has a summary of the amount of the winning
bids in its auctions online.  FCC, Auctions Summary, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/
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value of the foregone auction revenue on the chosen beneficiaries,
rather than spending it on government services.
Why this subsidy?  Everyone who creates or benefits from a net-
work (whether cellular telephony, broadcast television, or car dealer-
ships) wants the government to contribute, free of charge, some
otherwise expensive element of that network.  And every network
operator claims that its network creates benefits for society.  The
norm for communications networks today—including most wired and
wireless networks—is that the government does not devote spectrum,
or wire, to them gratis.235  So why should the government donate spec-
trum for abundant networks?
One possible answer is that lower costs will allow the providers of
products for those networks to charge lower prices to users.236  Giving
spectrum away, one might argue, will enable providers to make com-
munications cheaper for end users.237  But that is always possible.
Giving away wire to cable companies, and spectrum to cellular and
satellite providers, will similarly reduce their costs and give them
room to reduce prices.  Indeed, giving away land to car dealerships
will provide such room.
Maybe we should want free access to spectrum because abundant
networks will work better as more people join.  Adding users creates
positive externalities, and so it would increase social welfare to subsi-
235 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting that, since 1997, most spectrum has R
been allocated via auction).
236 This relates to another possible argument, namely that avoiding payment for spec-
trum will help people with low incomes by making room for the cost to be lower.  This
argument suffers from the problem identified in the text—namely that this is true for any
network (or any good).  But the difficulties of this particular argument are even greater.  If
the goal is to help those who cannot afford to pay market rates for communications ser-
vices, why subsidize an unproven network rather than one that has already been estab-
lished as providing valuable services?  It would make more sense to subsidize a network
that has proven its worth, so that we can be confident that the poor are actually gaining
something of value.  This is an especially powerful point given that abundant networks
depend on the existence of many users.  Not only may the protocols not work as planned,
but there may not be enough users to serve as repeaters and thus relay messages.  See
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text; infra note 264 and accompanying text.  A more R
effective way to help those with low incomes would be to give them funds to purchase
services from the network of their choice (or perhaps simply give them funds outright and
let them make the choice as to how to spend it).  Subsidizing an abundant network is one
of the least effective means of helping them.
237 It bears noting that giving spectrum free of charge may not lead to lower prices.  The
cost of spectrum is a sunk cost, and in a competitive market prices reflect marginal costs.
Sunk costs’ main effect is on market structure, with high sunk costs leading to fewer
entrants.  See Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection:  An Overview, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1341,
1386 (1987); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 265-66 (1987); Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and
the Public Interest:  An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1335, 1349-52 & n.73 (1986).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 76  3-DEC-03 16:30
2082 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2007
dize the growth of that network by having the government supply a
key element—spectrum—free of charge.  But this is true of most net-
works.  Each additional fax machine, or e-mail user, or Web page adds
value for everyone else who is on that network, and thereby creates
positive externalities.  In order to distinguish abundant networks from
other networks, one would need to explain why their positive exter-
nalities are particularly valuable—why ensuring free access to abun-
dant networks is particularly valuable.  So these answers do not
advance the argument, and instead simply beg the question:  What is
so special about abundant networks that the government should
choose to subsidize them?  Why do they merit this special treatment?
The only way to answer this question is to point to something
special about abundant networks.  Every new network differs from
the other networks, so merely identifying a distinction is not sufficient.
The question is whether there is some difference between abundant
networks and other networks—in particular the cellular networks that
most resemble them—great enough to justify a special subsidy for
abundant networks.
2. Is Government Control More Likely to Produce Neutral
Networks?
This brings us to the other claimed advantages of abundant net-
works that I laid out at the beginning—namely that they will serve our
interests as citizens and will not impose any filters on us.  Benkler in
particular emphasizes these potential advantages.  He contends that
autonomy is a central value for the First Amendment and for a demo-
cratic society.  He further argues that regimes relying on private own-
ership will undermine autonomy because those owners will act in their
commercial interests, rather than in the public interest.238  Private
ownership will, Benkler fears, produce networks aimed at consumers,
not users.  According to Benkler, “As the digitally networked envi-
ronment matures, regulatory choices abound that implicate whether
the network will be one of peer users or one of active producers who
serve a menu of prepackaged information goods to consumers whose
role is limited to selecting from this menu.”239  He thus argues not
only that government-created abundant networks are more efficient
(the central assertion to which I respond), but also that they will pro-
duce different, and better, kinds of networks and communications.
The motivating idea is that we can have the networks that we as
citizens want and need, rather than networks that are aimed at us as
238 See Benkler, supra note 33, at 57-72. R
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consumers.  Government control, on this theory, will produce net-
works that are not focused on advertising, or on revenue more gener-
ally.  More fundamentally, government control will let citizens
communicate with each other more freely than private control will.
The commons advocates’ point is that the profit motive has a down-
side—the distortions created by the need to gain revenue.  There is
little reason to believe, however, that privately controlled networks
will be less responsive to users’ autonomously chosen interests than
government-controlled networks would be.
A key point from Part I is worth reiterating:  The choice is not
between a controlled network and an uncontrolled one.  Truly open
access—in which people can transmit according to whatever methods
they choose—would not produce the desired networks.  Some entity
must determine how the abundant networks will be structured.  The
real question, then, is how control will be divided between the govern-
ment and private parties.
To put the point differently, abundant networks will not be truly
open platforms, in the sense of allowing individuals to design their
own protocols and transmit using whatever methods they see fit.  The
most they will be is what I will call neutral platforms, meaning that
they allow people to communicate as freely as possible consistent with
the limits inherent in abundant networks.  People will not be able to
create their own communications systems, but they can communicate
without filters, advertising, or other limitations above and beyond the
algorithms and power limitations entailed by abundant networks.
This comparative point leaves open the possibility that the gov-
ernment will better respond to users’ preferences (and, therefore, pre-
sumably impose fewer limits)240 than a private party will.  Maybe
government control will in fact be more responsive to users’ desires
than private control will be.  This position, though, understates both
the government’s incentives and the possibility that the market will
provide citizens with the networks that they want.
There is a debate among theorists about how much of public
actors’ motivations are guided by their private interests.  Public choice
theorists argue that everyone tries to maximize her own interests, and
that the question regarding public actors is what exactly they want to
maximize (e.g., power, money, limousines, etc.).241  Critics of public
240 This presumption will be accurate only if it turns out that users are, in fact, interested
in having truly neutral platforms.  See infra text accompanying notes 250-51. R
241 See, e.g., Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2
Handbook of Industrial Organization 1253, 1262-63 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989); Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in Perspec-
tives on Public Choice:  A Handbook 455, 456-58 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 78  3-DEC-03 16:30
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choice theory argue that these theories are too sweeping.  By
excluding the possibility of ideology, or the public interest more gen-
erally, as motivating factors for government actors, public choice
theory (according to its critics) misdescribes the actions of govern-
ment officials.  In the view of the critics, unselfish interests also moti-
vate government actors.242  But no one argues that private interests
play no role in the decisions of government officials.  All agree that
government actors are motivated, at least in part, by their own goals
and desires.243  It thus seems fanciful to suggest that private owners
will want to manipulate their networks for their own benefit, but gov-
ernment officials will be free of such motivation.  The goals, and thus
the manipulations, will likely be different:  Private companies will
tend to promote purchases of their goods, and government officials
are more likely to promote their own re-election (or retention in
office).  But the manipulations are likely to be present in either event.
Moreover, even if this were incorrect, it should not necessarily
make us more comfortable with government control.  The main alter-
native to private interests that public choice theory’s critics have iden-
tified is ideology; some elected officials seem to act on behalf of
sincere convictions about the value of advancing a particular political
agenda.244  The problem is that the desire to advance an ideology
might lead to the creation of networks that advance that ideology.  So,
rather than having a network that subtly endorses the private interests
of a government actor, it would instead subtly endorse the substantive
vision of that actor.  Either way, the manipulation is present.245
This is not purely a matter of theory.  Regulatory decisions about
technology platforms often reflect the substantive preferences of gov-
ernment officials.  For instance, the government has pursued a policy
of “localism” in broadcasting that initially thwarted the expansion of
242 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Foreword:  Post-Public Choice?,
87 Cornell L. Rev. 267, 268-70 (2002) (noting that behavior research portrays people as less
self-centered than public choice suggests).
243 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2388, 2415
(2003) (noting that “recent criticisms of public choice theory merely question its utility as a
comprehensive explanation of legislative behavior.  It may be simplistic to assume that
legislators routinely ‘sell’ their votes to interest groups, but few would deny that the goals
of competing interest groups play a role, and often an important one, in shaping legisla-
tion.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law,
65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 123, 146 (1989) (noting that critics of public choice have shown only
that ideology plays some role in legislative behavior; critics “merely limit[ ] the appropriate
claims that can be made for an economic theory of politics”).
244 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 29-33 (1991)
(noting that ideology is strong predictor of legislators’ votes).
245 If the answer is that it would be difficult for the government to engage in such
manipulations, then the question is why it wouldn’t be just as difficult for a private actor to
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cable television and has required the carriage of local broadcasters, in
significant part because of the desires of members of Congress to
ensure that their constituents would have access to local news cov-
erage—including, of course, coverage of the local member of
Congress.246  The government also prohibited broadcasters from using
the radio waves to send point-to-point communications or to offer
subscription services.247  There was no technological limit on such ser-
vices.  The FCC decided that they were inconsistent with its goals for
radio communications, and so it prohibited them.248
246 See Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1981, at 81-91 (1981) (noting FCC actions that limited
growth of cable, in attempt to protect local broadcast stations); see also Amendment of
Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations
in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Com-
munity Antenna Sys., Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 774-78, ¶¶ 123-30 (1966)
(placing limits on growth of cable, in light of concerns about local UHF broadcasters);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for
Converging Communications Media, 104 Yale L.J. 1719, 1736 (1995) (noting that FCC’s
allocation plan “gave great weight to factors such as placing at least one transmitter in as
many communities (and, therefore, congressional districts) as possible. . . . The allocation
plan sacrificed viewer interests in access and diversity to narrow political concerns and
entrenched industry goals.”).  The Court in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994), split over the question whether the protections for local television should
be understood as reflecting a congressional preference for local television’s content or a
conclusion that local broadcasting “ha[s] some intrinsic value,” id. at 648; see also id. at
675-80 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  It seems clear, though, that the preference for localism
in broadcasting encompasses, whether directly or indirectly, a recognition of the kinds of
communication local broadcasters offer.  See Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(8)(A), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461
(presenting as finding in support of requiring cable operators to carry local stations that
“[b]roadcast television stations continue to be an important source of local news and public
affairs programming and other local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate”);
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media:  The First Amendment, the New Mass Media,
and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 141, 186 (1995) (stating that “the
view that ‘localism’ is advanced more by broadcasters than cable programmers, clearly
motivated Congress when it passed the must-carry rules.  Otherwise, Congress’ statements
about the value of diversity [in its findings] would be nonsensical.”); Clay Calvert, Free
Speech and Content-Neutrality:  Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable
Doctrine, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 69, 85-86 (1997) (quoting Edwin Baker as stating that “[i]t
is difficult to imagine that Congress would justify the must-carry rules except in part on
grounds that the content is expected characteristically to differ from that on cable and that
this different content has value,” and adding that “[f]or Kennedy, however, the fact that
the justification ‘in part’ was content based was not determinative.  Instead, he focused on
what he considered to be the ‘overriding objective’ and ‘overriding congressional purpose’
of preserving free access to messages” (citations omitted; emphasis added by Calvert)).
247 See Shelanski, supra note 11, at 1054-57.  There was one exception to the prohibition R
on subscription services:  The FCC allowed the Muzak Corporation to conduct a limited
and temporary trial of a subscription radio service in 1941.  See id. at 1057.
248 Government decisions regarding broadcasting licenses are another example:
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration sought to give broadcasting licenses (mainly in
radio) to Democrats who supported the New Deal, and it supported the build-out of radio
networks; licenses distributed in the Eisenhower administration (mainly in television)\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 80  3-DEC-03 16:30
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Just as the commons advocates understate the government’s
incentives, they overstate the likelihood of private actors advertising
in abundant networks or restricting users’ freedom.  Economic theory
tells us that if individuals want a neutral platform and/or a commer-
cial-free environment in which they can communicate as they please,
profit-maximizing companies will provide it to them.  One potential
response to this argument is that this theory does not play out in real
life—look, for example, at the advertisements on many websites.  But
this evidence is too narrow.  There are lots of situations in which com-
panies have foregone advertising and received revenue from other
sources.  Pay-per-view and pay-per-channel cable television fall into
this category.  Better examples, though, are networks that do not sup-
port advertising or alter users’ messages in any way.  Obvious exam-
ples include cellular networks and instant messaging systems.  Private
companies created both.  Both provide real-time communications
through which people say whatever they like, without any filtering.
Both, indeed, seem to provide exactly the sort of neutral platform for
communications that commons advocates hail as the networks that cit-
izens want and need.  They may not be as capacious as commons
advocates hope the abundant networks will be, but they allow people
to communicate messages as they see fit.249
tended to go to Republican supporters of the administration, and that administration
strongly supported the build-out of television networks.  See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., American
Broadcasting and the First Amendment 74-77 (1987) (describing favors granted by partisan
Republicans on FCC); William B. Ray, FCC:  The Ups and Downs of Radio-TV Regula-
tion 45 (1990) (stating that Republican newspapers received TV licenses while Democratic
newspapers did not); Bernard Schwartz, The Professor and the Commissions 162-64 (1959)
(noting that Eisenhower-appointed FCC was influenced by political affiliations of appli-
cants); Bernard Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor’s Foot, 47 Geo. L.J.
655, 690-94 (1959) (same).
Meanwhile, government decisions about where and how to locate radio stations
reflected substantive policy goals of overserving (relative to their populations), and
thereby benefiting, small and rural communities.  See Act of Mar. 28, 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-
195, § 5, 45 Stat. 373, 373-74 (1928) (establishing equal allocation of broadcasting licenses
to all zones); Benjamin et al., supra note 4, at 19. R
Government websites are an example of a more direct kind of manipulation.  Many of
them present themselves as nonpartisan but in fact contain elements that, subtly or not,
advance the agenda of the entity sponsoring the site.  See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Critics Say
Government Deleted Sexual Material From Web Sites to Push Abstinence, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 26, 2002, at A18 (noting changes in government websites that advance administra-
tion’s agenda); Adam Clymer, U.S. Revises Sex Information, and a Fight Goes On, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 27, 2002, at A17 (same).
These are only a few examples of regulatory decisions involving telecommunications
that were influenced by considerations other than the public interest.  For other examples,
see Powe, supra, at 69-74, 83-84, 112-16, 121-29, 131-41.
249 The same points apply to another possible argument in favor of government control,
namely that it will protect consumers’ privacy.  First, there is little reason to assume that
the government will be more protective of privacy than a private company will be.  Private\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 81  3-DEC-03 16:30
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One further example is also illustrative.  Recall that in the early
1990s the main online service companies—Prodigy, CompuServe, and
America Online—offered only closed proprietary content.  Users
dialed in to the company’s computers and received only material cre-
ated by or affiliated with that company; users could not go directly
onto the World Wide Web.  As the Web developed, however, these
companies found that they could not attract customers (or keep the
ones they had) unless they provided open access to it.  The companies
provided such access, of course, thereby giving their users the oppor-
tunity to join the most participatory and open platform the world has
yet known.250
Maybe commons advocates, instead, fear that companies will not
provide truly neutral platforms because there will be insufficient
demand for them.  That is, maybe they fear that what citizens want is
not what citizens need; they will happily use networks that push them
toward commerce and will not demand neutral platforms, because
they will not sufficiently prefer neutral platforms to pay for them.  But
if that is the case, then commons advocates are making the paternal-
istic argument that they know what is good for citizens, and the citi-
companies have an incentive to discover users’ buying habits, but government officials
have their own incentives, and one of them is monitoring antigovernment behavior.
Second, there is every reason to believe that, if people want their privacy to be protected,
private companies will create networks that protect their privacy.
Again, these are not matters of pure theory.  Government officials have, in fact,
attempted to require that networks be configured to allow them access to individuals’ com-
munications (e.g., the Clipper Chip and, more recently, Carnivore as well as post-9/11 regu-
lations), and private companies have often resisted these attempts.  See, e.g., Frank J.
Eichenlaub, Carnivore:  Taking a Bite Out of the Fourth Amendment?, 80 N.C. L. Rev.
315, 317 (2001) (noting that Carnivore allows FBI to monitor suspect’s e-mail); Daniel J.
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1083, 1089-1101 (2002) (describing increasing flow of personal information gathered
by private sector to government).  If the government controlled the various networks, this
source of opposition would be eliminated.  More generally, private companies have created
networks that specifically protect individuals’ privacy, because they have found that it is a
good (i.e., more profitable) business practice to do so.  Internet service providers, for
example, have set up privacy controls, and indeed often resisted—to the point of litiga-
tion—attempts to gain access to users’ communications.  See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Pro-
tecting Privacy and Free Speech in Cyberspace, 89 Geo. L.J. 2103, 2105-09 (2001)
(discussing recent government attempts to obtain information about users, and ACLU’s
support for individuals and Internet service providers that have resisted such attempts); see
also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C.
2003) (rejecting Verizon’s arguments that it was not obliged to reveal identity of anony-
mous user who was alleged to have infringed copyrights).
One final point bears emphasis:  Insofar as we are afraid that companies will ignore
our preferences and trample upon our privacy, Congress obviously can legislate to prevent
such intrusions—whether the networks are controlled by the government or by private
entities.
250 See Speta, supra note 181, at 86 (recounting this history); Benjamin, supra note 214, R
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zens themselves do not—or in any event do not want what is
“actually” good for them.  This is not the place to recite the well-
known arguments for and against such paternalism, but it bears noting
that this argument is particularly weak in the context of abundant
networks.
It may be that few people desire neutral platforms, so that the
vast majority will not flock to them even if such platforms are offered.
If so, these neutral platforms will not be created by private firms and
will never be a highly valued use of spectrum (other than for the elite
few who, unlike the vast majority of users, do value neutrality).251  If
the great bulk of people will never prefer neutral platforms, creating
one seems a poor use of government largesse, not to mention its cre-
ators’ time and energy.  It would constitute a very large governmental
subsidy for relatively few users.  I might like the government to subsi-
dize such a network (because I would prefer the neutrality), just as I
might like the government to subsidize all sorts of unpopular prefer-
ences that I have.  But it would be quite arrogant for me to claim that
the government should devote its resources to satisfying my prefer-
ences rather than those of the masses, because I would be saying that
my definition of value should prevail—forever—over that of the vast
majority.
For the reasons highlighted in the previous paragraph, paternal-
istic arguments usually do not assume that the masses will never want
what is being offered.  Instead, paternalistic arguments are at their
strongest (or perhaps their least weak) in situations in which people
have never been exposed to the proffered alternative that is suppos-
edly best for them.  The idea is that people have become so condi-
tioned by society/corporations/their parents/etc. that they simply do
not realize that other options are available, and (in part as a result of
this conditioning) such other options are not in fact on the market; but
if such other options were made available, then people would realize
their value.  On this reasoning, once people see the value of these net-
works, they will flock to them (and thank the farsighted creators for
developing them).  The problem here is that, as I noted above, people
251 Note that it would need to be the vast majority.  If, say, twenty-five percent of users
would prefer a neutral platform (i.e., were willing to contribute as much for a neutral plat-
form as they would contribute to a nonneutral one, including in-kind contributions to the
latter), and enough spectrum rights were auctioned as private property to support four
abundant networks, then we would expect that one of the successful bidders would create a
network with a neutral platform.  Note that this assumes that abundant networks are as
superior to all other uses of spectrum as their supporters promise, so that all auctioned
spectrum would be used for that purpose.  If that is not the case, then perhaps no neutral
platform will be created.  But this raises a far more serious—indeed fundamental—
problem for the argument for such networks in the first place.  See supra p. 2042.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 83  3-DEC-03 16:30
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have been exposed to all sorts of platforms, some of which allow
people to transmit as they see fit.  Cellular networks have no adver-
tising or filters, and they have added capabilities (e.g., text messaging,
video, e-mail, web surfing, even digital photography) that allow
people to structure their communications quite freely.  There is no
reason to believe that people need additional exposure to neutral net-
works in order to understand their benefits.  To put the point more
sharply, there is no basis for concluding that any lack of desire among
citizens for neutral abundant networks would flow from unfamiliarity
with the benefits of such neutrality.  If they do not want such a neutral
platform, we would need to be prepared to impose one upon con-
sumers indefinitely, with no realistic hope of some future point of
enlightenment at which most citizens will come to thank us for forcing
them to eat their metaphorical spinach.
This does not mean that private ownership is necessarily more
likely to produce neutral platforms than government control would
be.  It is conceivable that a majority of citizens would desire neutral
platforms but not find them offered by private networks, and also con-
ceivable that we can overcome principal-agent problems between us
and our representatives such that the government will create the neu-
tral platforms that we want and otherwise will not get.  The point of
this discussion is that the benefits of government control are uncertain
at best.
That brings us back to considerations about which we can have
more confidence:  Competition among private firms has distinct
advantages in terms of innovation and flexibility in creating and modi-
fying abundant networks.  Government control, meanwhile, has the
advantage of avoiding the creation of a private monopoly.  As to the
concentration of power, though, the benefits are less clear:  A govern-
ment monopoly entails its own risks; and the risk of, and therefore
dangers posed by, a private monopoly seem fairly small.  Still, there is
some risk of private monopoly, and we are left to draw the balance.
In my view, the more certain disadvantages of government control
outweigh the more speculative disadvantages of property rights.  But
the matter does not end there.  There is one more uncertainty that
looms large:  the uncertainty over whether an abundant network will
work as planned and be embraced by users.  This uncertainty consti-
tutes a cost of imposing an abundant network.  And that cost tilts the
policy balance more strongly in favor of property rights.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 84  3-DEC-03 16:30
2090 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2007
IV
SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT ALLOT FREQUENCIES
IN LARGE BANDS?
The discussion above indicates that if abundant networks work as
promised, we should expect private ownership to yield several of them
as long as the government holds a big auction and allots spectrum in
large bands.  Furthermore, the discussion suggests that, on balance,
private control of an abundant network is probably preferable to gov-
ernment control.  But that does not necessarily mean that the govern-
ment should, in fact, create such big allotments.  Just because the
government can allot frequencies in large bands does not mean that it
should.  We still have the question whether any of these options is
preferable to a similarly big auction that adopts the current system of
small allotments.  To answer that, we have to evaluate the costs of
allotting such big bands versus the benefits of doing so.
A. Parcel Size, Transaction Costs, and Combinatorial Bidding
Insofar as the highest and best use of all the auctioned spectrum
is for abundant networks, there are significant benefits to allotting
spectrum in large parcels and no costs:  The winning bidders will be
able to put the networks to their most valued use without having to
aggregate or disaggregate frequencies.  But if abundant networks are
not the most valued use of all the auctioned spectrum (or, worse yet,
any of the spectrum), then costs become an issue.  Unless a private
owner finds that some other use of a big swath of frequencies is the
most valued use, it will be faced with the choice of either keeping its
allotment together in a suboptimal use or incurring the transaction
costs of dividing up the spectrum it has purchased.  If, for example,
the spectrum is divided into 100-megahertz allotments for auction pur-
poses, but the winning bidder in each case will find that the most prof-
itable use is to subdivide its allotment into pieces of varying smaller
sizes (e.g., one to ten megahertz), the costs of choosing the size of
each slice and auctioning them will be significant.
The transaction costs of dividing up spectrum per se are not the
problem.  Those are costs that would be borne by the government if it
allotted spectrum in smaller bands.  If the ultimate result is going to
be that spectrum will be allotted in a variety of smaller sizes,
someone—either the government or a private party—is going to bear
those costs.252
252 Consider an entity that is interested in purchasing the right to transmit over a five-
megahertz channel.  If the FCC allots spectrum in parcels of that size, the entity will take
part in an FCC auction and bid for its desired spectrum.  If the FCC instead allots spectrum\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 85  3-DEC-03 16:30
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It may then be tempting to argue that holding an auction for
bands in 100-megahertz slices imposes no costs.  The idea would be
that, if the cost of holding the auction for, say, twenty-five separate
parcels totaling 100 megahertz is X and the total value of these parcels
to the highest bidders is Y, then either the government pays X to con-
duct the auction (because it auctions the twenty-five separate parcels)
and the highest bidders offer, in total, Y, or the high bidder for the
bundle of 100 megahertz bids Y minus X and then conducts its own
auction.253  The problem with this analysis is that it ignores the fact
that we may be needlessly creating a two-stage auction process.  This
analysis merely demonstrates that a private party can hold an auction
according to the same rules (and with the same costs) as the
government.
Each auction entails costs for the auctioneer and the bidders.  So,
if the most valued use of spectrum is in small bands, having an auction
for much bigger bands creates additional costs by creating an unneces-
sary additional auction.  For the auctioneer, it has to set up the
arrangements for the auction and conduct it.  These may not be huge
costs, but they are not likely to be trivial, either; each auction entails a
fair amount of administrative time and energy.  For each bidder on a
large allotment (which I will call the “big-swath bidders”), their costs
of evaluating the spectrum and gaining financial backing for their bid
would not exist if that spectrum were directly auctioned to the ulti-
mate purchasers (“small-parcel bidders”).  Big-swath bidders may
expend significant resources determining how much spectrum is worth
to them.  And, because the prices paid for spectrum have been so
great and the costs of borrowing can be high, many bidders may con-
clude that they want to conduct negotiations before the auction with
potential buyers of parts of the allotment up for bid.  At first blush,
this might not seem to increase costs, as it just pushes up the time
when the small-parcel bidder cuts a deal with the bidder:  The small-
parcel bidder wants to buy a portion of the allotment, and it will con-
duct that negotiation either before or after the auction is completed.
in bands of, say, 100 megahertz, the entity desiring five megahertz will contact the winning
bidder in order to enter the winner’s private auction.  Indeed, the entity desiring the five
megahertz might well contact the entities bidding for the entire 100-megahertz allotment
before the auction, thereby allowing a bidder for the 100 megahertz to bundle the bids of
its buyers into the price that it can offer for the spectrum.  The private auctioneer can
choose to use the exact same bidding system and protocols as the government uses, and
thus can mimic virtually every aspect of the government auction.  If so, the costs for the
bidder wanting five megahertz will be the same whether it makes its bid to the private
auctioneer or to the government auctioneer.
253 On this reasoning, the government receives Y minus X, and the bidder pays, in total,
Y (and the people who administer the auction receive X) under both scenarios.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 86  3-DEC-03 16:30
2092 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2007
But the difference is that, for all the unsuccessful bidders for the 100-
megahertz allotment, the time spent negotiating with small-parcel bid-
ders is time wasted.  They will have nothing to sell, so the costs of
arranging their secondary auction will be a deadweight loss.
These various costs of holding an unnecessary auction may not be
massive, but in combination they could be significant.  That is why,
after all, we would expect less total money to be paid for spectrum if
the highest valued use was 1-megahertz allotments but there was first
an auction for a 400-megahertz allotment, then a second auction con-
ducted by the winner for four 100-megahertz allotments, then another
auction conducted by those winners for 25-megahertz allotments, and
so on.  Each auction might not cost a huge amount of money for the
auctioneer and the bidders, but there are real costs involved.  And if
we know that the most valued use of the frequencies is that they end
up in one-megahertz allotments, then the many different auctions that
it takes to get to one-megahertz allotments are largely a deadweight
loss.  The efficient outcome would be for the auctioneer to proceed
immediately to auctioning one-megahertz allotments.254
This discussion highlights the fact that not only are there costs of
dividing spectrum into pieces that are too small (i.e., the transaction
costs of aggregating), but also there are costs of failing to divide spec-
trum into small enough pieces (i.e., the costs of disaggregating).
There are no easy ways to minimize these costs.  The government can
attempt to gain information about the value that bidders place on
small versus large swaths per megahertz, but in so doing it faces the
problem that bidders usually guard that information jealously.  The
government can try to obtain that information by actually auctioning a
portion of spectrum in different size swaths and then auctioning the
remainder based on the results of the first auction, but this entails two
separate auctions and thus eliminates the benefits of a single auc-
tion.255  And the smaller the number of megahertz offered in the first
auction, the more likely bidders will not reveal their true preferences
or otherwise will game the system; but the bigger the number of
megahertz in the first auction, the less will be available for auction
after the government has obtained the information.
Auction theorists have considered this question, and some have
proposed combinatorial (or package) bidding as a promising option:
254 Note, though, the existence of countervailing considerations.  One advantage of
having the two-stage auction is that the big-swath bidders may do a better job of distrib-
uting spectrum to small-parcel bidders who have the highest and best use.  The profit
motive will lead them to pick the services that have the greatest interest to potential end
users.  The bigger advantage, though, is that it leaves room for abundant networks.
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The government could let entities bid on individual parcels (e.g., allot-
ments of 6 or 10 megahertz each) and on a package of parcels (e.g.,
allotments containing 10 or so of the individual parcels, for a total of
60 to 100 megahertz).256  If the total bid on the package was greater
than the total for the individual parcels, then the spectrum would be
assigned to the single winning bidder; otherwise, the parcels would be
assigned to the entities that were the highest bidder for each of the
individual parcels.257  The idea is that, when it is not clear whether a
given set of properties (here, frequencies) has more value as a single
unit or a set of separate pieces, it makes sense to leave that determina-
tion to the market by letting entities bid for either the package or for
individual parcels.  The FCC has, in fact, introduced package bidding
into some of its auctions for spectrum.258  As the FCC notes, package
bidding “would allow bidders to better express the value of any syner-
gies (benefits from combining complementary items) that may exist
among licenses, and to avoid exposure problems—the risks bidders
face in trying to acquire efficient packages of licenses.”259  Package
bidding is thus a response to uncertainty about the most valued use
that allows for aggregation of spectrum without the transaction or
holdout costs of an entity putting spectrum together on its own.260
But combinatorial bidding also creates some costs.  As the FCC
acknowledged, there is a danger that package bidding can bias the
outcome.  Most notably, a bidder for the whole package might have a
slight advantage because “bidders for parts of a larger package each
have an incentive to hold back in the hope that a bidder for another
piece of the larger package will increase its bid sufficiently for the bids
on the pieces collectively to beat the bid on the larger package.”261
256 See Procedures Implementing Package Bidding for Auction No. 31, 65 Fed. Reg.
43,361 (July 13, 2000) (describing package bidding).
257 Brian C. Fritts, Note, Private Property, Economic Efficiency, and Spectrum Policy in
the Wake of the C Block Auction, 51 Fed. Comm. L.J. 849, 881-82 (1999) (explaining that
combinatorial bidding allows entity to enter package bid for group of licenses).
258 See Auction of Licenses on the 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands Scheduled for June
19, 2002, Round Results Process and Results Replication, 17 F.C.C.R. 8128 (2002) (dis-
cussing package-bidding process); Procedures Implementing Package Bidding for Auction
No. 31, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,361 (describing procedures for package bidding); Auction of
Licenses in the 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands Scheduled for September 6, 2000, 15
F.C.C.R. 8809 (2000) (same).
259 Comment Sought on Modifying the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction Design
To Allow Combinatorial (Package) Bidding, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,636 (June 5, 2000).
260 See Kwerel & Williams, supra note 17, at 15 (“Package bidding could provide for a R
market test of mutually exclusive band plans.  Bidders could bid on two or more mutually
exclusive band plans at the same time and the auction process would determine the single
band plan that maximizes auction revenue.”).
261 Comment Sought on Modifying the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction Design
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The government can structure auctions (as the FCC has done) to over-
come biases such as these, but creating and administering such rules is
a cost of holding an auction with package bidding.  Perhaps of greater
concern, the FCC has never attempted package bidding on anything
like the scale that a big bang auction would entail, and the complica-
tions of such an auction procedure would be great.  Holding two sepa-
rate, simultaneous auctions, one of which contains many different
parcels, involves a level of sheer complexity that imposes significant
coordination and administration costs.  The additional complications
increase the amount of time and effort that the government would
need to expend in designing and running the auctions, and it is pos-
sible that the government would not be able to design a satisfactory
auction procedure.262
Failing to auction the optimal size swaths thus entails costs—in
the form of aggregation and disaggregation costs, and/or in the form
of administrative costs from creating package bidding or from trying
to obtain information about bidding from private parties.  These costs
can be significant, and the aggregation or disaggregation costs might
well forestall what would be the highest valued use of spectrum.
Much thus depends on the likelihood of abundant networks being the
highest and best use of spectrum.  The greater the likelihood, the
lower the cost of allotting frequencies in big bands (and, concomi-
tantly, the greater the cost of allotting it in small ones).
B. The Importance of Uncertainty
The problem with making this determination is that significant
uncertainty surrounds abundant networks.  First, we do not know if
they will work as planned.  Engineers will have to try to design appro-
priate protocols, which is no mean feat.  Then the networks will have
to work in the real world.  Nobody has yet implemented one and the
engineering difficulties of such implementation could be very great.
This is no small hurdle.  The challenges facing the designer of an abun-
dant network are enormous.263  Second, even if the networks operate
262 See Kwerel & Williams, supra note 17, at 16-17; see also Owen & Rosston, supra R
note 42, at 212 (suggesting that package bidding makes sense for small numbers of R
licenses).
263 See Piyush Gupta & P. R. Kumar, Towards an Information Theory of Large Net-
works:  An Achievable Rate Region (2001), available at http://decision.csl.uiuc.edu/
~prkumar/ps_files/net_info.pdf.  Gupta and Kumar use the term “ad hoc wireless net-
works” to refer to networks that communicate with each other without centralized routing,
and that cooperate in routing each other’s messages.  Id. at 2.  They state that, under cur-
rent technology,
an ad hoc wireless network furnishes an average throughput to each user for
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exactly as planned, people may not flock to them.  At the outset, note
that if there are not a fair number of users (we do not know how many
because no abundant network has yet been developed), the system
will not work.264  The network depends on the presence of repeaters,
as without them messages will not travel very far.  So user adoption is
necessary for the network to transmit messages effectively.  But
assuming that enough people buy user devices to make the network
function as planned, there is the much larger hurdle of the networks
being so wildly successful that they are better than the other possible
uses of spectrum that would involve smaller allotments of frequencies.
The question, remember, is whether the possibility of abundant net-
works should lead the government to auction spectrum in big swaths.
If it turns out that people value having any (and every) set of 100
megahertz providing a bunch of television broadcast channels more
than they value having 100 megahertz devoted to an abundant net-
work, the case for making room for abundant networks will have been
eviscerated.265
nodes increases in the network.  This suggests that only small ad hoc networks
or networks supporting mainly nearest neighbor communications are feasible
with current technology.
Id. at 3; Sanjay Shakkottai & Theodore S. Rappaport, Research Challenges in Wireless
Networks:  A Technical Overview, 2002 Proc. Int’l Symp. of Wireless Personal Multimedia
Comm. 6 (noting “many open problems in both the fundamental nature of these networks
(for example, capacity and scaling with reliability issues, time-varying channels, spatial dis-
tribution of users, etc.) as well as practical, distributed algorithms for routing, congestion
control and secure communication over such networks”), available at http://
www.wirelessvalley.com/Assets/presentations/Research_Challenges.pdf; Zaher Dawy &
Pornchai Leelapornchai, Optimal Number of Relay Nodes in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
with Non-Cooperative Accessing Schemes, 2002 Proc. Int’l Symp. on Info. Theory & Its
Applications 5 (stating that “there exists an optimal number of relay nodes to be used
between any source-destination pair that achieves the least sum transmit power.  This
optimal number of relay nodes decreases as the transmission rate increases, which interest-
ingly shows that multihop transmission might not be suitable for very high data rate net-
works.”); O. L´ evˆ eque, Upper Bounds on the Capacity of Large “Ad-Hoc” Wireless
Networks (2002), available at http://lthiwww.epfl.ch/~leveque/Publications/resday02.pdf; Li
et al., supra note 71, at 61; Gupta & Kumar, supra note 37. R
264 See supra note 75; see also Seapahn Meguerdichian et al., Coverage Problems in R
Wireless Ad-Hoc Sensor Networks (2001) (paper presented at IEEE Infocom 2001)
(noting difficulty of determining right number of nodes and hops in abundant network),
available at http://www.ieee-infocom.org/2001/paper/843.pdf.
265 Of course, if it turns out that an abundant network is not the highest and best use of
any portion of the spectrum but a similarly bandwidth-intensive use is the highest and best
use, then auctioning spectrum for that other use might result in swaths as big as those that
would be appropriate for abundant networks anyway.  Note, though, that in this situation
the government would not be making room for abundant networks, but instead for the
ones with the highest value.  It would be mere happenstance that the allotment sizes appro-
priate for abundant networks would also be appropriate for the highest and best use.  Note
also that we would not expect—or want, as an efficiency matter—to see any private entity\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 90  3-DEC-03 16:30
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This discussion raises two larger points:  First, if we ultimately
decide that the costs of allocating spectrum in a way that allows for
private abundant networks are greater than the benefits of making
room for them, then the government should not create them on its
own.  If allocation of spectrum in large bands for purposes of private
property rights (with package bidding or without it) is unattractive,
similarly large allocation for purposes of government-mandated abun-
dant networks is even worse.  If making it possible for private abun-
dant networks is a worse use of spectrum than policies that make such
networks prohibitively expensive, then there is no basis for preferring
policies that not only make possible but in fact mandate the creation
of such abundant networks.
Second, and more fundamentally, uncertainty about abundant
networks goes to the heart of the argument for private, rather than
public, control.  The distinct possibility that the network either will
not work as planned or will not be valued by many users creates a cost
of imposing it.  As with any proposition, we must discount the value of
abundant networks by the possibility that they will fail.  The discus-
sion in the previous Parts focused on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of private versus public control of abundant networks assuming
that someone could design abundant networks that would work and
would attract users.  But the possibility that these abundant networks
will not have this success adds considerably to the cost of the govern-
ment imposing one.  This is another way in which the greater flexi-
bility of private parties confers an advantage on the property rights
model.266  A government decision to create an abundant network can
be undone by a subsequent government decision, but that entails a
long and costly public process.  Deliberative processes are part and
parcel of our governmental decisionmaking, and that confers many
advantages in terms of democratic legitimacy; but it also results in a
slow-moving process.267  Benkler proposes a review of commons after
ten years, but that still leaves open the possibility of valuable spec-
trum being poorly used for that period of time.268  Private parties, on
the other hand, can freely choose not only to abandon or redesign an
abundant network once built, but also can choose not to build one in
the first place.  If, after undertaking its own review of the options, a
private entity decides to proceed with a different plan, it can do so
create an abundant network in such circumstances, because it would not be the highest and
best use.
266 See supra Part III.C.
267 See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text. R
268 See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.  As I noted in Part III.C, even then R
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immediately.  Thus a central difference between government and pri-
vate control is that private entities can more easily choose what ser-
vices to provide.
The government could reduce the uncertainty surrounding
whether an abundant network would work as planned by letting pri-
vate networks develop first.  But such private development might
increase the risk of the government network failing to be popular, as
the government’s network might not have enough perceived advan-
tages to draw a significant number of users of other abundant net-
works and/or new users who were not attracted to the private
networks.  And the benefits created by the government network
would likely be lower if it was one among many than if it was the only
one.  As I noted above, once there is a competitive market it is not
clear what a new government-controlled abundant network would
add, and it might create its own distortions.  More generally, the bene-
fits created by a new entrant (whether government or private)
entering a competitive market are uncertain at best.  The first entrant
creates the market, and the second creates competition, but the fifth
or tenth may not add anything.
Even if the points in this last paragraph are wrong, because the
uncertainties for the government are much lower once private firms
have created successful abundant networks and/or the benefits of the
nth network are as great as the benefits of the first, that merely indi-
cates that government creation of abundant networks may be efficient
once private firms have been successful.  It would still not justify the
government creating an abundant network before private ones have
been successful.  Until successful abundant networks have been cre-
ated, the costs created by uncertainty continue to exist.
It might make sense for the government to create an abundant
network even before any were successful, if there were reason to
believe that private firms would not create them.  But, as I discussed
above, private firms will have an incentive to create them if spectrum
is allocated in large swaths.  Given the alternative of private creation,
the costs created by uncertainty loom large.
V
NONEXHAUSTIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS
It is important to be clear about what the arguments in this
Article do, and do not, suggest.  One implication of my arguments is
that frequencies that are subject to significant interference are not
attractive candidates for spectrum commons.  The biggest drawback to
a spectrum commons has long been the danger of interference—and\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 92  3-DEC-03 16:30
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most proposed uses of spectrum entail a substantial risk of interfer-
ence.  Insofar as open access will lead to significant interference, the
costs of such open access are very high.269  Commons advocates do
not contend otherwise, but instead argue that they have avoided these
costs—and thereby rendered a government commons desirable—by
eliminating the risk of interference.  On this basis, they present abun-
dant networks as ideal candidates for a spectrum commons.  The unat-
tractiveness of a government commons in the setting most conducive
to such government control—where the tragedy of the commons
should be least likely to occur, because heavy utilization will not
create problems—undercuts the case for a government commons for
any service that is more susceptible to interference than an abundant
network would be.
The failure of the commons advocates’ arguments does not mean
that all usable spectrum should be subject to private control.  My view
is that government-created commons are not only efficient but also
desirable in many situations—for example, the real property context
(e.g., public parks), the intellectual property context (e.g., enlarging
the public domain by narrowing patent applicability and copyright
terms), and the spectrum context.  As to spectrum, it may be that not
all frequencies should be subject to property regimes, and that prop-
erty rights should not be construed to extend to all transmissions on a
given frequency.  On the former point, commons are appropriate for
bands in which interference would not arise and private ownership
would create high transaction costs.270  So, for example, the FCC’s
Spectrum Policy Task Force proposes a commons at very high fre-
quencies (above 50 GHz), on the theory that there is little danger of
interference, and that exclusive rights in that spectrum would create
significant transaction costs.271  Assuming the Task Force’s characteri-
zation of these factors is accurate, this seems to be a sensible proposal.
269 See supra Part I.A.
270 The FCC’s Spectrum Policy Task Force emphasizes these considerations as well.  See
Report of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, supra note 16, at 39. R
271 The Report of the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force recommends:
[The] use of the commons model in higher spectrum bands, particularly above
50 GHz, based on the physical characteristics of the spectrum itself.  In these
bands, the propagation characteristics of spectrum preclude many of the appli-
cations that are possible in lower bands (e.g., mobile service, broadcasting),
and instead favor short-distance line-of-sight operation using narrow transmis-
sion beams.  Thus, these bands are well-suited to accommodate multiple
devices operating within a small area without interference.  Moreover,
administering these uses on an individualized licensed basis would involve very
high transaction costs.
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We also may want to construe property rights not to cover all
transmissions on a given range of frequencies.272  Recall that the com-
mons advocates’ main argument for the efficiency of abundant net-
works is that the transaction costs of spectrum aggregation make
private ownership unattractive.  That argument is not persuasive as to
abundant networks, but it is persuasive in other situations.  A recent
Chief Economist and a recent Chief Technologist at the FCC, for
example, have put forward a powerful argument in favor of treating
all property rights in spectrum as entailing an easement for anyone to
use a low-power wideband device that does not meaningfully interfere
with the property owner’s use of that spectrum, and the FCC’s Spec-
trum Policy Task Force has similarly recommended.273  The key char-
acteristic of such low-power transmissions is that they might have
significant value as a secondary use, but might not be sufficiently valu-
272 We might define a property right as conferring complete control over a set of fre-
quencies, or instead as providing a right to use those frequencies for the owner’s transmis-
sions.  The latter formulation would not preclude other transmissions that did not interfere
with the property owner’s transmissions.  Gerald R. Faulhaber and David Farber have con-
ceptualized this as an easement:  Users would have the right to use others’ spectrum as
long as they did not interfere.  See Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 18, at 14.  One can R
reach the same result by conceptualizing the property right as not extending to
noninterfering transmissions.  As I have noted previously:
This is purely a question of how the rights in the license are constructed and
construed.  If a license to broadcast television were construed as giving the
licensee complete control over a given range of frequencies, then any potential
user would have to obtain the existing licensee’s agreement before it could
offer a new service—just as someone who wanted to offer a new service on a
portion of a parcel of land would have to gain the approval of the parcel’s
owner.  If, on the other hand, a license to broadcast were construed as confer-
ring only the right to broadcast on that range of frequencies without interfer-
ence, and as not including a broader property right in that range of
frequencies, then a potential new user would not have to gain the agreement of
the licensee.  Just as someone who held only the mining rights to land would
have no claim if the owner of the surface allowed a new use that did not inter-
fere with the mining, the holder of the broadcasting rights would have no claim
against a new user; the licensee could not claim interference with her rights to
that range of frequencies, because she would have no rights other than the
right to broadcast.
Benjamin, supra note 6, at 85 n.259. R
273 See Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 18 (discussing their proposal); Report of the R
FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, supra note 16, at 27-30.  The Task Force proposed that R
the government set an “interference temperature” limit that would protect devices from
harmful interference, and then allow other users to operate in that band, “with the interfer-
ence temperature serving as the maximum cap on the potential RF energy they could
introduce in the band.”  Id. at 30.  Indeed, the Task Force recommended the creation of
underlay rights for devices that operate below the interference limits.  Id. at 40.  Further-
more, according to the Report, in light of the transaction costs of negotiating access and
the fact that these devices will not cause interference, such underlay rights should be avail-
able to anyone—i.e., should be a commons.  Id.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 94  3-DEC-03 16:30
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able either to justify allotting spectrum in large swaths or to overcome
the transaction costs of aggregating small allotments of spectrum.274
This proposal differs from that of the commons advocates.
Instead of having spectrum set aside for unlicensed usage, it would be
devoted primarily to conventional uses, with wideband services as an
add-on that would be an underlay to the existing uses.  The result
would likely be that the abundance envisioned by the commons advo-
cates would not materialize:  The necessity of avoiding interference
with an existing use on those same frequencies would limit the ability
of the wideband service to operate freely.  On this basis, Benkler
opposes simply relying on easements, and pushes instead for spectrum
devoted entirely to his envisioned networks.275  But the advantage of
these easements is that these underlay uses would not displace any
existing uses of spectrum, and instead would be consistent with them.
The difficulty for these underlay wideband services is the same as
that for abundant networks:  The transaction and holdout costs of
aggregating spectrum are high, and without a big swath of spectrum
these wideband services will not work as planned.  The solution sug-
gested in Part II.A—that the government can simply auction spectrum
in wide bands—will not work for these underlay services, because
they are not envisioned to be the main use of the auctioned spectrum
and they might not support a bid for the entire band.  That is, the
underlay services may not be sufficiently valuable to entice a bidder to
bid for the whole band, set up the underlay services, and then auction
off spectrum in pieces for a primary use.276
274 There are a number of services that could operate at very low power over a broad
range of frequencies without interfering with simultaneous high-power transmissions.
These services would underlay the existing ones, operating at such a low power level that
they would create only trivial interference (below the level of background noise) for the
existing services operating on the same frequencies.  See Benjamin, supra note 6, at 23-24 R
(“UWB [ultra-wideband transmission] operates at such low power, and over such a wide
swath of spectrum, that ‘to traditional receivers their signals are indistinguishable from
background noise.’” (citation omitted)).
275 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 32, 62-65. R
276 If the most valuable primary service would occupy small swaths of spectrum, and the
transaction costs of parceling spectrum into small swaths and selling them to individual
bidders were greater than the value of the underlay service, then we would expect bidders
to seek small swaths.  We would expect that bidders who could choose what band size to
bid on would prefer to bid on smaller bands that they would use for themselves (thus
making the creation of an underlay service difficult, given the transaction costs of aggre-
gating spectrum), rather than bidding on larger swaths that would be suitable for wideband
services and which they would then auction privately to other users for their primary use.
Accordingly, for spread spectrum as a secondary use, there is a plausible argument that
simply allocating the spectrum in large bands will not result in wideband secondary ser-
vices, even if wideband service would be valuable.  It might be less valuable than the trans-
action costs of disaggregating the spectrum, and if so we would not expect them to be
created.  Insofar, therefore, as we are confident that these services would be of value, but\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 95  3-DEC-03 16:30
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It thus might be that the best (and only) way to allow for such
valuable, noninterfering transmissions is to limit the property rights of
spectrum owners and leave room for unlicensed usage.  But abundant
networks are intended as the primary—indeed the only—use of the
frequencies on which they would operate.  If they are not sufficiently
valuable to entice a private owner of a wide swath of spectrum to
create such a network, that should be telling us something—and
should dissuade the government from creating an abundant network
on its own.  The commons advocates argue that a government-created
abundant network is the more efficient path, but they have not made
their case.  In this instance efficiency lies with private, not govern-
ment, control.
CONCLUSION
The commons advocates put forward a straightforward narrative:
Devices that repeat others’ messages and utilize low-power wideband
communications can provide effectively infinite network capacity.
Creating these networks is the most efficient use of spectrum and will
be valuable to users, but private owners will not create them.  So the
government should create these networks.
I take these arguments seriously, and in this Article I have sought
both to respond to and build on them.  In my view, there is a role for
unlicensed spectrum, and the commons advocates’ arguments help to
make that case.  It is not as large a role as they would like, but it is one
that is informed by the insights that they have brought to the fore.
The commons advocates’ main argument against private owner-
ship is that allotment of spectrum into small parcels makes creation of
a wideband network unlikely because abundant networks work best
with a broad swath of spectrum and the costs of aggregating spectrum
are significant.  The goal of creating abundant networks is thus in ten-
sion with policies that keep the spectrum divided into small chunks of
frequencies.  This is not an argument against private ownership, how-
ever, but instead an argument against allotment in small bands.  If
spectrum is auctioned in large enough swaths, there is no impediment
to creating abundant networks, and the more efficient solution should
not enough to overcome the transaction costs of disaggregation (or the costs of aggrega-
tion, which might be higher, see supra Part II.A), the best response is for the government
to avoid the transaction costs of either aggregating or disaggregating by simply providing
that existing licenses do not prevent noninterfering underlay uses.  This reasoning would
not apply, however, to abundant networks, as they are the only planned use for a given set
of frequencies and thus there should be no need for disaggregation (and accordingly no
fear of the costs of disaggregation).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\78-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 96  3-DEC-03 16:30
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win out.  Insofar as abundant networks really are more efficient, auc-
tions of bigger slices should produce them.
The choice between privately and publicly created abundant net-
works entails some tradeoffs:  Notably, concerns about the concentra-
tion of private power are matched against the likelihood that private
firms will have a greater incentive and ability to implement and
update successful protocols, to conserve spectrum, and to design desir-
able pricing schemes.  The government’s disadvantages—such as its
susceptibility to rent-seeking behavior—might not outweigh those of
private entities if the choice were between a truly unregulated com-
mons and a regulated private network.  But abundant networks
require a significant amount of regulation in order to work as planned.
Some entity is going to be in control, and a private entity probably is
preferable to the government.
The advantages of private control are even more clear when we
consider the possibility that these abundant networks will not work as
planned or will not be as popular as hoped.  The government could
ensure the creation of abundant networks by setting aside spectrum
for that purpose, but providing that certainty may be a bad idea.  We
should prefer a government-created abundant network only if we are
confident that a particular set of protocols will work as planned, that
the government will choose that design, and that users will flock to the
abundant network that is created.  The problem is that there is uncer-
tainty on all three counts (and private parties are likely to have better
information).  It makes more sense to allow for experimentation; that
consideration favors private entities, who can create new services,
modify them, and/or abandon them very quickly.  And, of course, the
risk of failure would then fall on the private entities’ owners, rather
than on taxpayers.  Thus the better course is to let engineers persuade
those with an economic stake to create abundant networks.